AN

ABRIDGMENT

OF

Mr. *LOCKE*'s

ESSAY

CONCERNING

HUMAN UNDERSTANDING.

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To the much Eſteemed

Mr. JOHN LOCKE.

Honoured Sir,

I SEND you this imperfect Draught of your excellent *Eſſay* concerning *Human Underſtanding*; which, I muſt confeſs, falls as much ſhort of the Perfection, as it does of the Length of the Original. Nevertheleſs, as I lately intimated to you (and you were pleaſed to think, that what I propoſed in Reference to this Deſign, would not be wholly loſt Labour) I am not without Hopes that it may, in this contracted *Form*, prove in ſome Meaſure ſerviceable to that noble End, which you have ſo ſucceſsfully aimed at in it, viz. *The Advancement of real and uſeful Knowledge*. The Inducement which moved me to think of abridging it, was a

Conſideration purely extrinſical to the Work itſelf, and in Effect no other than this; that it would be better ſuited to the Eaſe and Convenience of ſome Sort of Readers, when reduced into this narrow Compaſs. In Order to this, I thought the *Firſt Book*, which is employed in refuting the common Opinion of *innate Notions* and *Ideas*, might be beſt ſpared in this Abridgment; eſpecially ſince the Reader may be convinced by what he ſhall find here, that ſuch a Suppoſition is at leaſt needleſs, in Regard he may attain to all the Knowledge he has, or finds himſelf capable of, without the Help of any ſuch *innate Ideas*. Beſides this, I have retrenched moſt of the larger Explications; and ſome uſeful Hints, and inſtructive Theories, I have wholly omitted; not becauſe they are leſs conſiderable in themſelves, but becauſe they ſeemed not ſo neceſſary to be inſiſted on in an *Abridgement*, it being conſidered as a previous Inſtrument, and preparatory Help to guide and conduct the Mind in its *Search after Truth and Knowledge*, which is ſo effectually accompliſhed in the Original, that it muſt be conſidered as the higheſt of Neglects, in thoſe who omit the fair Opportunity you have given them. The Importance of ſome Chapters has laid me under the Neceſſity

Neceſſity of giving them entire, while in others not more is omitted, than the Recapitulation of their Subjects, which from the Influence you had over it, they have apprehended in different Lights. This I hope will prove no Prejudice to the *Eſſay* itſelf, ſince none, I preſume, will think it reaſonable to form a Judgment of the whole Work from an Abridgment of it; for as far as a Copy is removed from its Original, ſo far it is diſtant from Authenticity, ſince this univerſally holds good, in what other Light can an Abridgment be eſteemed but in that which has been already mentioned, that of preparing the Mind for a Free Conception of the Original. And I perſuade myſelf, that few *Readers* will be content with this *Epitome*, who can conveniently furniſh themſelves with the *Eſſay* at large. However, I am to think, that this alone will ſerve to make the Way to Knowledge ſomewhat more plain and eaſy; and afford ſuch Helps for the Improvement of Reaſon, as are perhaps in vain ſought after in thoſe Books, which profeſs to teach the *Art of Reaſoning*: But nevertheleſs, whether you ſhall think fit to let it come abroad under the Diſadvantages that attend it in this *Form*, I muſt leave you to judge. I ſhall only add, that I think my own Pains abundantly

ly recompenſed by the agreeable as well as inſtructive Entertainment, which this nearer View and cloſer Inſpection into your *Eſſay* afforded me: And I am not a little pleaſed, that it has given me this Opportunity of expreſſing the juſt Value and Eſteem I have for it, as well as the Honour and Reſpect I have for its Author.

I am,

Oxon, Ap. 17, 1695.

Honoured SIR,

Your very Humble

And Obliged Servant,

JOHN WYNNE.

THE

THE INTRODUCTION.

I. SINCE it is the *Underſtanding* that ſets Man above the Reſt of ſenſible Beings, and gives him all the Advantage and Dominion which he has over them; it is certainly a Subject, even for its Nobleneſs, worth the inquiring into.

II. My Purpoſe therefore is to inquire into the *Original*, *Certainty*, and *Extent* of Human Knowledge; together with the Grounds and Degrees of *Belief*, *Opinion*, and *Aſſent*, which I ſhall do in the following Method.

III. *Firſt*, I ſhall inquire into the *Original* of thoſe *Ideas* or Notions, which a Man obſerves, and is conſcious to himſelf he has in his Mind, and the *Ways* whereby the Underſtanding comes to be furniſhed with them.

Secondly, What *Knowledge* the Underſtanding hath by thoſe Ideas; and the Certainty, Evidence, and Extent of it.

Thirdly, I ſhall make ſome Inquiry into the Nature and Grounds of *Faith* and *Opinion*.

IV. If by this Inquiry into the Nature of the Underſtanding, I can diſcover the Powers thereof, *how far* they reach, and where they fail us, it may be of Uſe to prevail with the buſy Mind of Man to be more cautious in meddling with Things exceeding its Comprehenſion, to ſtop when it is at the utmoſt Extent of its Ability, and to ſit down in a quiet Ignorance of thoſe Things, which upon Examination are found to be beyond the Reach of our Capacities.

We

We ſhould not then perhaps be ſo forward, out of an Affectation of *Univerſal Knowledge*, to perplex ourſelves with Diſputes about Things to which our Underſtandings are not ſuited; and of which we cannot frame in our Minds any clear or diſtinct Perceptions, or whereof (as it has perhaps too often happened) we have not any Notions at all: But ſhould learn to content ourſelves with what is attainable by us in this State.

V. For though the *Comprehenſion* of our Underſtanding comes exceeding ſhort of the vaſt Extent of Things; yet we ſhall have Cauſe enough to magnify the bountiful *Author* of our Being, for that Portion and Degree of Knowledge he has beſtowed on us ſo far above all the reſt of the Inhabitants of this our Manſion. Men have Reaſon to be well ſatisfied with what God hath thought fit for them, ſince he has given them (as St. *Peter* ſays, Πάντα πρὸς ζωὴν καὶ εὐσέβειαν) whatſoever is neceſſary for the Conveniencies of *Life*, and Information of *Virtue*; and has put within the Reach of their Diſcovery, the comfortable Proviſion for this Life, and the Way that leads to a better. How ſhort ſoever their Knowledge may come of an univerſal, or perfect Comprehenſion of whatever is, it yet ſecures their great Concernments, that they have Light enough to lead them to the Knowledge of their *Maker*, and the Sight of their own *Duties*. Men may find Matter ſufficient to buſy their Heads, and employ their Hands with Variety, Delight and Satisfaction; if they will not boldly quarrel with their own Conſtitution, and throw away the Bleſſings their Hands are filled with, becauſe they are not big enough to graſp every Thing. We ſhall not have much Reaſon to complain of the Narrowneſs of our Minds, if we will but employ them about what may be of Uſe to us; for of that they are very capable: And it will be an unpardonable, as well as childiſh Peeviſhneſs, if we undervalue the Advantages of our

our Knowledge, and neglect to improve it to the Ends for which it was given us, because there are some Things that are set out of the Reach of it. It will be no Excuse to an idle and untoward Servant, who would not attend his Business by Candle-light, to plead that he had not broad Sunshine. The Candle that is set up in us, shines bright enough for all our Purposes. The Discoveries we can make with this, ought to satisfy us. And we shall then use our Understandings right, when we entertain all Objects in the Way and Proportion, that they are suited to our Faculties; and upon those Grounds they are capable of being proposed to us; and not peremptorily or intemperately require *Demonstration*, and demand *Certainty*, where *Probability* only is to be had, and which is sufficient to govern all our Concernments. If we will disbelieve every Thing, because we cannot certainly know all Things; we shall do as wisely as he did who would not use his Legs, but sat still and perished because he had not Wings to fly.

VI. When we know our own *Strength*, we shall the better know what to undertake with Hopes of Success. And when we have well surveyed the *Powers* of our own Minds, we shall not be inclined either to sit still, and not set our Thoughts on Work, in despair of knowing any Thing; nor on the other Side, question every Thing, and disclaim all Knowledge, because some Things are not to be understood. Our *Business* here, is not to know all Things, but those Things which concern our Conduct. If we can find out those Measures whereby a *rational Creature*, put into that State which Man is in, in this World, may and ought to govern his Opinions and Actions depending thereon, we need not be troubled that some other Things escape our Knowledge.

VII. This was that which gave the first *Rise* to this *Essay* concerning the Understanding. For I thought that the first Step towards satisfying several Inquiries

ries the Mind of Man was very apt to run into, was to take a Survey of *our Underſtandings*, examine our own *Powers*, and ſee to what Things they were adapted. Till that was done, I ſuſpected we began at the wrong End, and in vain ſought for Satisfaction in a quiet and ſecure Poſſeſſion of Truths that moſt concerned us, whilſt we let looſe our Thoughts in the vaſt *Ocean* of Being, as if all that boundleſs Extent were the natural and undoubted Poſſeſſion of our Underſtandings; wherein there was nothing exempt from its Deciſions, or that eſcaped its Comprehenſion. Thus Men extending their Inquiries beyond their Capacities, and letting their Thoughts wander into thoſe Depths where they can find no ſure Footing, it is no wonder that they raiſe *Queſtions*, and multiply *Diſputes*, which never coming to any clear Reſolution, are proper only to continue and increaſe their Doubts, and to confirm them, at laſt, in perfect *Scepticiſm*. Whereas were the Capacities of our Underſtandings well conſidered, the Extent of our Knowledge once diſcovered, and the *Horizon* found, which ſets Bounds betwen the enlightened and dark Parts of Things, between what is, and what is not comprehenſible by us, Men would perhaps with leſs Scruple acquieſce in the avowed Ignorance of the *One*, and employ their Thoughts and Diſcourſe, with more Advantage and Satisfaction in the *Other*.

BOOK

BOOK II.

CHAP. I.

Of Ideas in general, and their Original.

BY the Term *Idea*, I mean whatever is the Object of the Underſtanding, when a Man *Thinks*; or whatever it is which the Mind can be employed about when Thinking.

I preſume it will be eaſily granted me, that there are ſuch *Ideas* in Mens Minds: Every one is conſcious of them in himſelf; and Mens Words and Actions will ſatisfy him that they are in others. Our *firſt Inquiry* then ſhall be, how they come into the Mind.

It is an eſtabliſhed Opinion amongſt ſome Men, that there are in the Underſtanding certain *Innate Principles*, ſome primary Notions (Κοιναὶ ἔννοιαι) *Characters*, as it were ſtamped upon the Mind of Man, which the Soul receives in its very firſt Being, and brings into the World with it.

This Opinion is accurately diſcuſſed, and refuted in the *Firſt* Book of this *Eſſay*, to which I ſhall refer the Reader, that deſires Satisfaction in this particular.

It ſhall be ſufficient here to ſhew, how Men barely by the Uſe of their *natural Faculties*, may attain to all the Knowledge they have, without the Help of

any *Innate* Impreſſions; and may arrive at Certainty without any ſuch original Notions or Principles. For I imagine, any one will eaſily grant, That it would be impertinent to ſuppoſe the *Ideas* of *Colours* innate in a Creature to whom God hath given *Sight*, and a Power to receive them by the Eyes from external Objects. I ſhall ſhew by what Ways and Degrees all other *Ideas* come into the Mind; for which I ſhall appeal to every one's own Experience and Obſervation.

Let us then ſuppoſe the Mind to be, as we ſay, *white Paper*, void of all Characters, without any *Ideas*: How comes it to be furniſhed? Whence has it all the Materials of Reaſon and Knowledge? To this I anſwer, in one Word, from *Experience* and *Obſervation*. This when employed about external ſenſible Objects, we may call *Senſation*: By this we have the *Ideas* of *Bitter*, *Sweet*, *Yellow*, *Hard*, &c. which are commonly called *ſenſible Qualities*, becauſe conveyed into the Mind by the *Senſes*. The ſame *Experience*, when employed about the internal Operations of the Mind, perceived, and reflected on by us, we may call *Reflection*. Hence we have the *Ideas* of *Perception*, *Thinking*, *Doubting*, *Willing*, *Reaſoning*, &c.

Theſe two, *viz. External material Things*, as the Objects of *Senſation*; and the *Operations of our own Minds*, as the Objects of *Reflection*, appear to me the only *Originals* from whence all our *Ideas* take their Beginnings. The Underſtanding ſeems not to have the leaſt Glimmering of *Ideas*, which it doth not receive from one of theſe two *Sources*. Theſe, when we have taken a full Survey of them, and their ſeveral *Modes* and Compoſitions, we ſhall find to contain our whole Stock of *Ideas*; and that we have nothing in our Minds which did not come in one of theſe two ways.

'Tis evident that Children come by Degrees to be furniſhed with *Ideas* from the Objects they are converſant

verſant with. They are ſo ſurrounded with Bodies that perpetually and diverſly affect them, that ſome *Ideas* will (whether they will or no) be imprinted on their Minds. *Light* and *Colours*, *Sounds*, and *Tangible* Qualities, do continually ſolicit their proper *Senſes*, and force an Entrance into the Mind. It is commonly late before *Children* come to have *Ideas* of the Operations of their Minds; and ſome Men have not any very clear or perfect *Ideas* of the greateſt part of them all their Lives. Becauſe, though they paſs there continually; yet, like floating Viſions, they make not deep Impreſſions enough to leave, in the Mind, clear and laſting *Ideas*, till the Underſtanding turns inward upon its ſelf and *reflects* on its own Operations, and makes them the Objects of its own Contemplation.

When a Man *firſt perceives*, then he may be ſaid *to have Ideas*; having *Ideas*, and Perception ſignifying the ſame thing. It is an Opinion maintained by ſome, That the *Soul always thinks*, and that it always has the actual Perception of *Ideas* as long as it exiſts: And that *actual Thinking* is as inſeparable from the Soul, as *actual extenſion* is from Body. But I cannot conceive it any more neceſſary for the Soul always to *think*, than for Body always to *move*: The Perception of *Ideas* being (as I conceive) to the Soul, what Motion is to Body, not its *Eſſence*, but one of its *Operations*: And therefore, though Thinking be never ſo much the proper Action of the Soul, yet it is not neceſſary to ſuppoſe, that it ſhould always Think, always be in Action. That perhaps is the Privilege of the infinite *Author* and Preſerver of all Things, *who never ſlumbers nor ſleeps*; but is not competent to any *finite* Being. We know certainly by experience, that we ſometimes think; and thence draw this infallible Conſequence, that there is ſomething in us that has a Power to think; but whether that Subſtance perpetually thinks or no, we can be no farther aſſured than Experience informs us.

I would be glad to learn from thoſe Men, who ſo

confidently pronounce that the Human Soul always thinks, how they come to know it: Nay, how they come to know that they themſelves think, when they themſelves do not perceive it? The moſt that can be ſaid of it, is, That 'tis poſſible the Soul may always think; but not always retain it in *Memory*: And, I ſay, it is as poſſible the Soul may not always think; and much more probable that it ſhould ſometimes not think, than that it ſhould often think, and that a long while together, and not be conſcious to its ſelf the next Moment after that it had thought.

I ſee no Reaſon therefore to believe, that the Soul thinks before the Senſes have furniſhed it with *Ideas* to think on; and as thoſe are increaſed and retained, ſo it comes by Exerciſe to improve its Faculty of Thinking, in the ſeveral Parts of it: as well as afterwards by *Compounding* thoſe *Ideas*, and *reflecting* on its own Operations, it increaſes its *Stock*, as well as Facility in Remembring, Imagining, Reaſoning, and other *Modes* of Thinking.

CHAP. II.

Of Simple Ideas.

OF Ideas ſome are *Simple*, others *Complex*. A *Simple Idea* is one uniform Appearance or Conception in the Mind, which is not diſtinguiſhable into different *Ideas*. Such are the *Ideas* of *ſenſible Qualities*, which though they are in the Things themſelves ſo united and blended, that there is no Separation, no Diſtance between them; yet the *Ideas* they produce in the Mind, enter by the Senſes ſimple and unmixed. Thus tho' the Hand feels *Softneſs* and *Warmth* in the ſame piece of *Wax*; yet the *ſimple Ideas* thus united in the ſame Subject, are as perfectly *diſtinct* as thoſe that come in by different Senſes.

Theſe

Theſe *Simple Ideas* are ſuggeſted no other Way than from the two Ways abovementioned *viz. Senſation* and *Reflection*.

The Mind being once ſtored with the *ſimple Ideas*, has the Power to repeat, compare, and unite them to an infinite Variety: And ſo can make, at pleaſure, new *complex Ideas*. But the moſt enlarged Underſtanding cannot frame one new *ſimple Idea*; nor by any Force deſtroy them that are there.

CHAP. III.

Of Ideas of one Senſe.

IDEAS with Reference to different Ways wherein they approach the Mind, are of *four Sorts*.

Firſt, There are ſome which come into our Minds by *one Senſe* only.

Secondly, There are others conveyed into the Mind by *more Senſes than one*.

Thirdly, Others that are had from *Reflection* only.

Fourthly, There are ſome ſuggeſted to the Mind by all the ways of *Senſation* and *Reflection*.

Firſt, Some enter into the Mind only by one Senſe peculiarly adapted to receive them. Thus *Colours*, *Sounds*, *Smells*, &c. come in only by the *Eyes*, *Ears*, and *Noſe*. And if any of theſe Organs, are ſo diſordered as not to perform their Functions, they have no Poſtern to be admitted by; no other way to bring themſelves in view, and be perceived by the Underſtanding. It will be needleſs to enumerate all the particular *ſimple Ideas* belonging to each *Senſe*; nor indeed is it poſſible; there being a great many more than we have *Names* for.

CHAP. IV.

Of Solidity.

I SHALL here mention one which we receive by our *Touch*, becauſe it is one of the chief Ingredients in many of our *complex Ideas*, and that is, the Idea of *Solidity*; It ariſes from the Reſiſtance one Body makes to the Entrance of another Body into the Place it Poſſeſſes, till *it* has left it. There is no Idea which we more conſtantly receive from *Senſation* than this. In whatever Poſture we are, we feel ſomewhat that ſupports us, and hinders us from ſinking downwards: And the Bodies we daily handle, make us perceive, that while they remain between them, they do by an unſurmountable Force hinder the Approach of the Parts of our Hands that Preſs them. This Idea is commonly called *Impenetrability*. I conceive *Solidity* is more proper to expreſs it, becauſe this carries ſomething more of *Poſitive* in it than *Impenetrability*, which is *negative*, and is perhaps more a Conſequence of Solidity, than Solidity itſelf. This ſeems to be the moſt *eſſential* Property of Body, and that whereby we conceive it to fill Space: The Idea of which is, that where we imagine any Space taken up by a ſolid Subſtance, we conceive it ſo to poſſeſs it, that it excludes all other ſolid Subſtances. This Reſiſtance is ſo great that no Force can ſurmount it. All the Bodies in the World preſſing a *Drop of Water* on all Sides, will never be able to overcome the Reſiſtance it makes to their approaching one another, till it be removed out of their Way.

The Idea of Solidity is diſtinguiſhed from that of *pure Space*, in as much as this *latter* is neither capable of Reſiſtance, nor motion: It is diſtinguiſhed from *Hardneſs*, in as much as Hardneſs is a firm Coheſion of the ſolid Parts of Matter making up Maſſes of a ſenſible Bulk, ſo that the whole doth not eaſily change its Figure. Indeed, *Hard* and *Soft*,

Soft, as commonly apprehended by us, are but *Relative* to the Conſtitutions of our Bodies: That being called *Hard* which will put us to Pain ſooner than change its Figure, by the Preſſure of any Part of our Bodies; and that *Soft*, which changes the Situation of its Parts upon an eaſy and unpainful Touch.

This Difficulty of changing Situation among the Parts, gives no more *Solidity* to the hardeſt Body, than to the ſofteſt; nor is an *Adamant* one Jot more ſolid than *Water*: He that ſhall fill a yielding ſoft Body well with *Air* or *Water* will quickly find its Reſiſtance. By this we may diſtinguiſh the Idea of the Extenſion of *Body*, from the Idea of the Extenſion of *Space*: That of *Body*, is the Coheſion or Continuity of ſolid, ſeparable and moveable Parts; that of *Space*, the Continuity of unſolid, inſeparable and immoveable Parts. Upon the Solidity of Bodies depend their mutual *Impulſe*, *Reſiſtance* and *Protruſion*. Of *Pure Space*, and *Solidity* there are ſeveral (among which I confeſs myſelf one) who perſuade themſelves they have clear and diſtinct Ideas: And that they can think on *Space* without any thing in it that reſiſts, or is protruded by Body, as well as on ſomething *that fills Space*, that can be protruded by the Impulſe of other Bodies, or reſiſt their Motion; the Idea of the Diſtance between the oppoſite Parts of a concave Surface, being equally clear without, as with the Idea of any ſolid Parts between. If any one aſk what this *Solidity* is, I ſend him to his Senſes to inform him: let him put a *Flint* or *Football* between his Hands, and then endeavour to join them, and he will know.

CHAP. V.

Of Simple Ideas of divers Senſes.

SOME Ideas we get into the Mind by *more than one Senſe*, as *Space*, *Extenſion*, *Figure*, *Reſt*, and

Motion, Theſe are perceivable by the Eyes and Touch.

CHAP. VI.

Of Simple Ideas of Reflection.

SOME are had from *Reflection* only: Such are the Ideas we have of the *Operations* of our Minds: Of which the two principal are *Perception* or *Thinking*; and *Volition* or *Willing*. The Powers of producing theſe Operations are called *Faculties*, which are the *Underſtanding* and *Will*; the ſeveral *Modes* of thinking, *&c.* belong to this Head.

CHAP. VII.

Of Simple Ideas of Senſation and Reflection.

THERE are ſome Simple Ideas conveyed into the Mind by all the ways of *Senſation* and *Reflection*; ſuch are *Pleaſure*, *Pain*, *Power*, *Exiſtence*, *Unity*, *Succeſſion*. Pleaſure or Delight, Pain or Uneaſineſs accompany almoſt every Impreſſion on our Senſes, and every Action or Thought of the *Mind*. By *Pleaſure* or *Pain* we mean whatever delights or Moleſts us, whether it ariſes from the Thoughts of our Minds; or any thing operating on our Bodies. Satisfaction, Delight, Pleaſure, Happineſs, and Uneaſineſs, Trouble, Torment, Miſery, *&c.* are but different Degrees, the one of Pleaſure, the other of Pain.

The Author of our Being having given us a Power over ſeveral Parts of our Bodies, to move or keep them at reſt as we think fit; and alſo by their Motion to move ourſelves and other contiguous Bodies; having alſo given a Power to our Mind in ſeveral Inſtances, to chooſe amongſt its Ideas which it will think on: To excite us to theſe Actions of *Thinking*

Thinking and *Motion*, he has joined to ſeveral Thoughts and Senſations a *Perception of Delight*: Without this we ſhould have no Reaſon to prefer one Thought or Action to another, Motion to Reſt. In which State, Man, however furniſhed with the Faculties of Underſtanding and Will, would be a very Idle, unactive Creature, and paſs his Time only in a lazy, lethargick Dream.

Pain has the ſame Efficacy to ſet us on work that Pleaſure has; ſince we are as ready to avoid that, as to purſue this. This is worth our Conſideration, that *Pain is often produced by the ſame Objects and Ideas that produce pleaſure* in us. This their near Conjunction gives us new Occaſion of admiring the Wiſdom and Goodneſs of our *Maker*, who deſigning the Preſervation of our Being, has annexed Pain to the Application of many Things to our Bodies, to warn us of the Harm they will do us, and as Advices to withdraw us from them. But he, not deſigning our Preſervation barely, but the Preſervation of every Part and Organ in its Perfection, hath in many Caſes annexed Pain to thoſe very Ideas which delight us. Thus *Heat* that is very agreeable to us in one Degree, by a little greater Increaſe of it, proves no ordinary Torment: Which is wiſely ordered by *Nature*, that when any Object does by the Vehemence of its Operation diſorder the Inſtruments of Senſation, whoſe Structures cannot but be very delicate, we might by the Pain be warned to withdraw before the Organ be quite put out of order. That this is the *End of Pain*, appears from this Conſideration; that though great Light is inſufferable to the Eyes, yet the higheſt degree of *Darkneſs* does not at all diſeaſe them; becauſe *that* cauſes no diſorderly Motion in that curious Organ the Eye. But Exceſs of *Cold* as well as *Heat* pains us; becauſe it is equally deſtructive to the Temper which is neceſſary to the Preſervation of Life.

Another Reaſon why God hath annexed ſeveral Degrees of Pleaſure and Pain to all the Things that

environ and affect us, and blended them together in all Things that our Thoughts and Senſes are concerned in, is, that we finding Imperfection and Diſſatisfaction, and want of complete Happineſs in all the Enjoyments of the Creatures, might be led to ſeek it in the Enjoyments of Him *with whom is Fulneſs of Joy, and at whoſe right Hand are Pleaſures for evermore.* Though what is here ſaid concerning *Pleaſure* and *Pain* may not perhaps make thoſe Ideas clearer to us than our own Experience does, yet it may ſerve to give us due Sentiments of the Wiſdom and Goodneſs of the *Sovereign* Diſpoſer of all Things, which is not unſuitable to the main end of theſe Inquiries: The Knowledge and Veneration of Him being the *chief End* of all our Thoughts, and the proper Buſineſs of all Underſtandings.

Exiſtence and *Unity* are two other Ideas ſuggeſted by every object without, and every Idea within. When Ideas are in our Minds, we conſider them as being actually there, as well as we conſider things to be actually without us; which is, that they *exiſt*, or have Exiſtence: And whatever we conſider as *one thing*, whether a *real Being*, or *Idea*, ſuggeſts the Idea of *Unity*.

Power is another Idea derived from theſe Sources. For finding in ourſelves that we can *think*, and *move* ſeveral parts of our Bodies at pleaſure; and obſerving the *Effects* that natural Bodies produce in one another: By both theſe Ways we get the Idea of *Power*.

Succeſſion is another Idea ſuggeſted by our Senſes, and by Reflection on what paſſes in our Minds. For if we look into ourſelves, we ſhall find our *Ideas* always whilſt we are awake, or have any Thought, paſſing in train, one going and another coming, without Intermiſſion.

CHAP.

CHAP. VII.

Some farther Conſiderations concerning Simple Ideas

WHatſoever is able, by affecting our Senſes, to cauſe any Perception in the Mind, doth thereby produce in the Underſtanding a *Simple Idea*; which, whatſoever be the Cauſe of it, is looked upon as a *real poſitive Idea* in the Underſtanding. Thus the Ideas of *Heat* and *Cold*, *Light* and *Darkneſs*, *Motion* and *Reſt*, &c. are equally poſitive in the Mind, though ſome of their Cauſes may be mere *Privations*. An Inquiry into their Cauſes belongs not to the Ideas as in the Underſtanding; but to the Nature of the Things exiſting without us. Thus a *Painter* has diſtinct Ideas of White and Black, as well as the Philoſopher, who tells us what Kind of Particles, and how ranged in the Surface, occaſioned thoſe Colours.

That a *Privative* Cauſe may produce a *Poſitive* Idea, appears from Shadows; which (though nothing but the Abſence of Light) are diſcernable; and cauſe clear and poſitive Ideas. The natural Reaſon of which may be this *viz.* That ſince Senſation is produced only by different Degrees and Modes of Motion in our animal Spirits, variouſly agitated by external Objects; the Abatement of any former Motion muſt as neceſſarily produce a new Senſation, as the increaſe and Variation of it; and thereby introduce a new Idea. We have indeed ſome *negative* Names which ſtand not directly for poſitive Ideas, but for their Abſence; ſuch as *inſipid*, *Silence*, which denote poſitive Ideas, *viz.* *Taſte* and *Sound*, with a ſignification of their Abſence.

It will be uſeful to diſtinguiſh *Ideas* as they are *Perceptions* in our Minds, from what *they are in the Bodies* that cauſe ſuch Perceptions in us: For we are not to think the former Exact Images and Reſemblances of ſomething inherent in the Subject, moſt of thoſe of *Senſation* being in the Mind, no more the Likeneſs.

Likeneſs of ſomething exiſting without us, than the Names that ſtand for them are the Likeneſs of our Ideas, which yet, upon hearing, they are apt to excite in us.

Whatſoever the *Mind perceives in itſelf*, or is the immediate Object of Perception, Thought, or Underſtanding, that I call an Idea: And the Power to produce any Idea in our Mind, I call the *Quality of the Subject* wherein that Power is: Thus a *Snow-ball* having the Power to produce in us the Ideas of *white*, *cold*, and *round*, thoſe *Powers*, as they are in the Snow-ball, I call *Qualities*; and as they are *Senſations* or *Perceptions* in our Underſtandings, I call them *Ideas*: Which Ideas if I ſpeak of ſometimes, as in the Things themſelves, I would be underſtood to mean thoſe *Qualities* in the Objects which produce them in us. Theſe *Qualities* are of *two Sorts*, Firſt, *original* or primary, ſuch are *Solidity*, *Extenſion*, *Motion* or *Reſt*, *Number* and *Figure*. Theſe are inſeperable from Body, and ſuch as it conſtantly keeps in all its Changes and Alterations: Thus take a Grain of *Wheat*, divide it into two Parts, each Part has ſtill *Solidity*, *Extenſion*, *Figure*, *Mobility*: Divide it again, and it ſtill retains the ſame Qualities, and will do ſtill, though you divide it on, till the Parts becomes inſenſible.

Secondly, *ſecondary Qualities*, ſuch as *Colours*, *Smells*, *Taſtes*, *Sounds*, *&c.* which, whatever Reality we by miſtake may attribute to them, are in truth nothing in the Objects themſelves, but *Powers* to produce various ſenſations in us; and depend on the Qualities before-mentioned.

The *Ideas* of *primary* Qualities of Bodies are Reſemblances of them: And their Patterns really exiſt in Bodies themſelves: But the Ideas produced in us by *ſecondary* Qualities, have no Reſemblance of them at all: Aud what is *ſweet*, *blue*, or *warm* in the Idea, is but the certain Bulk, Figure, and Motion of the inſenſible

inſenſible Parts in the Bodies themſelves, which we call ſo.

Thus we ſee that Fire, at one diſtance, produces in us the Senſation of *Warmth*, which at a nearer Approach cauſes the Senſation of *Pain*. Now what Reaſon have we to ſay that the Idea of *Warmth* is actually in the Fire, but that of *Pain* not in the Fire, which the ſame Fire produces in us the ſame way? The Bulk, Number, Figure and Motion of the Parts of Fire, are really in it, whether we perceive them or no; and therefore may be called *real* Qualities, becauſe they really exiſt in that Body. But *Light* and *Heat* are no more really in it, than Sickneſs or Pain: Take away the Senſation of them; let not the Eyes ſee Light or Colours, nor the Ear hear Sounds; let the Palate not taſte, or the Noſe ſmell, and all *Colours*, *Taſtes*, *Odours* and *Sounds*, as they are ſuch particular Ideas, vaniſh and ceaſe, and are reduced to their Cauſes (that is) Bulk, Motion, Figure, *&c.* of Parts.

Theſe *ſecondary* Qualities are of two Sorts, Firſt, *immediately perceivable*, which by immediately operating on our Bodies, produce ſeveral different Ideas in us. Secondly, *mediately perceivable*, which by operating on other Bodies, change their primary Qualities, ſo as to render them capable of producing Ideas in us different from what they did before. Theſe laſt are powers in Bodies which proceed from the particular Conſtitution of thoſe primary and original Qualities, to make ſuch a Change in the *Bulk*, *Figure*, *Texture*, &c. of another Body, as to make it operate on our Senſes different from what it did before; as in Fire to make Lead fluid: Theſe two laſt being nothing but Powers relating to other Bodies, and reſulting from the different Modifications of the original Qualities, are yet otherwiſe thought of; the former being eſteemed *real Qualities*; but the latter barely *Powers:* The Reaſon of this Miſtake ſeems to be this; That our ideas of ſenſible Qualities containing nothing in them of Bulk, Figure, *&c.* we cannot

cannot think them the Effect of thoſe primary Qualities which appear not to our Senſes to operate in their Productions, and with which they have not any apparent Congruity, or conceivable Connection: Nor can Reaſon ſhew how Bodies by their Bulk, Figure, &c. ſhould produce in the Mind the Ideas of *warm*, *yellow*, &c. But in the other Caſe, when Bodies operate upon one another, we plainly ſee that the Quality produced hath commonly no Reſemblance with any thing in the Thing producing it, and therefore we look upon it as the Effect of Power: But our Senſes not being able to diſcover any Unlikeneſs between the Idea produced in us, and the Quality of the Object producing it, we imagine that our Ideas are Reſemblances of ſomething in the Objects, and not the Effects of certain Powers placed in the Modification of the primary Qualities, with which primary Qualities the Ideas produced in us have no Reſemblance.

This little Excurſion into Natural Philoſophy was neceſſary, in our preſent Inquiry, to diſtinguiſh the *primary* and real Qualities of Bodies which are always in them, from thoſe *ſecondary* and imputed Qualities, which are but the Powers of ſeveral Combinations of thoſe primary ones, when they operate without being diſtinctly diſcerned; whereby we learn to know what Ideas are, and what are not Reſemblances of ſomething really exiſting in the Bodies we denominate from them.

CHAP. IX.

Of Perception.

Perception is the firſt Idea we receive from Reflection: It is by ſome called *Thinking* in general: though *Thinking*, in the Propriety of the *Engliſh* Tongue, ſignifies that Sort of Operation of the Mind about its Ideas, wherein the Mind is active; where it

it conſiders any thing with ſome Degree of voluntary Attention: for in bare *Perception* the Mind is for the moſt part only *paſſive*; and what it perceives it cannot avoid perceiving. What this is, we cannot otherwiſe know, than by reflecting on what paſſes in our Minds when we *ſee*, *feel*, *hear*, &c.

Impreſſions made on the outward Parts, if they are not taken notice of within, cauſe no *Perception*: as we ſee in thoſe whoſe Minds are intently buſied in the Contemplation of certain Objects. A ſufficient Impulſe there may be upon the Organs of Senſation: but if it reach not the Obſervation of the Mind, there follows no Perception: ſo that wherever there is Senſe or Perception, there ſome Idea is actually produced and preſent in the Underſtanding.

We may obſerve that the Ideas we receive from Senſation, are often in grown People altered by the Judgment without our taking notice of it. Thus a Globe of any uniform Colour (as of Gold or Jet) being ſet before our Eyes, the *Idea* thereby imprinted is of a flat Circle variouſly ſhadowed. But being accuſtomed to perceive what kind of Appearances convex Bodies are wont to make in us; the Judgment alters the Appearances into their Cauſes; and from that variety of Shadow or Colour, frames to itſelf the Perception of a convex Figure of one uniform Colour. This in many Caſes by a ſettled Habit is performed ſo readily, that we take that for the Perception of our Senſation, which is but an Idea formed by the Judgment: ſo that one ſerves only to excite the other, and is ſcarce taken Notice of its ſelf. As a Man who reads or hears with Attention, takes little Notice of the Characters or Sounds, but of the Ideas that are excited in him by them. Thus Habits come at laſt to produce Actions in us, which often eſcape our Obſervation.

The Faculty of *Perception* ſeems to be that which puts the Diſtinction between the Animal Kingdom and the inferior Parts of Nature: Since Vegetables, many

many of them, have ſome Degrees of Motion, and upon the different Application of other Bodies to them, do very briſkly alter their Figures and Motions, and thence have obtained the Name of *ſenſitive Plants:* which yet is, I ſuppoſe, but bare *Mechaniſm*, and no otherwiſe produced than the ſhortening of a Rope by the Affuſion of Water. But Perception, I believe, is in ſome degree in all Sorts of Animals: though I think we may, from the make of an *Oyſter* or *Cockle*, reaſonably conclude that it has not ſo many nor ſo quick Senſes as a Man, or ſeveral other Animals.

Perception is alſo the firſt Step and Degree towards Knowledge, and the Inlet of all the Materials of it: ſo that the fewer Senſes any Man has, and the duller the Impreſſions that are made by them are, the more remote he is from that Knowledge which is to be found in other Men.

CHAP. X.

Of Retention

THE next Faculty of the Mind whereby it makes a further Progreſs towards Knowledge, I call *Retention:* which is the keeping of thoſe Ideas it has received: which is done two ways.

Firſt, By keeping the Idea which is brought into the Mind for ſome time actually in View, which is called *Contemplation*.

Secondly, By reviving thoſe Ideas in our Minds which have diſappeared, and have been as it were laid out of Sight: and this is *Memory*, which is as it were the Store-houſe of our Ideas; for the narrow Mind of Man not being capable of having many Ideas under view at once, it was neceſſary to have a Repoſitory to lay up thoſe Ideas which at another time

time it may have Uſe of. But our *Ideas* being nothing but actual Perceptions in the Mind which ceaſe to be any thing, when there is no Perception of them, this laying up of our *Ideas* in the Repoſitory of the Memory, ſignifies no more than this, That the Mind has a Power in many Caſes to revive Perceptions it has once had, with this additional Perception annexed to them, that it has had them before. And it is by the Aſſiſtance of this faculty, that we are ſaid to have all thoſe Ideas in our Underſtandings, which we can bring in ſight, and make the Objects of our Thoughts, without the help of thoſe ſenſible Qualities which firſt imprinted them there.

Attention and *Repetition* help much to to the Fixing of Ideas in our Memories: but thoſe which make deepeſt and moſt laſting Impreſſions, are thoſe which are accompanied with *Pleaſure* or *Pain*. *Ideas* but once taken in and never again repeated are ſoon loſt; as thoſe of Colours in ſuch as loſt their Sight when very young.

The Memory in ſome Men is tenacious even to a Miracle: but yet there ſeems to be a conſtant decay of all our *Ideas*, even of thoſe which are ſtruck deepeſt; and in Minds the moſt retentive: So that if they be not ſometimes renewed, the Print wears out, and at laſt there remains nothing to be ſeen. Thoſe *Ideas* that are refreſhed by frequent Returns of the Objects or Actions that produce them, fix themſelves beſt in the Memory, and remain longeſt there: Such are the *original Qualities of Bodies*, viz. Solidity, Extenſion, Figure, Motion, *&c.* and *thoſe that almoſt conſtantly affect us*, as Heat and Cold: and thoſe that are the *Affections of all Kind of Beings*, as Exiſtence, Duration, Number: theſe and the like are ſeldom quite loſt while the Mind retains any *Ideas* at all.

In Memory the Mind is oftentimes more than barely *paſſive*; for it often ſets itſelf on work to ſearch ſome hidden *Ideas*; ſometimes they ſtart of their own

own Accord: and ſometimes turbulent and tempeſtuous Paſſions tumble them out of their Cells.

The Defects of the Memory are *two*.

Firſt, That it loſes the *Idea* quite, and ſo far it produces perfect *Ignorance*.

Secondly, That it moves ſlowly, and retrieves not the *Ideas* laid up in ſtore quick enough to ſerve the Mind upon Occaſions. This, if it be to a great Degree is *Stupidity*. In the having of *Ideas* ready at hand on all Occaſions, conſiſts what we call *Invention*, *Fancy*, and *Quickneſs of Parts*.

This Faculty other *Animals* ſeem to have to a great degree, as well as *Man*, as appears by Birds learning of Tunes, and their Endeavour to hit the Notes right. For it ſeems impoſſible that they ſhould endeavour to conform their Voices (as it is plain they do) to Notes, whereof they have no *Ideas*.

CHAP. XI.

Of Diſcerning and other Operations of the Mind.

ANOTHER Faculty of the Mind is, That of *diſcerning between its Ideas*: on this depends the Evidence, and Certainty of ſeveral even general Propoſitions, which paſs for *Innate Truths*: whereas indeed they depend on this clear diſcerning Faculty of the Mind, whereby it perceives two *Ideas* to be the ſame or different. In being able nicely to diſtinguiſh one Thing from another, where there is the leaſt Difference, conſiſts in a great Meaſure that *Exactneſs* of *Judgment* and *Clearneſs of Reaſon*, which is to be obſerved in one Man above another; which is quite oppoſite to *Wit*, which conſiſts moſt in the Aſſemblage of *Ideas*, and putting theſe together with quickneſs and Variety, which have the leaſt Reſemblance to form agreeable Viſions: where-

as

as Judgment ſeparates carefully thoſe *Ideas*, wherein can be found the leaſt Difference to prevent Error and Deluſion.

To the well diſtinguiſhing our *Ideas*, it chiefly contributes that they be clear and determinate; and when they are ſo, it will not breed any Confuſion or Miſtake about them, though the Senſes ſhould convey them from the ſame Object differently on different Occaſions.

The *comparing* of our *Ideas* one with another in reſpect of *Extent*, *Degree*, *Time*, *Place*, or any other Circumſtances, is another Operation of the Mind about its *Ideas*, which is the Ground of *Relation*. Brutes ſeem not to have this Faculty in any great Degree. They have probably ſeveral *Ideas* diſtinct enough; but cannot compare them farther than ſome ſenſible Circumſtances, annexed to the Objects themſelves. The Power of comparing general *Ideas*, which we may obſerve in Men, we may probably conjecture *Beaſts* have not at all.

Compoſition is another Operation of the Mind, whereby it combines ſeveral of its ſimple *Ideas* into *Complex* ones: under which Operation we may reckon that of *Enlarging*, wherein we put ſeveral *Ideas* together of the ſame Kind, as ſeveral Units to make a *Dozen*. In this alſo I ſuppoſe Brutes come far ſhort of Man, for though they take in and retain together ſeveral Combinations of Simple *Ideas*, as poſſibly a Dog does the *Shape*, *Smell* and *Voice* of his Maſter; yet theſe are rather ſo many diſtinct Marks, whereby he knows him, that one *Complex Idea* made out of theſe ſeveral ſimple ones.

Abſtraction is another Operation of the Mind, whereby it forms general from particular *Ideas*, received from particular Objects, which it does by conſidering them as they are in the Mind ſuch Appearances, ſeparate from all other Exiſtences, and the Circumſtances of real Exiſtence, as *Time*, *Place*, &c. Theſe become general *Repreſentatives* of all of the

the ſame kind, and their Names applicable to whatever exiſts conformable to ſuch abſtract *Ideas*. Thus the Colour which I receive from *Chalk*, *Snow* and *Milk*, is made a Repreſentative of all of that kind; and has a Name given it *(Whiteneſs)* which ſignifies the Quality wherever to be found or imagined. And thus *Univerſals* both *Ideas* and *Terms* are made.

This conſtitutes the great Difference between Man and Brutes: They ſeem to reaſon about particular Objects, and *Ideas*, but there appear no Footſteps of *Abſtraction* in them, or of making *General Ideas*.

CHAP. XII.

Of Complex Ideas.

IN the Reception of ſimple Ideas, the Mind is entirely *Paſſive*, having no Power to frame any one to its ſelf, nor has it any Idea which does not wholly conſiſt of them. But in reſpect to theſe ſimple Ideas it exerts ſeveral Acts of its own, whereby out of them, as the Materials and Foundations, the others are framed: The Acts of the Mind, wherein it exerts its Power over its ſimple Ideas, are chiefly theſe three: Firſt, it combines ſeveral ſimple Ideas into one Compound one, and thus all *complex Ideas* are formed. Secondly, It brings two Ideas, whether *Simple* or *Complex* together, and ſets them by one another, ſo as to take a View of them at once, without uniting them into one; by which way it gets all its Ideas of Relations. Thirdly, It ſeparates them from all other Ideas that accompany them in their real Exiſtence; this is called *Abſtraction*: And thus all its *General Ideas* are made. I ſhall here begin with the firſt of theſe, in the conſideration of *complex Ideas*, and come to the other two in their due Places. As *ſimple Ideas* are obſerved to exiſt in ſeveral Combinations

tions united, not only as they are really united in external Objects, but as itſelf has joined them. *Ideas* thus made up of ſeveral ſimple ones put together, I call *complex*, as *Man*, *Army*, *Beauty*, *Gratitude*, &c. By this Faculty of repeating and joining together its *Ideas*, the Mind has great Power in varying and multiplying the Objects of its Thoughts, infinitely beyond what Senſation or Reflection can furniſh it with. But it is ſtill confined to thoſe ſimple *Ideas* which it received from the two Sources of *Senſation* and *Reflection*. It can have no other *Ideas* of ſenſible Qualities, than what come from without by the Senſes, nor any other *Ideas* of the Operations of a thinking Subſtance, that what it finds in itſelf: but having once got theſe ſimple *Ideas*, it can, by its own Power, put them together, and make new *Complex ones*, which it never received ſo united.

Complex *Ideas* however compounded, and decompounded, though their Number be infinite and their Variety endleſs, may all be reduced under theſe three Heads, Firſt, *Modes*, Secondly, *Subſtances*, Thirdly, *Relations*.

Modes, I call ſuch complex *Ideas* which contain not the Suppoſition of ſubſiſting by themſelves, but are conſidered as Dependences on, and Affections of Subſtances, as *Triangle*, *Gratitude*, *Murder*, &c. Theſe Modes are of two Sorts, Firſt, *Simple*, which are different Combinations of the ſame Simple *Idea*, without the mixture of any other, as a *Dozen*, *Score*, &c. which are but the *Ideas* of ſo many diſtinct Units put together. Secondly, *Mixed*, which are compounded of ſimple *Ideas* of ſeveral Kinds, to make one complex one; as *Beauty*, which conſiſts in a certain Compoſition of Colour and Figure, cauſing Delight in the Beholder. *Theft*, which is the concealed Change of the Poſſeſſion of any thing without the Conſent of the Proprietor. *Theſe* viſibly contain a Combination of *Ideas* of ſeveral Kinds: and theſe I call *mixed Modes*.

Secondly,

Secondly, *Subſtance*, the *Ideas* of Subſtances are only ſuch Combinations of ſimple *Ideas* as are taken to repreſent diſtinct particular Things ſubſiſting by themſelves; in which the confuſed *Idea* of Subſtance is always the Chief. Thus a Combination of the *Ideas* of a certain Figure, with the Powers of Motion, Thought, and Reaſoning joined to Subſtance, make the ordinary *Idea* of Man.

Theſe again are either of *ſingle Subſtances*, as *Man*, *Stone*; or of *collective*, or ſeveral put together, as an *Army*, *Flock*, which collective *Ideas* of ſeveral Subſtances thus put together, are as much each of them one ſingle *Idea*, as that of a *Man*, or an *Unit*.

Thirdly, *Relations*, which conſiſt in the Conſideration and comparing one *Idea* with another. Of theſe ſeveral Kinds we ſhall treat in their Order.

CHAP. XIII.

Of Simple Modes, and firſt of the Simple Modes of Space.

CONcerning *ſimple Modes* we may obſerve that the Modifications of our *Simple Ideas*, are as perfectly different and diſtinct Ideas in the Mind, as thoſe of the greateſt Diſtance or Contrariety; Thus *Two* is as diſtinct from *Three*, as *Blueneſs* from *Heat*. Under this Head I ſhall firſt conſider the Modes of *Space*.

Space is a ſimple Idea which we get both by our Sight and Touch. When we conſider it barely in length between two Bodies it is called *Diſtance*; when in Length, Breadth, and Thickneſs, it may be called *Capacity*. When conſidered between the Extremities of Matter, which fills the Capacity of Space with ſomething ſolid, Tangible and Moveable, it is called *Extenſion*; and thus *Extenſion* will be an *Idea* belonging to Body: But *Space* may be conceived without it.

Each

Each Different *Diſtance* is a different Modification of ſpace; and each *Idea* of any different Space is a *ſimple Mode* of this *Idea*. Such are an *Inch*, *Foot*, *Yard*, &c. which are the *Ideas* of certain ſtated Lengths which men ſettle in their Minds for the Uſe, and by the cuſtom of meaſuring. When theſe *Ideas* are made familiar to Mens Thoughts, they can in their Minds repeat them as often as they will, without joining to them the *Idea* of Body and frame to themſelves the *Ideas* of Feet, Yards, or Fathoms beyond the utmoſt Bounds of all Bodies, and by adding theſe ſtill one to another, enlarge their *Idea* of Space as much as they pleaſe. From this Power of repeating any *Idea* of Diſtance, without being ever able to come to an end, we acquire the *Idea* of *Immenſity*.

Another Modification of *Space* is taken from the *Relation* the Parts of the Termination of Extenſion or circumſcribed Space, have amongſt themſelves: and this is what we call *Figure*: This the *Touch* diſcovers in ſenſible Bodies, whoſe Extremities come within our Reach, and the *Eye* takes both from Bodies and Colours, whoſe Boundaries are within its View; where obſerving how the Extremities terminate either in ſtraight Lines, which meet at diſcernable Angles; or in crooked Lines; where no Angles can be perceived; by conſidering theſe as they relate to one another in all parts of the Extremities of any Body or Space, it has that Idea we call *Figure*; which affords to the Mind infinite Variety.

Another *Mode* belonging to this Head, is that of *Place*. Our Idea of *Place* is nothing but the relative Poſition of any Thing with Reference to its Diſtance from ſome fixed and certain Point. Whence we ſay, that a Thing has or has not changed *Place*, when its Diſtance either is or is not altered with Reſpect to thoſe Bodies with which we have Occaſion to compare it. That this is ſo, we may eaſily collect from hence; that we can have no Idea of the Place of the *Univerſe*, though we can of all its Parts. To ſay that the World is *ſomewhere* means no more, than

than it does *exiſt*. The Word *Place* is ſometimes taken to ſignify that *Space*, which any Body takes up; and ſo the Univerſe may be conceived in a Place.

CHAP. XIV.

Of Duration and its Simple Modes.

THere is, another Sort of *Diſtance*. the *Ideas*, of which we get from the fleeting, and perpetually periſhing parts of Succeſſion, which we call *Duration*. The ſimple Modes of it are, any different Lengths of it, whereof we have diſtinct *Ideas*, as *Hours*, *Days*, *Years*, &c. *Time* and *Eternity*.

The *Idea* of *Succeſſion* is got by reflecting on that Train of *Ideas* which conſtantly follow one another in our Minds as long as we are awake. The diſtance between any part of this *Succeſſion* is what we call *Duration*: and the Continuation of the Exiſtence of our Selves, or any thing elſe *commenſurate* to the Succeſſion of any *Ideas* in our Minds, is what we all our *own Duration*, or *that* of another thing co-exiſting with our Thinking. That this is ſo, appears from hence, that we have no Perception of the Succeſſion or Duration of our *Ideas*, when that Succeſſion *ceaſes*, as in *Sleep*: The Moment that we leave off to think, till the Moment we begin again, ſeems to be joined and to have no Diſtance. And poſſibly it would to be ſo to a waking Man, could he fix upon one *Idea* without Variation, and the Succeſſion of others. And we ſee that they whoſe Thoughts are very intent upon one Thing, let ſlip out on their Account a good part of that *Duration*, and think that Time ſhorter than it is. But if, a Man, during his Sleep, *dreams*, and a Variety of *Ideas* make themſelves perceptible in his Mind, one after another, he hath then, during ſuch dreaming, a Senſe of *Duration* and of the Length of it.

A Man having once got this *Idea* of Duration, can apply it to Things which exiſt while he does not think:

think: and thus we meaſure the time of our Sleep, as well as that wherein we are awake.

Thoſe who think we get the *Idea* of *Succeſſion* from our Obſervation of Motion, by our Senſes, will be of our Opinion, when they conſider that Motion produces in the Mind an *Idea* of Succeſſion, no otherwiſe than as it produces there a continued Train of diſtinguiſhable *Ideas*. A Man that looks upon a Body really moving, perceives no Motion, unleſs that Motion produces a conſtant *Train of ſucceſſive Ideas*. But wherever a Man is, though all things be at reſt about him, if he thinks, he will perceive the various Ideas of his own Thoughts in his Mind, appearing one after another, and be *conſcious* of *Succeſſion* without perceiving any Motion. Hence Motions very *ſlow* are not perceived by us; becauſe the Change of Diſtance is ſo ſlow, that it cauſes no new *Idea* in us, but after a long Interval. The ſame happens in things that move very *ſwift*, which not affecting the Senſe with ſeveral diſtinguiſhable Diſtances of their Motion, cauſe not any Train of *Ideas* in our Minds, and conſequently are not perceived. Thus any thing that moves round in a Circle, in leſs time than our *Ideas* are wont to ſucceed one another in our Minds, is not perceived to move, but ſeems to be a perfect entire Circle of that Matter which is in Motion. Such a Part of Duration as takes up the time of only one *Idea* in our Minds, wherein we perceive no Succeſſion, we call an *Inſtant*.

Duration, as marked by certain Periods and Meaſures, is what we moſt properly call *Time*: which we meaſure by the Diurnal and Annual *Revolutions* of the Sun, as being conſtant, regular and univerſally obſervable by all Mankind, and ſuppoſed equal to one another.

It is not neceſſary that time ſhould be *meaſured by Motion*: any conſtant periodical appearance in ſeemingly equidiſtant Spaces, may as well diſtin-

guiſh the intervals of *Time* as what we make uſe of. For ſuppoſing the Sun to be lighted, and then Extinguiſhed every day, and that in the Space of an annual Revolution, it ſhould ſenſibly increaſe in Brightneſs, and ſo decreaſe again; ſuch a regular appearance would ſerve to meaſure out the diſtances of Duration, to all that could obſerve it, as well without, as with motion. The freezing of Water, the blowing of a Plant, returning at equidiſtant Periods in all the Parts of the Earth would ſerve for the ſame purpoſe. In effect, we find that a People of *America* counted the Years by the *coming* and *going away* of Birds at certain Seaſons.

The Mind having once got ſuch a meaſure of *Time* as the annual Revolution of the Sun, can eaſily apply it to Duration wherein that Meaſure itſelf did not exiſt: and the *Idea* of *Duration* equal to an *annual Revolution of the Sun*, is eaſily applicable in our Thoughts to Duration where no Sun, nor Motion was, as the *Idea* of a *Foot* or *Yard* to Diſtances beyond the Confines of the World.

By the ſame Means, and from the ſame Original that we come to have the *Idea* of Time, we have alſo that *Idea* which we call *Eternity*: For having got the *Ideas* of certain Lengths of Duration, we can in our Thoughts add them to one another as oft as we pleaſe, without ever coming to an End.

And thus it is plain, that from the two Fountains of all Knowledge before-mentioned, *viz. Senſation* and *Reflection*, we get the Ideas of *Duration*, and the ſeveral Meaſures of it. For,

1. By obſerving what paſſes in our Minds, how our Ideas there in train conſtantly vaniſh, while others begin to appear, we acquire the Idea of *Succeſſion*.

2. By obſerving a Diſtance in the Parts of this Succeſſion we get the Idea of *Duration*.

3. By

3. By obſerving certain Apperances at regular and ſeemingly equidiſtant Periods, we get the Ideas of certain Lengths or Meaſures of Duration, as *Minutes*, *Hours*, *Days*, &c.

4. By being able to repeat thoſe Meaſures of Time, as often as we will, we can come to imagine *Duration, where nothing does really endure or exiſt:* Thus we imagine to morrow, next Year, or ſeven Years hence.

5. By being able to repeat any ſuch Idea of any Length of Time, as of a Minute, Year, *&c.* as often as we will, and add them one to another without ever coming to an end of ſuch Addition, any nearer, than we can to the End of Numbers, to which we can always add, we come by the Idea of *Eternity*.

6. By conſidering any Part of infinite Duration, as ſet out by periodical Meaſures, we come by the Idea of what we call *Time* in general.

CHAP. XV.

Of Duration and Expanſion conſidered together.

TIME is to *Duration*, as *Place* is to *Space* and *Expanſion*. They are ſo much of thoſe boundleſs Oceans of *Eternity* and *Immenſity* as are ſet out and diſtinguiſhed from the reſt, as it were by Land Marks; and ſo are made uſe of to denote the Poſition of finite real Beings, in Reſpect one to another in thoſe infinite Oceans of Duration and Space.

Time and *Place* taken thus for determinate diſtinguiſhable Partitions of thoſe infinite Abyſſes of *Space* and *Duration*, ſet out or ſuppoſed to be diſtinguiſhed from the Reſt by Marks, and known Boundaries, have each a twofold Acceptation.

Firſt, Time in general is taken for ſo much of infinite Duration as is co-exiſtent with the Univerſe, and meaſured out by the motions of its great Bodies; in this Senſe, Time begins and ends with the Frame of the ſenſible World, as in the Phraſes *before all Time*, or *when Time ſhall be no more*.

Place is likewiſe ſometimes taken for that *Portion* of infinite Space, which is poſſeſſed by, and comprehended within the material World; and is thereby diſtinguiſhed from the reſt of Expanſion; though this might be more properly called *Extenſion* than *Place*. Within *Theſe two* are confined the particular Time or Duration, Extenſion or Place of all corporeal Beings.

Secondly, Time is ſometimes applied to Parts of that infinite Duration that were not really meaſured out by real Exiſtence, but ſuch as we upon Occaſion do ſuppoſe equal to certain Lengths of meaſured Time, as in the *Julian Period*, which makes an Excurſion of ſeven hundred and ſixty four Years beyond the Creation. Thus we may ſpeak of Place or Diſtance in the great *Inane*, beyond the Confines of the World, wherein I can conceive a Space equal to, or capable of receiving a Body of any aſſigned Dimenſions.

Where and *when* are queſtions belonging to all finite Exiſtences, and are by us always reckoned from ſome known Parts of this ſenſible World, and from ſome certain Epochs marked out to us by the Motions obſervable in it. Without ſome ſuch fixed Parts or Periods, the Order of Things would be loſt, to our finite Underſtandings, in the boundleſs invariable Oceans of Duration and Expanſion; which comprehend in them all finite Beings, and, in their full Extent, belong only to the Deity. And therefore we are not to wonder, that we comprehend them not, and do ſo often find our Thoughts at a Loſs, when we would conſider them, either abſtractedly

in

in themſelves, or as any Way attributed to the firſt incomprehenſible Being. But when applied to any particular finite Beings, the Extenſion of any Body is ſo much of that infinite Space, as the Bulk of that Body takes up. And Place is the Poſition of any Body, when conſidered at a certain Diſtance from ſome other. As the Idea of the particular Duration of any Thing, is an Idea of that Portion of infinite Duration, which paſſes during the Exiſtence of that Thing; ſo the Time when the Thing exiſted is the Idea of that Space of Duration, which paſſed between ſome known and fixed Period of Duration, and the being of that Thing. One ſhews the Diſtance of the Extremities of the Bulk, or Exiſtence of the ſame Thing, as that it is a Foot Square, or laſted two Years; the other ſhews the Diſtance of it in Place, or Exiſtence from the other fixed Points of Space or Duration; as that it was in the Middle of Lincoln's-Inn-Fields.

CHAP. XVI.

Of Numbers.

THE Complex *Ideas* of *Numbers* are formed by adding ſeveral *Units* together. The *Simple Modes* of it are each ſeveral Combinations, as, *Two*, *Three*, &c. Theſe are of all others moſt diſtinct, the neareſt being as clearly different from each other as the moſt remote; *Two* being as diſtinct from *One*, as Two Hundred. But it is hard to form diſtinct *Ideas* of every the leaſt Exceſs in Extenſion Hence Demonſtrations in Numbers are more general in their Uſe, and more determinate in their Application than thoſe of Extenſion.

Simple Modes of Numbers being in our Minds but ſo many Combinations of Units which have no Variety, nor are capable of any other Difference, than *more* or *leſs*: *Names* for each of theſe diſtinct Combinations

binations, seems more necessary than in any other of our *Ideas*. For without such *Names* or *Marks*, to distinguish their precise Collection or number of Units, it will be hardly possible to keep them from being a heap of Confusion. Hence some *Americans* have no distinct Idea of any *Number* beyond *Twenty*; so that when they are discoursed with of greater Numbers, they shew the Hairs of their head. So that to reckon right, two Things are required:

First, that the Mind distinguish carefully two *Ideas* which are different from one another, only by the Addition or Substraction of one Unit.

Secondly, That it retain in Memory the Names or Marks of the several Combinations from an Unit to that Number; and that not confusedly, and at Random, but in that exact Order, as the Numbers follow one another. In either of which if it fails, the whole Business of *Numbering* will be disturbed; and there will remain only the confused *Idea* of *Multitude*: but the Ideas necessary to distinct Numeration will not be obtained or conceived.

CHAP. XVII.

Of Infinity.

THE *Idea* signified by the Name *Infinity*, is best examined, by considering to *what* Infinity is by the Mind more immediately attributed, and then *how* it frames it. *Finite* and *Infinite* then are considered by the Mind, as the Modes of Quantity, and attributed primarily to Things that have Parts, and are capable of Increase or Diminution, by the *Addition* or *Substraction* of any the least Part. Such are the *Idea* of *Space*, *Duration* and *Number*.

When we apply this Idea to the *Supreme Being*, we do it primarily in respect of his Duration and Ubiquity; but more figuratively when applied to his *Wisdom*,

Wiſdom, *Power*, *Goodneſs*, and other Attributes which are properly *inexhauſtible* and *incomprehenſible*: For when we call them Infinite, we have no other *Idea* of this Infinity, but what carries with it ſome Reflection on the *Number*, or the *Extent* of the *Acts* or *Objects* of God's Power and Wiſdom, which can never be ſuppoſed ſo great or ſo many, that theſe Attributes will not always ſurmount and exceed, though we multiply them in our Thoughts, with the Infinity of *endleſs Number*. I do not pretend to ſay, how theſe Attributes *are in God*, who is infinitely beyond the reach of our narrow Capacities: but this is our Way of *conceiving them*, and theſe our Ideas of their Infinity.

The next thing to be conſidered, is *how we come* by the *Idea* of Infinity. Every one that has any *Idea* of any ſtated Lengths of Space, as a *Foot*, *Yard*, &c. finds that he can repeat that *Idea*, and join it to *another*, to a *Third*, and ſo on, without ever coming to an End of his Additions: From this Power of enlarging his *Idea* of Space, he takes the *Idea* of infinite Space or *Immenſity*; ſo, by being able to repeat the *Idea* of any Length of Duration (we have in our Minds,) with all the endleſs Addition of Number, we come by the *Idea* of *Eternity*.

If our Idea of *Infinity* be got by repeating without End our own *Ideas*; why do we not attribute it to other *Ideas*, as well as thoſe of *Space* and *Duration*; ſince they may be as eaſily and as often repeated in our Minds as the other, yet no body ever thinks of infinite *Sweetneſs* or *Whiteneſs*, though he can repeat the *Idea* of Sweet or White as frequently as thoſe of *Yard* or *Day*? I anſwer, that thoſe *Ideas* that have Parts, and are capable of Increaſe by the Addition of any Parts, afford us by their repetition, an *Idea* of *Infinity*; becauſe with the endleſs Repetition there is continued an Enlargement, of which there is no End; but it is not ſo in other *Ideas*: For if to the perfecteſt *Idea* I have of *White*, I add another of equal *Whiteneſs*; it enlarges not my *Idea* at all, and

therefore the different Ideas of whiteneſs, &c. are called *Degrees*; but thoſe Ideas, that conſiſt of Parts, are capable of being augmented by every Addition of the leaſt Part, and without any the leaſt Confuſion. Thoſe *Ideas* that conſiſt not of Parts, cannot be augmented to what Proportion Men pleaſe, or be ſtretched beyond what they have received by their Senſes: But *Space*, *Duration*, and *Number* being capable of increaſe by Repetition, leave in the Mind an *Idea* of an endleſs Room for more; nor can we conceive any where a Stop to a farther Addition or Progreſſion, and ſo thoſe *Ideas* alone lead the Mind towards the Thought of *Infinity*.

We are carefully to diſtinguiſh between the *Idea* of the *Infinity of Space*, and the *Idea* of a *Space Infinite*. The firſt is nothing but a ſuppoſed endleſs Progreſſion of the Mind over any repeated *Idea* of a Space. But to have actually in the Mind the *Idea* of a Space Infinite, is to ſuppoſe the Mind already paſſed over, and actually to have a View of all thoſe repeated *Ideas* of Space, which an endleſs Repetition can never totally repreſent to it, which carries in it a plain Contradiction.

This will be plainer, if we conſider *Infinity in Numbers*. The Infinity of Numbers, to the End of whoſe Addition every one perceives there is no Approach eaſily, appears to any one that reflects on it: But how clear ſoever this *Idea* of the Infinity of Number be, there is nothing yet more evident, than the Abſurdity of the actual *Idea* of an infinite Number.

CHAP. XVIII.

Of other Simple Modes.

THE Mind has ſeveral diſtinct *Ideas* of *Sliding*, *Rolling*, *Walking*, *Creeping*, &c. which are all but the different Modifications of Motion. *Swift* and

and *Slow* are two different *Ideas* of Motion, the Meaſures whereof are made out of the diſtances of Time and Space put together.

The like Variety we have in *Sounds*: Every articulate Word is a different Modification of Sound: as are alſo Notes of different Length put together, which make that Complex *Idea* called a *Tune*.

The Modes of *Colours* are alſo very Various; ſome of which we take notice of, as the different Degrees, or as they are termed Shades of the ſame Colour. But ſince we ſeldom make Aſſemblages of Colours, without taking in Figure alſo, as in Painting, *&c*. thoſe which are taken Notice of, do moſt commonly belong to mixed Modes, as being made up of Ideas of divers Kinds, *viz*. Figure and Colour, ſuch as *Beauty*, *Rainbow*, &c.

All compounded *Taſtes* and *Smells* are alſo Modes, made up of the ſimple *Ideas* of thoſe Senſes: But they being ſuch as generally we have no Names for, cannot be ſet down in Writing, but therefore muſt be left without Enumeration to the Thoughts and Experience of the Reader.

CHAP. XIX.

Of the Modes of Thinking.

WHEN the Mind turns its View inwards upon itſelf, *Thinking* is the firſt *Idea* that occurs, wherein it obſerves a great Variety of Modifications; and thereof frames to itſelf diſtinct *Ideas*. Thus the Perception annexed to any Impreſſion on the Body made by an external Object, is called *Senſation*. When an *Idea* recurs without the Preſence of the Object, it is called *Remembrance*. When ſought after by the Mind, and brought again in View, it is *Recollection*. When held there long, under attentive Conſideration it is *Contemplation*. When

Ideas float in the Mind, without Regard or Reflection, it is called in French *Reſverie*, our Language has ſcarce a Name for it. When the *Ideas* are taken Notice of, and as it were regiſtered in the Memory, it is *Attention*. When the Mind fixes its View on any one *Idea*, and conſiders it on all Sides, it is *Intention* and *Study*. *Sleep*, without Dreaming is Reſt from all theſe. And *Dreaming* is the Perception of *Ideas* in the Mind, not ſuggeſted by any external Objects, or known Occaſions; nor under any Choice or Conduct of the Underſtanding. Of theſe various Modes of thinking, the Mind forms as diſtinct *Ideas*, as it does of White and Red, a Square, or a Circle.

CHAP. XX.

Of the Modes of Pleaſure and Pain.

Pleaſure and *Pain* are ſimple *Ideas* which we receive both from Senſation and Reflection. There are Thoughts of the Mind as well as Senſations, accompanied with Pleaſure or Pain. Their Cauſes are termed *good* or *evil*. For things are eſteemed good or evil only in reference to Pleaſure or Pain. That we call *Good*, which is apt to cauſe or increaſe Pleaſure, or diminiſh Pain in us; to procure or preſerve the Poſſeſſion of any Good, or Abſence of any Evil: And on the contrary, that we call *Evil*, which is apt to produce or increaſe any Pain, or diminiſh any Pleaſure in us; or elſe to procure us any Evil, or deprive us of any Good. By Pleaſure and Pain, I would be underſtood to mean of *Body* or *Mind*, as they are commonly diſtinguiſhed, though in truth they are only different Conſtitutions of the Mind, ſometimes occaſioned by Diſorders in the Body, ſometimes by Thoughts of the Mind. *Pleaſure* and *Pain*, and their Cauſes *Good* and *Evil*, are the Hinges upon which our Paſſions

ſions turn: by reflecting on the various Modifications or Tempers of Mind, and the internal Senſations which Pleaſure and Pain, Good and Evil produce in us, we may thence form to ourſelves the *Ideas* of our Paſſions. Thus by reflecting upon the Thought we have of the Delight, which any preſent or abſent Thing is apt to produce in us, we have an *Idea* we call *Love*: and on the contrary, the Thought of the Pain, which any Thing preſent or abſent produces in us is what we call *Hatred*. *Deſire* is that Uneaſineſs which a man finds in himſelf upon the Abſence of any Thing, the preſent Enjoyment of which carries the *Idea* of Delight with it. *Joy* is a Delight of the Mind ariſing from the Conſideration of the preſent or aſſured approaching Poſſeſſion of a Good. *Sorrow* is an Uneaſineſs of the Mind, upon the Thought of a Good loſt, or Senſe of a preſent Evil. *Hope* is a Pleaſure in the Mind upon the Thought of a probable future Enjoyment of a Thing which is apt to delight. *Fear* is an Uneaſineſs of the Mind upon the Thought of a future Evil likely to befal us. *Anger* is a Diſcompoſure of Mind upon the Receipt of any Injury, with a preſent Purpoſe of Revenge. *Deſpair* is the Thought of the Unattainableneſs of any Good. *Envy* is an Uneaſineſs of Mind, cauſed by the Conſideration of a Good we deſire, obtained by one we think ſhould not have had it before us.

By *Pleaſure* and *Pain*, Delight and Uneaſineſs, I muſt all along be underſtood (as I have intimated) to mean, not only bodily Pain and Pleaſure, but whatſoever *Delight* or *Uneaſineſs* is felt by us, whether ariſing from any grateful, or unacceptable Senſation or Reflection.

It is to be conſidered, that in Reference to the Paſſions, the Removal or Leſſening of a Pain, is conſidered, and operates as a Pleaſure; and the Loſs or Diminiſhing of a Pleaſure, as a Pain. And farther, that the Paſſions in moſt Perſons operate on the Body, and cauſe various changes in it: But theſe

theſe being not always ſenſible, do not make a neceſſary part of the *Idea* of each Paſſion. Beſides theſe Modes of Pleaſure and Pain which reſult from the various Conſiderations of Good and Evil, there are many others I might have inſtanced in other Modes of Pleaſure and Pain more ſimple than theſe, as the *Pain* of *Hunger* and *Thirſt*, and the Pleaſure of *Eating* and *Drinking* to remove them; and of *Muſick*, &c. but I rather choſe to inſtance in the Paſſions, as being of much more Concernment to us.

CHAP. XXI.

Of Power.

THE Mind being every Day informed by the Senſes, of the Alteration of thoſe ſimple *Ideas* it obſerves in Things without; reflecting alſo on what paſſes within itſelf, and obſerving a conſtant Change of its *Ideas*, ſometimes by the Impreſſion of outward Objects on the Senſes, and ſometimes by the Determination of its own Choice; and concluding from what it has ſo conſtantly obſerved to have been, that the like Changes will, for the future, be made in the ſame Things, by the ſame Agents, and by the like Ways, conſiders in one Thing, the Poſſibility of having any of its ſimple *Ideas* changed; and in another, the Poſſibility of making that Change, and ſo comes by that *Idea* which we call *Power*. Thus we ſay *Fire* has a Power to *melt Gold*, and make it fluid, and *Gold* has a Power to be *melted*.

Power thus conſidered is twofold, *viz.* as able to make, or able to receive any Change; the one may be called *active*, the other *paſſive Power*. Of *paſſive Power* all ſenſible things abundantly furniſh us with *Ideas* whoſe ſenſible Qualities and Beings we find to be in a continual Flux, and therefore with Reaſon we look on them as liable ſtill to the ſame

ſame Change. Nor have we of *active Power* fewer Inſtances: ſince whatever Change is obſerved, the Mind muſt collect a Power ſomewhere able to make that Change. But yet if we will conſider it attentively, Bodies by our Senſes do not afford us ſo clear and diſtinct an Idea of *active Power*, as we have from Reflection, or the Operations of our Minds. For all Power relating to Action, and there being but two Sorts of *Action*, viz. *Thinking* and *Motion*, let us conſider whence we have the cleareſt Ideas of the Powers which produce theſe Actions.

Of *Thinking*, Body affords us no Idea at all; it is only from Reflection that we have that; neither have we from Body any Idea of the Beginning of Motion. A Body at reſt affords us no Idea of any *active* Power to move; and when it is ſet in Motion itſelf, that Motion is rather a Paſſion than an Action in it. The Idea of the Beginning of Motion we have only by reflecting on what paſſes in ourſelves; where we find by experience that barely by willing it, barely by a Thought of the Mind, we can move the Parts of our Bodies, which were before at reſt. This would lead us to think the Mind did receive its Idea of active Power clearer from reflecting on its own Operations there, than it doth from any external Senſation.

We find in ourſelves a Power to begin or forbear, continue or end ſeveral Actions of our Minds, and Motions of our Bodies, barely by a Thought or preference of the Mind. This Power which the Mind has thus to order the Conſideration of any Idea, or the forbearing to conſider it; or to prefer the Motion of any Part of the Body to its Reſt, and *vice verſa* in any particular Inſtance, is that we call the *Will*. The actual Exerciſe of that Power, by directing any particular Action, or its Forbearance, is, that which we call *Volition* or *Willing*: The Forbearance or Performance of that Action, conſequent to ſuch Order or Command of the Mind, is called *Voluntary*: And

And whatsoever Action is performed without such a Thought of the Mind, is called *Involuntary*.

The Power of Perception is that we call the *Understanding*. *Perception*, which we make the Act of the Understanding, is of *three* Sorts. *First*, The Perception of Ideas in our Minds. *Secondly*, The Perception of the Signification of Signs. *Thirdly*, The Perception of the Agreement or Disagreement of any distinct *Ideas*, these are more particularly attributed to the *Understanding*. These Powers of the Mind, *viz.* of *perceiving* and *preferring*, are usually called by another Name; and the ordinary Way of speaking is, that the Understanding and Will are two *Faculties* of the Mind: A Word proper enough, if it be used so as not to breed any Confusion in Mens Thoughts, by being supposed, (as I suspect it has been) to stand for some real Beings in the Soul that perform those Actions of Understanding and Volition.

From the Consideration of the Extent of the Power of the Mind over the Actions of the Man, which every one finds in himself, arise the Ideas of *Liberty* and *Necessity*: So far as a Man has a Power to think or not to think, to move or not to move, according to the Preference or Direction of his own Mind, so far is a Man *free*. Wherever any Performance or Forbearance are not equally in a Man's Power wherever doing or not doing will not equally follow upon the Preference of his Mind, directing it there he is not *free*, though perhaps the Action may be *voluntary*. So that the Idea of *Liberty* is the Idea of a Power in any Agent to do or forbear any Action according to the Determination or Thought of the Mind, whereby either of them is preferred to the other; where either of them is not in the Power of the Agent to be produced by him, according to his *Volition*, there he is not at *Liberty*; that Agent is under *Necessity*. So that *Liberty* cannot be where there is no *Thought*, no *Volition*, no *Will*, but there may

may be Thought, there may be Will, there may be Volition, where there is no *Liberty*. Thus a *Tennis-ball*, whether in Motion by the Stroke of a Racket, or lying at Reſt, is not by any one taken to be a free Agent; becauſe we conceive not a *Tennis-ball* to think, and conſequently not to have any Volition or Preference of Motion to Reſt, or *vice verſa*. So a Man ſtriking himſelf or his Friend by a convulſive Motion of his Arm, which is not in his Power by Volition or the Direction of his Mind to Stop, or forbear; nobody thinks he has, in this, *Liberty*, every one pities him as acting by *Neceſſity* and *Conſtraint*. Again, ſuppoſe a Man to be carried whilſt faſt aſleep into a Room, where is a Perſon he longs to ſee, and be there locked faſt in, beyond his Power to get out; he awakes, and is glad to ſee himſelf in ſo deſirable Company, which he ſtays willingly in; that is, prefers his ſtaying to going away. Is not this Stay voluntary? I think no Body will doubt it, and yet by being locked in, he is not at Liberty not to ſtay, he has not Freedom to be gone. So that *Liberty* is not an Idea belonging to Volition or Preferring, but to the Perſon having a Power of doing or forbearing to do, according as the Mind ſhall chooſe or direct.

As it is in the Motions of the Body, ſo is it with the Thoughts in our Mind: For where we are ſo ſituated, that we have Power to employ the Mind upon any one Thought, or to lay it by according to the Preference of the Mind, there we are at Liberty. A waking Man being under the Neceſſity of having ſome Ideas conſtantly in his Mind, is not at Liberty to think, or not to think, no more than he is at Liberty, whether his Body ſhall touch any other or no: But whether he will remove his Contemplation from one Idea to another, is many Times in his Choice. And then he is, in reſpect of his Ideas, as much at Liberty, as he is

is in reſpect of Bodies he reſts on. He can at Pleaſure remove from one Place to another: But yet ſome Ideas to the Mind, like ſome Motions to the Body, are ſuch, as in certain Circumſtances it cannot avoid or retire from, by the utmoſt Effort it can uſe. Thus a Man on the Rack is not at Liberty to lay by the Idea of *Pain*, and entertain other Contemplations.

Where-ever Thought is wholly wanting, or the Power to act or forbear according to the Direction of Thought, there *Neceſſity* takes place. This in an Agent capable of Volition, when the Beginning or Continuation of any Action is contrary to that Preference of his Mind, is called *Compulſion*; when the hindering or ſtopping any Action is contrary to his Volition, it is called *Reſtraint*: Agents that have no Thought, no Volition at all, are in every thing neceſſary Agents.

And thus I have in a ſhort Draught, given a View of our *Original Ideas*, from whence all the reſt are derived, and of which they are made up: And which may be all reduced to theſe few primary and original Ones, *viz. Extenſion*, *Solidity*, and *Mobility*, the Power of being moved, which by our Senſes we receive from Body: *Perceptivity*, the Power of *Perception* or *Thinking*; *Motivity*, the *Power of moving*, which we receive from our Minds by *Reflection*; to which if we add *Exiſtence*, *Duration*, *Number*, which belong both to the one and to the other, we have perhaps all the original Ideas, on which the reſt depend. By theſe I imagine might be explained the Nature of *Colours*, *Sounds*, *Taſtes*, *Smells*, and all other *Ideas* we have; if we had but Faculties acute enough to perceive, the ſeveral modified Extenſions and Motions of theſe minute Bodies, which produce thoſe ſeveral Senſations in us.

CHAP.

CHAP. XXII.

Of Mixed Modes.

HAving treated of *ſimple Modes* in the foregoing Chapters, and given ſeveral Inſtances of ſome of the moſt conſiderable of them, to ſhew what they are, and how we come by them; we are now, in the next Place, to conſider thoſe we call *Mixed Modes*; ſuch are the complex *Ideas*, we mark by the Names *Obligation*, *Drunkenneſs*, a *Lie*, &c. which, conſiſting of ſeveral Combinations of ſimple *Ideas* of different Kinds, I have called *Mixed Modes*, to diſtinguiſh them from the more ſimple Modes, which conſiſt only of ſimple Ideas of the ſame Kind. Theſe mixed Modes being alſo ſuch Combinations of ſimple Ideas, as are not looked upon to be characteriſtical Marks of any real Beings that have a ſteady Exiſtence, but ſcattered and independent Ideas, put together by the Mind, are thereby diſtinguiſhed from the complex Ideas of Subſtances.

That the Mind, in Reſpect of its ſimple Ideas, is wholly paſſive, and receives them all from the Exiſtence and Operations of Things, ſuch as Senſation or Reflection offers them, without being able to make any one Idea, Experience ſhews us. But if we attentively conſider theſe Ideas I call mixed Modes, we are now ſpeaking of, we ſhall find their Original quite different. The Mind often exerciſes an active Power in making theſe ſeveral Combinations: For it being only furniſhed with ſimple *Ideas*, it can put them together in ſeveral Compoſitions, and ſo make a Variety of complex Ideas, without examining whether they exiſt ſo together in Nature. And hence I think it is, that theſe Ideas are called *Notions* or *Conceptions*, as if they had their original and conſtant Exiſtence more in the Thoughts of Men than in the Reality of Things: And to form ſuch Ideas it ſufficeth that the Mind

put

put the Parts of them together, and that they were conſiſtent in the Underſtanding, without conſidering whether they had any real Being. There are three Ways whereby we get the complex Ideas of *mixed Modes*.

Firſt, By *Experience* and Obſervation of Things themſelves; thus by ſeeing two Men wreſtle, we get the *Idea* of wreſtling.

Secondly, By *Invention* or voluntary putting together ſeveral ſimple *Ideas* in our Minds; ſo the Perſon that firſt invented *Printing*, had an *Idea* of it in his Mind, before he ever exiſted it.

Thirdly, Which is the moſt uſual Way, by *explaining* the Names of Actions we never ſaw, or Notions we cannot ſee; and by enumerating, and thereby, as it were, ſetting before our Imaginations all thoſe *Ideas* which go to the making them up, and are the conſtituent Parts of them. For having, by Senſation and Reflection, ſtored our Minds with ſimple Ideas, and by Uſe got the Names that ſtand for them, we can by thoſe Names repreſent to another any complex Idea we would have him conceive; ſo that it has in it no ſimple Ideas but what he knows, and has, with us, the ſame Name for. For all our complex Ideas are ultimately reſolvable into ſimple Ideas, of which they are compounded, and originally made up, though perhaps their immediate Ingredients, as I may ſay, are alſo complex Ideas. Thus the mixed Mode which the Word *Lie* ſtands for, is made up of theſe ſimple *Ideas*: Firſt, *Articulate Sounds*. Secondly, *Certain* Ideas *in the Mind of the Speaker*. Thirdly, *Thoſe Words*, *the Signs of theſe* Ideas. Fourthly, *Thoſe Signs put together* by Affirmation or Negation, otherwiſe than the *Ideas* they ſtand for, are in the Mind of the Speaker. Since Languages are made, *complex Ideas* are uſually acquired by the Explication of thoſe Terms that ſtand for them: For ſince they conſiſt of ſimple *Ideas* combined, they may, by Words ſtanding for thoſe

ſimple

ſimple *Ideas*, be repreſented to the Mind of one who underſtands thoſe Words, tho' that Combination of ſimple *Ideas* was never offered to his Mind by the real Exiſtence of Things.

Mixed Modes have their *Unity* from an Act of the Mind, combining their ſeveral ſimple *Ideas* together, and conſidering them as one complex *Idea*: The *Mark* of this Union is one *Name* given to that Combination. Men ſeldom reckon any Number of *Ideas* to make one complex one; but ſuch Collections as there be Names for. Thus the *killing of an old Man*, is as fit to be united into one *complex Idea*, as that of *a Father*: Yet there being no Name for it, it is not taken for a particular complex *Idea*; nor a diſtinct Species of Action, from that of killing any other Man.

Thoſe Collections of *Ideas* have generally Names affixed to them, which are of great Uſe in Converſation; as Men are enabled by them to communicate their thoughts to one another with all poſſible Diſpatch. Thoſe other Ideas which they have ſeldom occaſion to mention, they unite not together, nor are they particulariſed by having Names given them.

This ſhews the Occaſion why there are Words in every Language, which cannot be rendered by any ſingle Word of another. For the Faſhions and Cuſtoms of one Nation, make ſeveral Combinations of *Ideas* familiar in one, which another had never any occaſion to make. Such were Ὀψαρτισμὸς among the *Greeks*, and *Proſcriptio* among the *Romans*. This alſo occaſions the *conſtant Change* of Languages; for the Change of Cuſtom and Opinions, bring with them new Combinations of *Ideas*, which, to avoid long Deſcriptions of, have new Names annexed to them, and ſo they become *new Species* of *mixed* Modes.

Of all our ſimple *Ideas*, thoſe that have had moſt *mixed Modes* made out of them, are *Thinking*, and

and *Motion*; (which comprehend in them all Action) and *Power*, from whence theſe Actions are conceived to flow. For Actions being the great Buſineſs of Mankind, it is no wonder if the ſeveral Modes of Thinking and Motion ſhould be taken Notice of, the *Ideas* of them obſerved and laid up in the Memory, and have Names aſſigned them. For without ſuch *complex Ideas* with Names to them, Men could not eaſily hold any Communication about them. Of this Kind are the Modes of Actions diſtinguiſhed by their *Cauſes*, *Means*, *Objects*, *Ends*, *Inſtruments*, *Time*, *Place*, and other Circumſtances; as alſo of the Powers fitted for thoſe Actions: Thus *Boldneſs* is the Power to do or Speak what we intend without Fear or Diſorder; which Power of doing any Thing, when it has been acquired by the frequent doing the ſame Thing, is that *Idea* we call *Habit*; when forward and ready upon every Occaſion to break into Action, we call it *Diſpoſition*: Thus *Teſtineſs* is a Diſpoſition or Aptneſs to be angry.

Power being the Source of all Action, the Subſtances wherein theſe Powers are, when they exert this Power, are called *Cauſes*; and the Subſtances thereupon produced, or the ſimple *Ideas* introduced into any Subject, *Effects*. The Efficacy whereby the new Subſtance or *Idea* is produced, is called, in the Subject, exerting that Power, *Action*; in the Subject wherein any ſimple *Idea* is changed, or produced, *Paſſion*:- which Efficacy in *intellectual Agents*, we can, I think, conceive to be nothing elſe but Modes of Thinking and Willing: In *corporeal Agents* nothing elſe but Modifications of Motion. Whatever Sort of Action, beſides theſe, produces any Effect, I confeſs myſelf to have no Notion or *Idea* of. And therefore many Words which ſeem to expreſs ſome Action, ſignify nothing more, but barely the Effect of the Action, with ſome circumſtances of the Subject wrought on, or Cauſe operating. Thus *Creation*, *Annihilation*, contain in them no *Idea* of the Action, or Manner, whereby they are produced, but

but barely of the Cauſe, and the Thing done. And when a Countryman ſays the Cold *freezes Water*, tho' the Word *Freezing* ſeems to import ſome Action, yet it truly ſignifies nothing but the Effect, *viz.* That Water that was before *fluid*, is become *hard*, and *conſiſtent*, without containing any *Idea* of the Action whereby it is done.

I think I ſhall not need to remark here, that though Power and Action make the greateſt part of mixed Modes, marked by Names, and familiar in the Minds and Mouths of Men; yet other ſimple Ideas, and their ſeveral Combinations, are not excluded; much leſs, I think, will it be neceſſary for me to enumerate all the mixed Modes, which have been ſettled, with Names to them. That would be to make a Dictionary of the greateſt part of the Words made uſe of in Divinity, Ethicks, Law, and Politicks, and ſeveral other Sciences. All that is requiſite to my preſent Deſign, is, to ſhew what ſort of Ideas thoſe are which I call *mixed Modes*; how the Mind comes by them; and that they are Compoſitions made up of ſimple Ideas got from Senſation and Reflection; which, I ſuppoſe, I have done.

CHAP. XXIII.

Of our complex Ideas *of Subſtances.*

THE Mind obſerving ſeveral ſimple *Ideas* to go conſtantly together, which being preſumed to belong to one Thing, are called, ſo united in one Subject, by one Name, which we are apt afterwards to talk of and conſider as one ſimple *Idea*, which indeed is a Complication of many *Ideas* together. We not conceiving how theſe ſimple *Ideas* can ſubſiſt by themſelves, ſuppoſe ſome *Subſtratum*, wherein they ſubſiſt, which we call *Subſtance*. The *Idea* of pure Subſtance is nothing but the ſuppoſed unknown

unknown Support of theſe Qualities, which are capable of producing ſimple *Ideas* in us; which Qualities are called *Accidents*.

The *Ideas* of *particular Sorts of Subſtances* are compoſed out of this obſcure and general *Idea* of Subſtance, together with ſuch Combinations of ſimple *Ideas*, as are obſerved to exiſt together, and ſuppoſed to flow from the particular internal Conſtitution and unknown Eſſence of that Subſtance. Thus we come by the *Ideas* of *Man*, *Horſe*, *Gold*, &c. Thus the ſenſible Qualities of *Iron* or a *Diamond*, make the complex *Ideas* of thoſe Subſtances, which a Smith or a Jeweller commonly knows better than a Philoſopher.

The ſame happens concerning the Operations of the Mind, *viz. Thinking*, *Reaſoning*, &c. which we concluding not to ſubſiſt of themſelves, nor apprehending how they can belong to Body, or be produced by it, are apt to think them the Actions of ſome other Subſtance, which we call *Spirit*; of whoſe Subſtance or Nature we have no clearer Conception than that of Body; the one being but the ſuppoſed *Subſtratum* of the ſimple *Ideas* we have from without; as the other is, of thoſe Operations which we experience in ourſelves within: So that the *Idea* of *corporeal Subſtances* in Matter, is as remote from our Conceptions as that of *ſpiritual Subſtances* in the Mind.

Hence we may conclude that he has the moſt perfect *Idea* of any particular Subſtance, who has collected moſt of thoſe ſimple *Ideas* which do exiſt in it; among which we are to reckon its *active Powers*, and *paſſive Capacities*, though not ſtrictly *ſimple Ideas*.

Secondary Qualities ſerve principally to diſtinguiſh Subſtances. For our Senſes failing us in the Diſcovery of the *Bulk*, *Figure*, *Texture*, &c. of the minute Parts of Bodies, on which their real Conſtitutions and Differences depend; Secondary Qualities are

are nothing more but the bare Powers of Subſtances with their Relations to our Senſes. The *Ideas* that make our complex Ones of corporeal Subſtances, are of three Sorts. Firſt, The *Ideas* of primary Qualities of Things, which are diſcovered by our Senſes: Such are *Bulk*, *Figure*, *Motion*, &c. *Secondly*, The ſenſible ſecondary Qualities, which are nothing but Powers to Produce ſeveral *Ideas* in us by our Senſes; which Ideas are not in the Things themſelves, otherwiſe than as any Thing is in its Cauſe. *Thirdly*, The Aptneſs we conſider in any Subſtance to give, or receive ſuch Alterations of primary Qualities, as that the Subſtance ſo altered, ſhould produce in us different *Ideas* from what it did before: Theſe are called *active* and *paſſive Powers*: All which, as far as we have any Notice or Notion of them, terminate in ſenſible *ſimple Ideas*.

Had we Senſes acute enough to diſcern the minute Particles of Bodies, and the real Conſtitution on which their ſenſible Qualities depend, it is not to be doubted, but they would produce quite different *Ideas* in us; as we find in viewing Things with *Microſcopes*. Such Bodies as to our naked Eyes appear clouded and opaque, will through *Microſcopes* appear pellucid. *Blood* to the naked Eye appears all red; but by a good *Microſcope* we ſee only ſome red Globules ſwimming in a tranſparent Liquor.

The *infinite wiſe Author* of our Being has fitted our Senſes, Organs and Faculties to the Conveniencies of Life, and the Buſineſs we have to do here: We may by our Senſes know and diſtinguiſh Things, ſo far as to accommodate them to the Exigencies of this Life. We have alſo Inſight enough into their admirable contrivances, and wonderful Effects, to admire and magnify the Wiſdom, Power and Goodneſs of their Author. Such a Knowledge as this, which is ſuited to our preſent Condition, we want not Faculties to attain; and we are fitted well enough with Abilities to provide for the Conveniencies of Living

Living here, and as far as we are connected with this World.

Beſides the complex *Ideas* we have of material ſenſible Subſtances, by the Simple *Ideas* taken from the Operation of our minds, we find, from Experience, a Power in ourſelves, of *Thinking*, *Underſtanding*, *Willing Knowing*, &c. co-exiſting in the ſame Subſtance from which we Frame the complex *Idea* of *Spirit*. And the *Idea* of an *immaterial Subſtance*, we have as clear a Perception of, by putting together the Ideas of Thinking, Perceiving, Willing, and the Power of moving, &c. as of a *material*, by putting together the Ideas of Extenſion, Figure, Solidity, &c. By joining the former with Subſtance, (of which we have no diſtinct *Idea*) we have the *Idea* of an immaterial Spirit: and by putting together the *Ideas* of coherent ſolid Parts, and Power of being moved, joined with Subſtance, (of which likewiſe we have no poſitive *Idea*) we have the *Idea* of *Matter*. The one is as clear and diſtinct an Idea as the other. The Subſtance of *Spirit* is unknown to us; and ſo is the Subſtance of *Body* equally unknown: Two primary Qualities or Properties of Body *viz. ſolid*, *coherent Parts*, and *Impulſe*, we have diſtinct, clear *Ideas* of: So likewiſe have we, of two primary qualities or Properties of Spirit, *Thinking* and a *Power of Action*. We have alſo clear and diſtinct *Ideas* of ſeveral Qualities inherent in Bodies, which are but the various Modifications of the extenſion of cohering ſolid Parts, and their Motion. We have likewiſe the *Ideas* of the ſeveral Modes of Thinking, *viz.* Believing, Doubting, Hoping, Fearing, *&c.* as alſo of willing and moving the Body conſequent to it.

If this Notion of Spirit may have ſome Difficulties in it, not eaſy to be explained, we have no more Reaſon to deny or doubt of the *Exiſtence of Spirit*, than we have to deny or doubt of the *Exiſtence of Body*: becauſe the Conception of Body is incumbered with ſome Difficulties very hard, and perhaps.

perhaps as impoſſible to be explained or underſtood by us. The *diviſibility in infinitum*, for inſtance, of any finite extenſion, involves us, whether we grant or deny it, in Conſequences impoſſible to be explicated, or made conſiſtent to our Apprehenſions. We have therefore as much Reaſon to be ſatisfied with our Notion of *Spirit*, as with our Notion of *Body*; and the Exiſtence of the one, as well as of the other. We have no other *Idea* of the *Supreme Being*, but a complex one of *Exiſtence*, *Power*, *Knowledge*, *Duration*, *Pleaſure*, *Happineſs*, and ſeveral other Qualities, Infinite and Eternal; which are all diſtinct *Ideas*, and ſome of them being relative, are again compounded of others; all which, as has been ſhown, are originally got from Senſation, and Reflection, and go to make up the Idea or Notion we have of God, and theſe to that vaſtneſs to which Infinity can extend them.

In which complex *Idea* we may obſerve that there is no ſimple one, excepting *Infinity*, which is not a part of our complex *Idea* of other Spirits; becauſe in our *Ideas*, as well of Spirits as other Things, we we are reſtrained to thoſe we receive from *Senſation* and *Reflection*.

CHAP. XXIV.

Of collective Ideas *of Subſtances.*

THERE are other *Ideas* of Subſtances which may be called *Collective*, and are made up of many particular Subſtances conſidered as united into one *Idea*, as a *Troop*, *Army*, &c. which the Mind makes by its Power of Compoſition. Theſe *collective* Ideas are but the artificial Draughts of the Mind bringing Things remote, and independent on one another, into one View, the better to contemplate and diſcourſe of them, united into one Conception, and ſignified by one Name. For there are no Things ſo remote, nor ſo contrary, which the Mind

cannot by this Art of Compoſition, bring into one *Idea*, as is viſible in that ſignified by the Name *Univerſe*.

CHAP. XXV.

Of Relation.

BESIDES the Ideas, whether ſimple or complex, that the Mind has of Things, as they are in themſelves, there are others it gets from their Compariſon one with another. The Underſtanding, in the Conſideration of any Thing, is not confined to that preciſe Object: It can carry any Idea, as it were, beyond itſelf, or, at leaſt, look beyond it, to ſee how it ſtands in Conformity to any other. When the Mind ſo conſiders one Thing, that it does, as it were, bring it to, and ſet it by another and carry its View from one to the other: This is, as the Words import, *Relation* and *Reſpect*; and the Denominations given to poſitive Things, intimating that *Reſpect*, and ſerving as Marks to lead the Thoughts beyond the ſubject itſelf denominated, to ſomething diſtinct from it, are what we call *Relatives*; and the Things ſo brought together, *related*. Thus when the Mind conſiders *Cajus*, as ſuch a poſitive Being, it takes nothing into that Idea, but what really exiſts in *Cajus*; *v. g.* when I conſider him as Man, I have nothing in my Mind, but the complex Idea of the Species, Man. So likewiſe, when I ſay *Cajus* is a white Man I have nothing but the bare Conſideration of Man, who hath that white Colour. But when I give *Cajus* the Name *Huſband*, I intimate ſome other Perſon; and when I give him the Name *Whiter*, I intimate ſome other Thing. In both Caſes my Thought is led to ſomething beyond *Cajus*, and there are two Things brought into Conſideration. And ſince any Idea, whether ſimple or complex, may be the Occaſion why the Mind thus brings two Things together,

and

and, as it were, takes a View of them at once, though ſtill conſidered as diſtinct; therefore any of our *Ideas* may be the Foundation of Relation.

Where Languages have failed to give correlative Names, there the Relation is not ſo eaſily taken Notice of: As in *Concubine*, which is a relative Name as well as *Wife*.

The *Ideas* of Relation may be the ſame, in thoſe Men who have very different *Ideas* of the Things that are related or compared. Thus thoſe who have different *Ideas* of *Man*, may agree in that of a *Father*.

There is no *Idea* of any Kind, which is not capable of an almoſt infinite Number of Conſiderations, in Reference to other Things: And therefore this makes no ſmall Part of Mens Words and Thoughts. Thus one ſingle Man may at once ſuſtain the Relations of *Father*, *Brother*, *Son Huſband*, *Friend*, *Subject*, *General*, *European*, *Engliſhman*, *Iſlander*, *Maſter*, *Servant*, *Greater*, *Leſs*, &c. to an almoſt infinite Number; he being capable of as many Relations as there may be Occaſions of comparing him to other Things in any Manner of Agreement, Diſagreement, or Reſpect whatſoever.

The *Ideas* of Relations are much *clearer* and more *diſtinct* than of the Things compared; becauſe the Knowledge of one ſimple *Idea* is oftentimes ſufficient to convey the Notion of the Relation: But to the knowing of any ſubſtantial Being, an accurate Collection of ſundry *Ideas* is neceſſary.

CHAP. XXVI.

Of Cauſe and Effects, and other Relations.

IN the Notice that our Senſes take of the conſtant *viciſſitude of Things*, we cannot but obſerve, that ſeveral Particulars, both Qualities and Subſtan-

ces, begin to exiſt; and that they receive their Exiſtence from the due Application and Operation of ſome other Beings. From this Obſervation we get our *Ideas* of *Cauſe* and *Effect*. That which *produces* any ſimple or complex Idea, we denote by the general Name *Cauſe*; and that which is *produced*, *Effect*. Thus finding, that in that Subſtance which we call Wax, *Fluidity* which is a ſimple Idea, that was not in it before, is conſtantly produced by the Application of a certain Degree of Heat, we call the ſimple Idea of Heat, in Relation to Fluidity in Wax, the Cauſe of it, and Fluidity, the Effect.

Having thus, from what our Senſes are able to diſcover, in the Operations of Bodies on one another, got the Notion of Cauſe and Effect; *viz.* A *Cauſe* is that, which makes any other Thing begin to be; whether a ſimple Idea, Subſtance or Mode, and an *Effect* is that, which had its beginning from ſome other Thing: The Mind finds no great Difficulty to diſtinguiſh the ſeveral Originals of things into two Sorts.

Firſt, When the Thing is wholly made new, ſo that no Part thereof did ever Exiſt before, as when a new Particle of Matter doth begin to exiſt, which had before no Being, this we call *Creation*.

Secondly, When a Thing is made up of Particles which did all of them before exiſt, but that very Thing ſo conſtituted of pre-exiſting Particles, had not any Exiſtence before, which conſidered altogether make up ſuch a Collection of ſimple *Ideas*, as this *Man*, this *Egg*, this *Roſe*, &c. This, when referred to a Subſtance, produced in the ordinary Courſe of Nature, by an internal Principle, but ſet on Work by ſome external Agent or Cauſe, and working by inſenſible Ways which we perceive not, is called *Generation*.

When the Cauſe is extrinſical, and the Effect produced by a ſenſible Separation, or Juxta-poſition of

of discernible Parts, we call it *making*; and such are all artificial Things. When any simple *Idea* is produced, which was not in that Subject before, we call it *Alteration*.

The Denominations of Things taken from *Time*, are for the most part only Relations. Thus when it is said that Queen *Elizabeth* lived Sixty Nine, and reigned Forty Five Years, no more is meant, than that the Duration of her Existence was equal to Sixty Nine, and of her Government to Forty Five annual Revolutions of the Sun: And so are all Words answering, *How long*.

Young and *Old*, and other words of Time, that are thought to stand for positive *Ideas*, are indeed relative; and intimate a Relation to a certain Length of Duration, wherein we have the *Idea* in our Minds. Thus we call a Man young or Old, that has lived little or much of that Time that Men usually attain to. This is evident from our Application of these Names to other Things; for a *Man* is called Young at twenty, but a *Horse* Old, &c. The Sun and Stars, though they have out-lasted several Generations of Men, we call not Old, because we know not what Period God has set to these Sorts of Beings.

There are other *Ideas*, that are truly *relative*, which we signify by Names that are thought *positive* and *absolute*; such as *great* and *little*, *strong* and *weak*. The Things thus denominated, are referred to some Standards, whereby to denominate the Bulk and Degrees of others, with which we compare them. Thus we call an *Apple great*, that is bigger than the ordinary Sort of those we have been used to, and a Man is said to be *weak* that has not so much Strength or Power to move as Men usually have, or usually those of his own Size have.

CHAP. XXVII

Of Identity and Diverſity.

ANother Occaſion the Mind takes of comparing, is the very *Being of Things:* when conſidering any Thing as exiſting at any certain Time, or Place, and comparing it with itſelf as exiſting at any other Time, &c. it forms the *Ideas* of *Identity* and *Diverſity*. When we ſee any Thing, in any certain Inſtant of Time, and Place, we are ſure, it is that very Thing, and no other, how like ſoever it may be in all other Reſpects, to another, which at the ſame Time exiſts in another Place, however like and undiſtinguiſhable it may be in all other Reſpects; and in this conſiſts *Identity*.

We conceiving it impoſſible, that two Things of the ſame Kind ſhould exiſt together in the ſame Place, at the ſame Time we rightly conclude that whatever exiſts any where, at any Time, excludes all of the ſame Kind, and is there itſelf alone. When therefore we demand whether any Thing be the *ſame*, or no, it refers always to ſomething that exiſted ſuch a Time, in ſuch a Place, which it was certain at that Inſtant was the ſame with itſelf and no other, from whence it follows that one Thing cannot have two Beginnings of Exiſtence, nor two Things one Beginning, it being impoſſible for two Things of the ſame Kind, to be, or exiſt, in the ſame Inſtant, in the very ſame Places, or one and the ſame Thing in different Places.

We have *Ideas* but of three Sorts of Subſtances, Firſt, God. Secondly, *Finite Intelligences*. Thirdly, *Bodies*.

Firſt, God is without beginning Eternal, unalterable, and every where, wherefore concerning his *Identity*, there can be no Doubt.

Secondly,

Secondly, Finite Spirits having had their determinate Time and Place of beginning to Exist, the Relation to that Time and Place will always determine to each of them their *Identity*, as long as they exist.

Thirdly, The same will hold of every Particle of Matter to which no Addition or Subtraction of Matter is made. For though these three Sorts of Substances, as we term them, do not exclude one another out of the same Place, yet we cannot conceive but that they must *necessarily* each exclude those of the same Kind, out of the same Place; or else the Notions and Names of *Identity* and *Diversity* would be in vain, and there could be no such Distinction of Substances.

The Identity and Diversity of *Modes* and *Relations* are determined after the same Manner that Substances are; only as to Things whose Existence is in Succession, such as the Actions of finite Beings, as *Motion* and *Thought*, both of which consisting in a Train of succession, concerning their Diversity, there can be no Question: because each perishing the Moment it begins, they cannot Exist in different Times or indifferent Places, as permanent Beings can at different Times exist in distant Places; therefore no *Motion* or *Thought*, considered as at different Times can be the same, each Part thereof having a different beginning of Existence.

From whence it is plain, that Existence itself is the *Principium individuationis*, which determines a Being to a particular Time and Place, incommunicable to two Beings of the same Kind. Thus suppose an *Atom* existing in a determined Time and Place; it is evident that considered in any Instant of its Existence, it is in that Instant the same with itself, and will be so as long as its Existence continues. The same may be said of two, or more, or any Number of Particles, while they continue together. The *Mass* will be the same, however jumbled; but if

one Atom be taken away, or one added, it is no longer the ſame Maſs, or the ſame Body.

In *Vegetables*, and living Creatures, their Identity depends not on the ſame Maſs of the ſame Particles, but on ſomething elſe: for in them the Variation of great Parcels of Matter alters not their Identity. The Reaſon of this is the Difference between an animate Body, and a Maſs of Matter; *the* latter being only the Coheſion of Particles any how united; *the other*, ſuch a Diſpoſition and Organization of Parts, as is fit to receive and diſtribute Nouriſhment, ſo as to continue and frame the Wood, Bark, Leaves, *&c.* of an *Oak*, in which conſiſts the vegetable Life. That therefore which has ſuch an Organization of Parts partaking of one common Life, continues to be the ſame *Plant*, tho' that Life be communicated to new Particles of Matter vitally united to the living Plant. The Caſe is not ſo much different in *Brutes*, but that any one may hence ſee what makes an *Animal* and continues it the *ſame*. Something like this we have in Machines, and may ſerve to illuſtrate it. For Example, what is a Watch? It is plain it is nothing but a fit Organization, or Conſtruction of Parts to a certain End, which, when a ſufficient Force is added to it, it is capable to attain. If we would ſuppoſe this Machine one continued Body, all whoſe organized Parts were repaired, increaſed, or diminiſhed, by a conſtant Addition or Separation of inſenſible Parts, with one common Life, we ſhould have ſomething very much like the Body of an Animal, with this Difference, that in an Animal, the fitneſs of the Organization and the Motion wherein Life conſiſts, begin together, the Motion coming from within; but in Machines, the Force coming ſenſibly from without, is often away when the Organ is in order, and well fitted to receive it.

This ſhows wherein the Identity of the *ſame Man* conſiſts; *viz.* in nothing but a Participation of the ſame continued Life, by conſtantly fleeting Particles of

of Matter, in Succeſſion, vitally united to the ſame organized Body.

To underſtand *Identity* aright, we muſt conſider what Idea the Word it is applied to ſtands for. It being one Thing to be the *ſame Subſtance*, another the *ſame Man*, and a third the *ſame Perſon*, if Perſon, Man, and Subſtance, are three Names ſtanding for three different Ideas; for ſuch as is the Idea belonging to that Name, ſuch muſt be the Identity: which, if it had been a little more carefully attended to, would poſſibly have prevented a great Deal of that Confuſion, which often occurs about this matter, with no ſmall ſeeming Difficulties, eſpecially concerning perſonal Identity, which therefore we ſhall, in the next place, a little conſider.

An *Animal* is a living organized Body; and conſequently the ſame Animal, is the ſame continued Life communicated to different Particles of Matter, as they happen ſucceſſively to be united to that organized living Body; and our Notion of Man is but of a particular Sort of Animal.

To find wherein perſonal Identity conſiſts, we muſt conſider what *Perſon* ſtands for; which is a thinking, intelligent Being, that reaſons and reflects, and can conſider itſelf the ſame Thing in different Times and Places; which it performs by that *Conſciouſneſs* that is inſepraable from Thinking, and eſſential to it; it being impoſſible for any one to perceive, without perceiving that he does perceive. By this every one is to himſelf what he calls *Self*, without conſidering whether that *Self* be continued in the ſame, or divers Subſtances. In this conſiſts *perſonal Identity*, or the Sameneſs of a rational Being: And ſo far as this Conſciouſneſs extends backward to any paſt Action, or Thought, ſo far reaches the Identity of that Perſon. It is the ſame *Self* now, it was then: And it is by the ſame *Self*, with this preſent one, that now reflects on it, that the Action was done.

Self is that conſcious thinking Thing, (whatever Subſtance made up of, whether ſpiritual, or material, ſimple or compound, it matters not,) which is conſcious of Pleaſure or Pain, capable of Happineſs or Miſery; and ſo is concerned for itſelf, as far as that Conſciouſneſs extends. That with which the Conſciouſneſs of this preſent thinking Thing can join itſelf, makes the ſame Perſon, and is one Self with it; and ſo attributes to itſelf, and owns all the Actions of that Thing, as its own, as far as that Conſciouſneſs reaches, and no farther; as every one who reflects, will perceive.

In this *perſonal Identity*, is founded all the Right and Juſtice of Reward and Puniſhment; Happineſs and Miſery being that for which every one is concerned for himſelf. For as it is evident, if the *Conſciouſneſs* went along with the little Finger, when that was cut off, it would be the ſame Self that was juſt before concerned for the whole Body.

This may ſhow us, that perſonal Identity is not in the Identity of Subſtance, but in the Identity of Conſciouſneſs, for, if the ſame *Socrates*, waking and ſleeping, did not partake of the ſame Conſciouſneſs, he would not be the ſame *Perſon*. *Socrates* waking, could not be in Juſtice accountable for what *Socrates* ſleeping did, no more than one *Twin*, for what his Brother *Twin* did, whereof he knew nothing, becauſe their Outſides were ſo like, that they could not be diſtinguiſhed.

But ſuppoſe I wholly loſe the Memory of ſome Parts of my Life, beyond a Poſſibility of retrieving them, ſo that I ſhall never be conſcious of them again; am I not the *ſame Perſon* that did thoſe Actions, tho' I have now forgot them? I anſwer, that we muſt here take Notice what the Word *I* is applied to, which in this Caſe is the Man only: And the ſame Man being preſumed to be the ſame Perſon, *I* is eaſily here ſuppoſed to ſtand alſo for the ſame Perſon. But if it be poſſible for the ſame Man to have

have diſtinct incommunicable Conſciouſneſs's at different Times, the ſame Man would at different Times make different Perſons. Which we ſee is the Senſe of Mankind in the moſt ſolemn Declaration of their Opinions, human Laws not puniſhing the Madman for the ſober Man's Actions, nor the ſober Man for what the Madman did; thereby making them two Perſons, which is ſomewhat explained by our Way of ſpeaking in *Engliſh*, when we ſay ſuch an one *is not himſelf*, or is *beſides himſelf*, in which Phraſes it is inſinuated, that *ſelf* is changed, and the *ſelf ſame Perſon* is no longer in that Man.

But is not a Man drunk or ſober the ſame Perſon? Why elſe is he puniſhed for the Crimes he commits when drunk, tho' he ſhould never afterwards be conſcious of them? He is juſt as much the ſame Perſon, as Man that walks and does Things in his ſleep, is the ſame Perſon, and is as anſwerable for any Miſchief he may do in it. Human Laws puniſh both with a Juſtice ſuitable to their Way of Knowledge; for in theſe Caſes they cannot diſtinguiſh with Certainty what is real, and what is counterfeit; and ſo the Ignorance in Drunkenneſs or ſleep, is not admitted as a Plea: for tho' Puniſhment is annexed to Perſonality, and Perſonality to Conſciouſneſs; and the Drunkard perhaps is not conſcious of what he did, yet human Judicatures juſtly puniſh him becauſe the Fact is proved againſt him; but want of Conſciouſneſs cannot be proved for him. But in the great Day, wherein the *Secrets of all Hearts ſhall be laid open*, it may be reaſonable to think, no one ſhall be made to anſwer for what he knows nothing of, but ſhall receive his Doom, his *own Conſcience accuſing*, or elſe *excuſing him*.

To conclude, whatever Subſtance begins to exiſt, it muſt during its Exiſtence neceſſarily be the ſame, whatever Compoſitions of Subſtances begin to exiſt, during the Union of theſe Subſtances, the Concrete muſt be the ſame. Whatſoever Mode begins to exiſt, during its Exiſtence, it is the ſame: And ſo if the

the Compoſition be of diſtinct Subſtances, and different Modes, the ſame Rule holds. Whence it appears that the Difficulty or Obſcurity that has been about this Matter, rather ariſes from *Names* being improperly *uſed*, than from any *Obſcurity in the Things* themſelves; for whatever makes the ſpecifick Idea, to which the Name is applied, if that Idea be ſteadily kept to, the Diſtinction of any Thing into the *ſame*, and *diverſe*, will eaſily be conceived, and there can ariſe no doubt concerning it.

CHAP. XXVIII.

Of other Relations.

ALL ſimple Ideas, being capable of Parts or Degrees, afford an Occaſion of comparing the Subjects wherein they are to one another, in Reſpect of theſe ſimple Ideas. As *whiter*, *ſweeter*, *more*, *leſs*, &c. Theſe depending on the Equality, and Exceſs of the ſame ſimple Idea, in ſeveral Subjects may be called, *proportional Relations*,

Another Occaſion of comparing Things is taken from the Circumſtances of their Origin, or Beginning; which not being afterwards to be altered, make the Relations depending thereon as laſting as the Subjects to which they belong; as *Father*, *Son*, *Brother*, &c. Theſe may be called *natural Relations*, which are of great Uſe, marking out to Mankind the Relationſhip they have to each other, there being Occaſion for it, both in Law, and other Communications, one with another: from whence alſo ariſe the Obligations of ſeveral Duties amongſt Men, and which are properly diſtinguiſhed by the Names affixed to them.

Sometimes the Foundation of conſidering Things is ſome Act whereby any one comes by a moral Right, Power, or Obligation, to do ſomething: Such

Such are *General*, *Captain*, *Burgher*; these are *instituted* and *voluntary Relations*, and may be distinguished from the *Natural*, in that they are alterable and separable from the Persons to whom they sometimes belonged, tho' neither of theSubstances so related be destroyed, which is otherwise in natural Relations, they holding good as long as their Subjects, as has been just observed.

Another Relation is the Conformity or Disagreement of Mens voluntary Actions to a Rule to which they are referred, and by which they are judged of: These may be called *moral Relations*. It is this Conformity or Disagreement of our Actions to some Law (whereby *Good* or *Evil* is drawn on us from the Will and Power of the Law-maker, and is what we call *Reward* or *Punishment*) that renders our Actions morally good or evil.

These deserve well to be examined, there being no Part of Knowledge wherein we should be more careful to get determined Ideas, and avoid, as much as possible, Obscurity and Confusion. Human Actions, when with their various Ends, Objects Manners and Circumstances, they are framed into distinct complex Ideas, are, as has been shown, so many mixed Modes, a great Part whereof have Names annexed to them. Thus, Gratitude, is a Readiness to acknowledge, and return Kindnesses received.

Of these *moral Rules*, or Laws, to which Men generally refer, and by which they judge of the Rectitude or Pravity of their Actions, there seem to be three Sorts, with their three different Enforcements, or Rewards and Punishments. For, since it would be utterly in vain to suppose a Rule set to the free Actions of Man, without annexing to it some Enforcement of Good and Evil to determine his Will, we must, where-ever we suppose a Law, suppose also some Reward or Punishment annexed to that Law. It would be in vain for one intelligent

gent Being to ſet a Rule to the Actions of another, if he had it not in his Power to reward the Compliance with, and Puniſh a Deviation from his Rule, by ſome good and Evil, that is not the Natural Product and Conſequence of the Action itſelf: for that being a natural Convenience, or Inconvenience, would operate of itſelf without a Law. This, if I miſtake not, is the Nature of all *Law*, properly ſo called.

The *Laws* that Men generally refer their Actions to, to judge of their Rectitude, or Obliquity, ſeem to me to be theſe three. 1. The *divine Law*. 2. The *civil Law*. 3. The *Law of Opinion or Reputation*, if I may ſo call it. By the Relation they bear to the firſt of theſe, Men judge whether their *Actions* are *Sins*, or *Duties*; by the ſecond, whether they be *criminal*, or *Innocent*; and by the third, whether they be *Virtues* or *Vices*.

Firſt, By the *Divine Law*, I mean that Law which God has ſet to the Actions of Men, whether promulgated to them by the Light of Nature, or the Voice of Revelation.

That God has given a Law to Mankind, ſeems undeniable, ſince he has, *Firſt*, a Right to do it, as we are his Creatures. *Secondly*, Goodneſs and Wiſdom to direct our Actions to what is beſt. *Thirdly*, Power to enforce it by Reward, and Puniſhment of infinite Weight and Duration, in another Life. This is the only true Touchſtone of moral Rectitude, and by which Men judge of the moſt conſiderable moral Good or Evil of their Actions: That is, whether as Duties or Sins they are like to procure to them Happineſs or Miſery from the Hands of the Almighty.

Secondly, The *civil Law* is the Rule ſet by the Commonwealth, to the Actions of thoſe that belong to it. This law no body overlooks; the Rewards and Puniſhments being ready at Hand to enforce it, extending to the protecting or taking away of Life,

Liberty

Liberty, and Eſtate of thoſe who obſerve or diſobey it; which are the Puniſhments of Offences againſt this Law.

Thirdly, The Law of Opinion or Reputation. *Virtue* and *Vice* are Names ſuppoſed every where to ſtand for Actions in their own Nature, right or wrong. As far as they are really ſo applied, they ſo far are co-incident with the divine Law. But this is viſible that theſe Names *Virtue* and *Vice*, in the particular Inſtances of their Application, through the ſeveral Nations and Societies of Men, are conſtantly attributed only to ſuch Actions as in each Country and Society are in Reputation or Diſcredit. So that the Meaſure of what is every where called and eſteemed *Virtue* and *Vice*, is the Approbation or Diſlike, Praiſe or Blame, which by a tacit Conſent eſtabliſhes itſelf in the Societies and Tribes of Men in the World; whereby ſeveral Actions come to find Credit or Diſgrace among them, according to the Judgment, Maxims, or Cuſtoms of the Place.

That this is ſo, appears hence: That tho' that paſſes for Virtue in one Place, which is elſewhere accounted Vice; yet every where *Virtue* and *Praiſe*, *Vice* and *Blame* go together; *Virtue* is every where that which is thought praiſe-worthy; and nothing elſe but that which has the Approbation of publick Eſteem, is called *Virtue*. Theſe have ſo cloſe an Alliance, that they are often called by the ſame Name.

'Tis true, Virtue and Vice do in a great Meaſure every where correſpond with the unchangeable Rule of right and wrong, which the Laws of God have eſtabliſhed; there being nothing that ſo directly and viſibly ſecures and advances the general Good of Mankind, in this World, as Obedience to the Laws he has ſet them, and nothing that breeds Miſchief and Confuſion ſo much as the Neglect of them; and therefore Men without renouncing all Senſe and Reaſon, and their own Intereſt, could not generally miſtake

mistake in placing their Commendation and Blame on that Side that deserved it not.

They who imagine Commendation and Disgrace not sufficient motives to engage Men to accommodate themselves to the Opinions and Rules of those with whom they converse, seem little skilled in the History of Mankind; the greatest Part whereof he will find to govern themselves chiefly by this *Law of Fashion*.

The Penalties that attend the Breach of God's Laws are seldom seriously reflected on, and those that do reflect on them, while they break the Law, entertain Thoughts of Future Reconciliation. And for the Punishment due from the Laws of the Commonwealth, Men flatter themselves with the Hopes of Impunity: But no Man escapes the Punishment of Censure and Dislike who offends against the Fashion and Opinion of the Company he keeps, and would recommend himself to; nor is there one of Ten Thousand who is stiff and insensible enough to bear up under the constant Dislike and Condemnation of his own Club.

These three then, 1. The Law of God. 2. The Law of political Societies, 3. The Law of Fashion, or private Censure, are those to which Men variously compare their Actions: and it is by their Conformity to one of these Laws, that they take their Measures, when they would judge of their Moral Rectitude, and denominate their Actions good or bad.

Whether the Rule, to which, as to a Touchstone, we bring our voluntary Actions, to examine them by, and try their Goodness, and accordingly to name them; which is, as it were, the Mark of the Value we set upon them: whether, I say, we take that Rule from the Fashion of the Country or the Will of a Law-maker, the Mind is easily able to observe the Relation any Action hath to it; and to judge, whether the Action agrees, or disagrees with the Rule; and so hath a Notion of *moral Goodness*

Goodneſs or Evil, which is either Conformity, or not Conformity of any Action to that Rule: And therefore is often called Moral Rectitude. This Rule being nothing but a Collection of ſeveral ſimple Ideas; the Conformity thereto is but ſo ordering the Action, that the ſimple Ideas belonging to it, may correſpond to thoſe which the Law requires. By which we ſee how moral Beings and Notions are founded on, and terminated in, the ſimple Ideas we have received from Senſation and Reflection. For Example, let us conſider the complex Idea ſignified by the Word *Murder*; and when we have taken it aſunder, and examined all the Particulars. we ſhall find them to amount to a Collection of ſimple Ideas derived from Reflection and Senſation, *viz.* Firſt from Reflection, we have the Ideas of *willing*, *conſidering*, *purpoſing*, *Malice*, &c. Alſo of *Life*, *Perception* and *Self Motion*. Secondly from Senſation, we have the Collection of thoſe ſimple ſenſible Ideas which are to be found in a *Man*, and of ſome Action whereby we put an End to that Perception and Motion in the Man, all which ſimple Ideas, are comprehend in the Word *Murder*. This Collection of ſimple Ideas being found to agree or diſagree with the Eſteem of the Country I have been bred in, and to be held worthy of Praiſe or Blame, I call the Action *virtuous* or *vicious*. If I have the Will of a ſupreme inviſible Law-maker for my Rule, then, as I ſuppoſe the Action commanded or forbidden by *God*, I call it Good or Evil, *Sin* or *Duty*: If I compare it with the civil Law, the Rule made by the Legiſlature of the Country, I call it *lawful* or *unlawful*, a Crime or no Crime. So that whenceſoever we take the Rule of Moral Actions, or by what Standard ſoever we frame in our Minds the Ideas of Virtues or Vices, they conſiſt only, and are made up of Collections of ſimple Ideas, which we originally received from Senſe or Reflection, and their Rectitude or Obliquity conſiſts in the Agreement or Diſagreement with thoſe Patterns preſcribed by ſome Law.

To

To conceive rightly the Rectitude of Moral Actions, we muſt take notice of them under this twofold Conſideration.

Firſt, As they are in themſelves a Collection of ſimple Ideas. Thus Drunkenneſs or Lying ſignifies ſuch a Collection of ſimple Ideas, which I call mixed Modes; in which Senſe they are poſitive abſolute Ideas.

Secondly, Our Actions are conſidered as *Good*, *Bad*, or *Indifferent*: In this Reſpect they are *relative*, it being their Conformity or Diſagreement with ſome Rules that makes them to be ſo. We ought carefully to diſtinguiſh between the poſitive Idea of the Action, and the Reference it has to a Rule: both which are commonly comprehended under one Name, which often occaſions Confuſion, and miſleads the Judgment.

Thus the taking from another what is his without his Conſent, is properly called *ſtealing*: But that Name being commonly underſtood to ſignify alſo the moral Pravity of the Action, Men are apt to condemn whatever they hear called *Stealing*, as an ill Action, diſagreeing with the Rule of Right. And yet the privately taking away a Madman's Sword to prevent his doing Miſchief, tho' it be properly denominated *Stealing*, as agreeing with the *Parts* that compoſe ſuch an *Act* or *Mixed Mode*; yet when compared to the Law of God, it is no Sin or Tranſgreſſion, tho' the Name *Stealing* ordinarily carries ſuch an Intimation with it.

And thus much for the Relation of human Actions to a Law, which therefore I call *moral Relations*.

It would be a Work of infinite Labour to go over the great Variety of Relations; I have here mentioned ſome of the moſt conſiderable, and ſuch as may ſerve to let us ſee, from whence we get our Ideas of Relations, and wherein they are founded.

CHAP.

CHAP. XXIX.

Of clear, obſcure, diſtinct and confuſed Ideas.

HAVING ſhewn the Original of our Ideas, and taken a View of their ſeveral Sorts; I ſhall offer ſome few other Conſiderations concerning them. The firſt is, that ſome are *clear*, others *obſcure*, ſome *diſtinct*, and others *confuſed*.

Our ſimple Ideas are *clear*, when they are ſuch as the Objects themſelves from whence they were taken, did, in a well-ordered Senſation or Perception, preſent them. Whilſt the Memory retains them thus, and can produce them ſo to the Mind when it has occaſion to conſider them, they are *clear Ideas*.

Our *complex* Ideas are *clear*, when the Ideas that go to their Compoſition are clear: And the Number and Order of thoſe ſimple Ideas, that are their Ingredients, is determinate and certain.

The Cauſe of *Obſcurity* in ſimple Ideas ſeems to be either dull Organs, or ſlight Impreſſions made by the Objects, or a Weakneſs in the Memory not able to retain them as received.

As a clear Idea is that whereof the Mind has ſuch a full and evident Perception, as it receives from an outward Object duly operating on a well-diſpoſed Organ; ſo a *diſtinct* Idea is that wherein the Mind perceives a Difference from all other: And a *confuſed*, ſuch an one as is not ſufficiently diſtinguiſhable from another from which it ought to be different. *Obſcurity* is oppoſed to *Clearneſs*, *Confuſion* to *Diſtinctneſs*.

This Confuſion incident to Ideas, is only in Reference to their Names. For every Idea a Man has, being viſibly what it is, and diſtinct from all other Ideas but itſelf, that which makes it *confuſed* is, when it is ſuch, that it may as well be called by another

another Name as by that by which it is expreſſed, the Difference which keeps the Thoughts diſtinct, and makes them to belong rather to the one, than to the other of thoſe Names, being left out; ſo that the Diſtinction which was intended to be kept up, by theſe different Names is quite loſt.

Confuſion is chiefly occaſioned by the following Defaults.

Firſt, When any *complex* Idea (for *complex* Ideas are moſt liable to Confuſion) is made up of too ſmall a Number of ſimple Ideas, and ſuch as are common to other Things, whereby the Differences that make it deſerve a different Name are left out. Thus he that has an Idea made up of barely the ſimple ones, of a Beaſt with Spots, has but a confuſed Idea of a *Leopard*, not being ſufficiently diſtinguiſhed from a *Panther*, and other Sorts of Beaſts that are ſpotted. Where the Ideas, for which we uſe different Terms, have not a difference anſwerable to their diſtinct Names, and ſo cannot be diſtinguiſhed by them, there it is that they are truly confuſed.

Secondly, When the Ideas are ſo jumbled together in the complex one, that it is not eaſily diſcernible, whether it more belongs to the Name given it, than to any other. We may conceive this Confuſion by a Sort of Pictures uſually ſhown, wherein the Colours mark out very odd and unuſual Figures, and have no diſcernible Order in their Poſition. This, when ſaid to be the Picture of a *Man* or *Cæſar*, we reckon confuſed, becauſe it is not diſcernible in that State, to belong more to the Name *Man* or *Cæſar*, than to the Name *Baboon* or *Pompey*. But when a cylindrical Mirrour, rightly placed, hath reduced thoſe irregular Lines on the table, into their due Order and Proportion, then the Eye preſently ſees that it is a *Man*, or *Cæſar*, that is, that it belongs to thoſe Names, and is ſufficiently diſtinguiſhable from

from a *Baboon* or *Pompey*; that is, from the Ideas ſignified by thoſe Names.

Thirdly, When any one of our *Ideas* ſignified by a Name, is uncertain and undetermined. Thus he that puts in, or leaves out an Idea of his complex one, of *Church* or *Idolatry*, every Time that he thinks of either, and holds not ſteady to any one preciſe Combination of Ideas, that makes it up, is ſaid to have a confuſed Idea of Church or Idolatry. Confuſion alway concerns two Ideas, and thoſe moſt, which moſt approach one another. To avoid Confuſion therefore, in any Idea, we ought to examine what other Idea it is in Danger to be confounded with, or which it cannot be eaſily ſeparated from; and that will be found an Idea belonging to another Name, and ſo ſhould be a different Thing, from which yet it is not ſufficiently diſtinct, and ſo keeps not that Difference from that other Idea, which the different Name imports.

It is to be obſerved that our *complex* Ideas may be very clear and diſtinct in one Part, and very obſcure and confuſed in another; Thus in a *Coiliaedrum* or Body of a *thouſand Sides*, the Idea of the Figure may be confuſed, tho' that of the Number be very diſtinct: We can diſcourſe and demonſtrate, concerning that Part of this *complex* Idea, which depends on the Number thouſand; tho' it is plain we have no preciſe Idea of its Figure, ſo as to diſtinguiſh it by that, from one that has but Nine Hundred and Ninety Nine Sides. The not obſerving this, cauſes no ſmall error in Mens Thoughts, and Confuſion in their Diſcourſes.

CHAP.

CHAP. XXX.

Of real and fantaſtical Ideas.

OUR Ideas in Reference to Things from whence they are taken, or which they may be ſuppoſed to repreſent, come under a *threefold* Diſtinction, and are, Firſt, either *real* or *fantaſtical*. Secondly, *adequate*, or *inadequate*. Thirdly *true or falſe*.

By *real* Ideas I mean ſuch as have a Foundation in Nature, ſuch as have a Conformity with the real Being and Exiſtence of Things, or with their Archetypes.

Fantaſtical are ſuch as have no Foundation in Nature nor any Conformity with that Reality of Being, to which they are referred as to their *Archetypes*. By examining the ſeveral Sorts of Ideas we ſhall find, that, Firſt, our *ſimple* Ideas are all real; not that they are Images or Repreſentations of what does exiſt; for though Whiteneſs and Coldneſs are no more in Snow, than Pain is; yet thoſe Ideas of Whiteneſs and Coldneſs, Pain, &c. being in us the certain Effects of Powers in Things without us, ordained by our Maker, to produce in us ſuch Senſations; they are real Ideas in us, whereby we diſtinguiſh the Qualities that are really in Things themſelves.

This Reality lies in the ſteady Correſpondence they have, with the diſtinct Circumſtances of real Beings. But whether they anſwer to them, as *Cauſes* or *Patterns* it matters not; it ſuffices that they are conſtantly produced by them. And thus our ſimple Ideas are all real and true, becauſe they anſwer and agree to thoſe Powers of Things which produce them in our Minds, that being all that is requiſite to make them real, and not fictious at Pleaſure. For in ſimple Ideas, as has been ſhown, the Mind is wholly confined to the Operation of Things upon it, and can make to itſelf no ſimple Idea, more than what it has received.

Though

Though the Mind be wholly paſſive, in Reſpect of its ſimple Ideas, yet, I think, we may ſay, it is not ſo in Reſpect of its *complex* Ideas, for thoſe being arbitrary Combinations of *ſimple* Ideas put together, and united under one general Name, in forming of which the Mind uſes its Liberty; we muſt inquire which of theſe are real, and which imaginary Combinations, and to this I ſay, that,

Firſt, mixed Modes and Relations having no other reality than what they have in the Minds of Men, nothing more is required to make them real, but a poſſibility of exiſting conformable to them. Theſe Ideas being themſelves Archetypes, cannot differ from their Archetypes, and ſo cannot be chimerical; unleſs any one will jumble together in them inconſiſtent Ideas. Thoſe indeed that have Names aſſigned them in any Language, muſt have a Conformity to the ordinary Signification of the Name that is given them, that they may not be thought fantaſtical, as if a Man would give the Name of *Juſtice* to that Idea, which common Uſe calls *Liberality*.

Secondly, Our complex Ideas of Subſtances being made in Reference to Things as they exiſt without us, whoſe repreſentations they are thought, are no farther real, than as they are ſuch Combinations of ſimple Ideas, as are really united, and co-exiſt in Things without us. Thoſe are fantaſtical which are made up of ſeveral Ideas, that were never found united, in Nature, as a *Centaur*, &c.

CHAP. XXXI.

Of Ideas *adequate* or *inadequate*.

REAL Ideas are either *adequate* or *inadequate*; *Firſt*, *adequate*, which perfectly repreſent thoſe Archetypes which the Mind ſuppoſes them taken from, and which it makes them to ſtand for, and to which it refers them. *Secondly*, *inadequate*, are ſuch which

which do but partially or incompletely repreſent thoſe Archetypes to which they are referred: Whence it appears.

Firſt, That all our *ſimple* Ideas are *adequate*; for they being but the Effects of certain Powers in Things fitted and ordained by God, to produce ſuch Senſations in us, they cannot but be correſpondent and adequate to ſuch Powers, and we are ſure they agree to the Reality of Things. For if Sugar produce in us the Ideas we call Whiteneſs and Sweetneſs, we are ſure there is a Power in Sugar to produce thoſe Ideas in our Minds, or elſe they could not have been produced there; which, as we have juſt remarked, are no other than Powers to excite ſuch Ideas in us; and are therefore called *Qualities* in, or of Sugar. But theſe being nothing, in Truth, but Powers to excite ſuch Ideas in us, we muſt, in that Senſe, be underſtood, when we ſpeak of *ſecondary Qualities*, as being in Things; or of their Ideas, as being in the Objects themſelves, that excite them in us. This Manner of Expreſſion we are under the Neceſſity of following to accommodate ourſelves to the Capacity of the human Mind, in Order to be underſtood; yet ſignifying not the Reality of ſuch Ideas exiſting in Bodies, but truly their Power of producing them in us, ſo long as we are fitted with Organs, for ſuch Conceptions, and which do exiſt no otherwiſe; but Solidity, and Extenſion, and the Termination of it, Figure, with Motion and Reſt, whereof we have Conception, would be really in the World as they are, whether there were any ſenſible Being to perceive them or not, which therefore we are to conſider as the real Modifications of Matter, and ſuch as are the exiſting Cauſes of all our various Senſations of Bodies.

Secondly, Our *complex* Ideas *of Modes* being voluntary Collections of *ſimple* Ideas, which the Mind puts together without Reference to any real Archetypes, cannot but be *adequate* Ideas. They are referred to no other Pattern, nor made by any Original, but

but the Inclination and Will of him that makes the Combination; theſe muſt be conſidered as perfect, having the different Combinations, the Mind which firſt framed them intended they ſhould have. If indeed one would conform his Ideas to thoſe which are formed by another Perſon, they may be wrong or *inadequate*, not correſponding, in every Particular, with that deſigned by another, as their Archetype and Pattern. In which Reſpect only, any Ideas of Modes can be wrong, imperfect, or inadequate, as that mixed Mode, denominated by the Word, *Goodneſs*, may be differently compounded in different Minds.

Thirdly, Our *Ideas of Subſtances*, have in the Mind a double Referrence: *Firſt*, They are ſometimes referred to a ſuppoſed real Eſſence, of each Species of Things; *Secondly*, They are deſigned for Repreſentations in the Mind, of Things that do exiſt, by Ideas diſcoverable in them: In both which Reſpects they are *imperfect* and *inadequate*.

Firſt, If the Names of Subſtances ſtand for Things, as ſuppoſed to have certain real Eſſences, whereby they are of this or that Species, (of which real Eſſences, Men are wholly ignorant and know nothing) it plainly follows that the Ideas they have in their Minds being referred to real Eſſences, as *Archetypes* which are unknown, they muſt be ſo far from being adequate, that they cannot be ſuppoſed to be any Repreſentation of them at all. Our Complex Ideas of Subſtances are, as has been ſhewn, nothing but certain Collections of ſimple Ideas that have been obſerved, or ſuppoſed conſtantly to exiſt together. But ſuch a complex Idea cannot be the real Eſſence of any Subſtance: For then the Properties we diſcover in it would be deducible from it, and their neceſſary Connection with it be known, as all the Properties of a *Triangle* depend on, and are deducible from the complex Idea of *three Lines including a Space*, but it is certain that in our complex Ideas of Subſtances, are not contained ſuch Ideas on which all the other Qualities that are to be found in them depend.

Secondly, Thoſe that take their Ideas of Subſtances from their ſenſible Qualities, cannot form adequate Ideas of them; becauſe their Qualities and Powers are ſo various, that no Man's complex Idea can contain them all. Moſt of our ſimple Ideas, whereof our complex ones of Subſtances do conſiſt, are Powers, which being Relations to other Subſtances, we cannot be ſure we know all the Powers, till we have tried what Changes they are fitted to give and receive from other Subſtances, in their ſeveral Ways of Application: which being not poſſible to be tried upon one Body, much leſs upon all, it is impoſſible we ſhould have adequate Ideas of any Subſtance, made of a Collection of all its Properties. For ſince the Powers or Qualities, that are obſervable by us, are not the real Eſſence of that Subſtance, but depend on it, and flow from it, any Collection whatſoever of theſe Qualities, cannot be the real Eſſence of that Thing. Whereby it is plain, that our Ideas of Subſtances are not adequate; are not what the Mind intends them to be. Beſides, a Man has no Idea of Subſtance in general, nor knows what Subſtance is in itſelf.

CHAP. XXXII.

Of true and falſe Ideas.

TRUTH and *Falſehood* in Propriety of Speech belong only to Propoſitions; and when Ideas are termed *true* or *falſe*, there is ſome ſecret or tacit Propoſition, which is the Foundation of that Denomination. Our Ideas being nothing but bare *Appearances* or *Perceptions* in the Mind, can in Strictneſs of Speech, no more be ſaid to be true or falſe, than mere Names of Things can be ſaid to be true or falſe. The Idea of *Centaur* has no more Falſehood in it when it appears in our Minds, than the Name *Centaur* when it is pronounced or writ upon Paper. For Truth or Falſehood lying always in ſome Affirmation or Negation, our Ideas are not capable

capable of either of them, until the Mind paſſes ſome Judgment on them; that is, affirms or denies ſomething of them. In a *metaphyſical* Senſe, of the Word *Truth*, both Ideas and Words may be ſaid to be true, that is, to be really ſuch as they exiſt, bare Perceptions of the Mind, tho' in Things called true, even in that Senſe, there is perhaps a ſecret Reference to ſome Ideas, looked upon as the Standards of that Truth, which amounts to a *mental Propoſition*.

When the Mind refers any of its Ideas to any Thing extraneous to it, they are then capable of being true or falſe: Becauſe in ſuch a Reference the Mind makes a tacit Suppoſition, of their Conformity to that Thing; which Suppoſition, as it is true or falſe, ſo the Ideas themſelves come to be denominated. This happens in their Caſes.

Firſt, When the Mind ſuppoſes its Idea conformable to that in other Mens Minds, called by the ſame Name, ſuch as that of *Juſtice*, *Virtue*, &c. to be the ſame, with what other Men give thoſe Names to.

Secondly, When the Mind ſuppoſes any Idea conformable to ſome real Exiſtence. Thus that of *Man* is true, that of *Centaur* falſe, the one having a Conformity to what has really exiſted; the other not.

Thirdly, When the Mind refers any of its Ideas to that real Conſtitution, and Eſſence of any Thing whereon all its Properties depend: And thus the greateſt Part, if not all of our Ideas of *Subſtances*, are falſe.

As to the *Firſt*, when we judge of our Ideas by their Conformity to thoſe of other Men, of the ſame Name, they may be any of them falſe. But ſimple Ideas are leaſt liable to be ſo miſtaken, from the Regularity of their Appearance in the Objects they are found; we ſeldom miſtake *green* for *blue*, or *bitter* for *ſweet*, much leſs do we confound the Names belonging to different Senſes, and call a Colour by the Name of a *Taſte*. Complex Ideas are much more liable to falſehood in this particular; and thoſe of mixed

Modes more than thoſe of Subſtances; becauſe in Subſtances there are ſome remarkable ſenſible Qualities that ſerve ſufficiently to diſtinguiſh one Sort from another, and eaſily preſerve them when Names are uſed with Caution, and not applied to other Sorts of Subſtances; but in mixed Modes we are more uncertain, and we may call that *Juſtice* which ought to be called by another Name. The Reaſon of this is, that the abſtract Ideas of mixed Modes, being Mens voluntary Combinations of ſuch a preciſe Collection of ſimple Ideas, ſo that the Eſſence of each Species being made by man alone, we have nothing elſe to refer our Ideas of mixed Modes to as Standards; but the Ideas of thoſe who are thought to uſe their Names in their moſt proper Signification: And as our Ideas conform to, or differ from them, they paſs for true or falſe.

As to the *Second*, when we refer our Ideas to the real Exiſtence of Things, none can be termed falſe, but our complex Ideas of Subſtances. For our ſimple Ideas being nothing but Perceptions in us anſwerable to certain Powers in external Objects, their Truth conſiſts in nothing but ſuch Appearances, as are produced in us ſuitable to thoſe Powers: Neither do they become liable to the Imputation of Falſehood, whether we judge theſe Ideas to be in the Things themſelves or no. For God having deſigned theſe as Marks by which we diſtinguiſh one Thing from another; they well anſwer the Purpoſe, and enable us to chooſe them as we have Occaſion: It alters not the Nature of our ſimple *Ideas*, whether we think the *Idea* of *blue* (for Inſtance,) to be in the *Violet* itſelf, or in the Mind only: And it is equally from that Appearance to be denominated *blue*, whether it be that real Colour, or only a peculiar Texture in it, that cauſes in us that *Idea*; ſince the Name *blue* ſignifies properly nothing more than that Mark of Diſtinction, that is in a Violet, diſcernible only by our Eyes whatever it conſiſts in.

Neither would our ſimple Ideas be *falſe*, if from the Structure of our Organs it was ſo ordered, that the

the ſame Object ſhould produce in ſeveral Mens Minds, different Ideas. Of this from our Situations, we cannot have any Certainty, but with the higheſt Aſſurance we may ſuppoſe, that external Objects conſtantly operate, according to the Structure of the Organs, by which they are conveyed, and that their Appearances are in every Man's Mind the ſame. Names of ſimple *Ideas* may be miſapplied, as a Man ignorant in the *Engliſh* Tongue may call *Purple*, *Scarlet*; but this makes no Falſehood in the *Ideas*.

Complex *Ideas* of Modes cannot be falſe, in Reference to the Eſſence of any Thing really exiſting; as they have not any Reference or Patterns already exiſting, or made by Nature; being as we before obſerved, voluntary Combinations of the Mind, to which they are wholly indebted for their exiſtence.

Our complex *Ideas* of Subſtances, being all referred to Patterns or Things exiſting without us, may be falſe. They are ſo, *Firſt*, when looked upon as Repreſentations of the Eſſence of Things, of which Eſſence we are entirely ignorant. *Secondly*, when they put together ſimple *Ideas* which, in the real Exiſtence of Things, have no Union: As a *Centaur*. *Thirdly*, when from any Collection of ſimple *Ideas*, that do always exiſt together, there is one ſeparated or left out of the Number of ſimple *Ideas*, which are conſtantly joined and perceived to exiſt together. Thus, if from Extenſion, Solidity, Fixedneſs, Malleableneſs, Fuſibility, *&c.* we leave out the Colour obſerved in *Gold*.

If this Idea be only left out of the complex one of *Gold*, it is to be looked on as an inadequate and imperfect, rather than a falſe one: Since, tho' it contains not all the ſimple Ideas, that are united in Nature, yet it puts none together, but what really exiſt together.

Upon the whole, I think that our Ideas as they are conſidered by the Mind, either in Reference to the proper Signification of their Names, or in reference to the reality of Things, may more properly be called

right or *wrong Ideas*, according as they agree or diſagree with thoſe Patterns to which they are referred. The *Ideas* that are in Mens Minds, ſimply conſidered, cannot be wrong, unleſs ſuch *complex Ideas*, wherein inconſiſtent Parts are jumbled together. All other Ideas are in themſelves right, and the Knowledge about them right, and true Knowledge, as exiſting in the Mind. But when we come to refer them to Patterns, or Archetypes, then they are capable of being wrong, as far as they agree or diſagree with ſuch Archetypes.

CHAP. XXVI.

Of the Aſſociation of Ideas.

THERE is ſcarce any one that does not obſerve ſomething that ſeems odd to him, and is itſelf really extravagant in the Opinions, Reaſonings, and Actions of other Men. The leaſt Flaw of this Kind, if at all different from his own, every one is quick-ſighted enough to perceive, and forward to condemn; and tho' he ſhould be guilty of much greater Unreaſonableneſs in his own Tenets and Conduct, it will paſs unobſerved by him, of which ſhould it be pointed out, he will hardly be convinced.

This Sort of Unreaſonableneſs is uſually imputed to Education and Prejudice, and, for the moſt Part, truly enough; tho' that reaches not the Bottom of the Diſeaſe, nor ſhows diſtinctly enough whence it riſes, or wherein it lies. Education is often rightly aſſigned for the Cauſe; and Prejudice is a good general Name for the Thing itſelf; but yet I think he ought to look a little farther, who would trace it to the Root it ſprings from, and ſo explain it, as to ſhow whence this Flaw has its Original in very ſober and rational Minds, and wherein it conſiſts. For this, being a Weakneſs to which all Men are liable, and a Taint which univerſally infects Mankind, the greater Care ſhould be taken to lay it open.

Some

Some of our Ideas have a natural Correſpondence and Connection one with another: It is the office and Excellency of our Reaſon to trace theſe, and hold them together in that Union and Correſpondence which is founded in their peculiar Beings. Beſides this, there is another Connection of Ideas wholly owing to Chance or Cuſtom; Ideas that, in themſelves, are not at all of a Kin, yet come to be ſo united in ſome Men's Minds, that 'tis very hard to ſeparate them; they always keep Company, and the one no ſooner comes into the Underſtanding, but its Aſſociate appears with it; and if they are more than Two, the whole Gang, always inſeparable, ſhew themſelves together. This ſtrong Combination of Ideas, not allied by Nature, the Mind makes in itſelf either voluntarily or by chance: and hence it comes in different Men to be very different, according to their different *Inclinations*, *Educations*, *Intereſts*, &c. Cuſtom ſettles Habits for Thinking in the Underſtanding, as well as of determining in the Will, and of Motions in the Body; all which ſeem to be but a Train of Motions in the animal Spirits, which, once ſet a going, continue on in the ſame Track they have been uſed to: Which by often treading is worn into a ſmooth Path, when the Motion in it becomes eaſy, and as it were natural. As far as we can comprehend Thinking, our Ideas ſeem to be thus produced in our Minds; or if they are not, this may ſerve to explain their following one another in an habitual Train, when once they are put into that Track, as well as it does to explain ſuch particular Motions of the Body.

This Connection of Ideas in our Minds (in themſelves looſe and independent one of another) is of ſo great Force as to ſet us awry in our Actions, as well moral as natural, influencing our Paſſions, Reaſonings, and Conceptions, and ſo much, that perhaps there is not any one Thing that deſerves more to be looked after or merit our Attention. Thus the Ideas of *Goblins* and *Sprights* have really no more to do with Darkneſs than Light; yet let but a fooliſh

Maid inculcate these often on the Mind of a Child, and raise them there together, possibly he shall never be able to separate them again so long as he lives; but Darkness shall ever afterwards bring with it these frightful Ideas. So likewise, if a Man has suffered Pain or Sickness in any place; or seen his friend die in such a room; tho' these have in Nature nothing to do, one with another, yet when the Idea of the *Place* occurs to his Mind, it brings that Pain and Displeasure with it, that he formerly suffered there, he confounds them in his Mind, and can as little bear the one as the other.

Intellectual Habits, and Defects this Way contracted are not less frequent and powerful, but less observed. Let the Ideas of *Being* and *Matter* be strongly joined either by Education or much Thought, whilst they are still combined in the mind, what Notions, what Reasonings will there be about separate Spirits? Let Custom from the very Childhood but have joined Figure and Shape to the Idea of God, and what absurdities will that mind be liable to about the Deity? Let the Idea of *Infallibility* be joined to any Person, and these two constantly together possess the Mind, and then one Body in two Places at once, shall be swallowed for a certain Truth, whenever that *imagined* infallible Person dictates and demands Assent without Inquiry.

Some such wrong Combinations of Ideas will be found to establish the irreconcileable Opposition between different Sects of Philosophy and Religion: For we cannot imagine every one of their Followers would impose wilfully on himself, and knowingly refuse Truth offered by plain Reason. Interest, tho' it does a great deal in the Case, yet cannot be thought to affect whole Societies of Men to so universal a Perverseness, as that every one of them should, *knowingly*, maintain Falsehood: Some at least must be allowed to do what all pretend to; *i. e.* to pursue truth sincerely. That, therefore, which captivates their Reasons, and leads Men of Sincerity blindfold from common Sense, will, when examined

be

be found to be, what we have juſt mentioned: Some independent Ideas, are by Education, Cuſtom, and the conſtant din of their Party ſo coupled in their Minds, that they always appear there together, and they can no more ſeparate them in their Thoughts, than if they were but one Idea; and they operate as if they were ſo. This gives Senſe to Jargon, Demonſtration to Abſurdities, and Conſiſtency to Nonſenſe, and is the Foundation of the greateſt, I had almoſt ſaid of all, the Errours in the World: Or if it does not reach as far, it is at leaſt the moſt dangerous one, ſince ſo far as it obtains this Influence, it hinders Men from ſeeing and examining with that Freedom and independence they ſhould. The Confuſion of two different Ideas which a cuſtomary Connection of them in their Minds hath to them in Effect made but one, cannot but fill Mens Heads with falſe Views, and their Reaſonings with falſe Conſequences.

Having thus given an Account of the *Original Sorts* and *Extent* of our Ideas, which are the Inſtruments or Materials of our Knowledge, I ſhould immediately proceed to ſhow, what Uſe the Underſtanding makes of them, and what Knowledge we have by them. But upon a nearer Approach, I find that there is ſo cloſe a Connection between Ideas and *Words*; and our Abſtract Ideas and general *Words* have ſo conſtant a relation, one to another, that it is impoſſible to ſpeak clearly and diſtinctly of our Knowledge, which all conſiſts in Propoſitions, without conſidering firſt, the Nature, Uſe, and Signification of *Language*, which, therefore, muſt be the Buſineſs of the next Book.

BOOK III.

CHAP. I.

Of Words or Language in general.

GOD, having deſigned Man for a ſociable Creature, made him not only with an Inclination, and under a neceſſity to have Fellowſhip with thoſe of his own Kind, but furniſhed him alſo with *Language*, which was to be the great Inſtrument and common Tie of Society. Man therefore had by Nature his Organs ſo faſhioned, as to be fit to frame *articulate Sounds* which we call Words.

But beſides articulate Sounds (which Birds may be taught to imitate) it was further neceſſary that he ſhould be able to uſe *theſe Sounds* as Signs of *internal Conceptions*, and make them ſtand as Marks of the Ideas in his Mind, whereby they might be known to others.

But it is not enough for the Perfection of Language, that Sounds can be made Signs of Ideas, unleſs theſe can be made uſe of, ſo as to comprehend ſeveral particular Things; for the Multiplication of Words would have perplexed their Uſe, had every particular thing need of a diſtinct Name to be ſignified by. To remedy this Inconvenience, Language had yet a farther Improvement in the Uſe of *general Terms*, Whereby one Word was made to mark a Multitude of particular Exiſtences; which advantageous

advantageous Uſe of Sounds was obtained only by the Difference of the Ideas they were made Signs of. Thoſe Names become *general*, which are made to ſtand for *general Ideas*; and thoſe remaining *Particular*, where the Ideas they are uſed for are *Particular*. There are other Words which ſignify the *Want* or *Abſence* of Ideas, as *Ignorance*, *Barrenneſs*, &c. which relate to *poſitive Ideas*, and ſignify their Abſence.

It is obſervable that the Words which ſtand for Actions and Notions quite removed from Senſe, are borrowed from ſenſible Ideas, *v. g.* to imagine, apprehend, comprehend, underſtand, adhere, conceive, inſtil, Diſguſt, Diſturbance, Tranquillity, *&c.* which are all taken from the Operations of ſenſible Things, and applied to *Modes* of *Thinking*. *Spirit*, in its primary Signification, is no more than Breath; *Angel*, a Meſſenger. By which we may gueſs what Kind of Notions they were, and whence derived, which filled the Minds of the firſt Beginners of Languages, and how nature, even in the naming of Things unawares, ſuggeſted to Men the Originals of all their Knowledge: Whilſt to give Names that might make known to others any Operations they felt in themſelves, or any other Ideas, that came not under their Senſes, they were fain to borrow Words from the ordinary and known Ideas of *Senſation*.

The better to underſtand the *Uſe* and *Force* of Language, as ſubſervient to Knowledge, it will be neceſſary to conſider,

Firſt, To what it is that *Names* in the Uſe of Language are immediately applied.

Secondly, Since all (except proper Names) are *General*, and ſo ſtand not for this or that Single Thing, but for *Sorts* and *Ranks*; it will be neceſſary to conſider what thoſe Sorts and Kinds of Things are; wherein they conſiſt, and how they came to be made: This ſhall be conſidered in the following Chapters.

CHAP.

CHAP. II

Of the Significations of Words.

MAN, though he has great Variety of Thoughts, yet are they all within his own Breaſt inviſible and hidden from others, nor can, of themſelves, be made to appear. It was neceſſary therefore, for the Comfort and Advantage of Society, that Man ſhould find out ſome *external Signs*, whereby thoſe inviſible Ideas might be made known to others. For which Purpoſe none was ſo fit, either for Number or for Quickneſs, as thoſe *articulate Sounds*, he found himſelf able to make. Hence *Words* came to be made Uſe of by Men, as Signs of their Ideas: Not upon Account of any *Natural* Connection between articulate Sounds, and certain Ideas; for then there would be but one Language amongſt all Men; but a voluntary impoſition, whereby ſuch a Word is made *Arbitrarily* the Mark of ſuch an Idea. The Uſe then of Words, is to be ſenſible Marks of our Ideas; and they Ideas the ſtand for, are their *proper* and *immediate Signification*: In which they ſtand for nothing more but the Ideas in the Mind of him that uſes them. For when a Man ſpeaks to another, it is that he may be underſtood; that is, that his Sounds may make known his Ideas to the Hearer.

Words, being voluntary Signs, cannot be impoſed on Things we know not: This would be to make them Signs of nothing, Sounds without Signification. A Man cannot make his words the Signs, either, of *Qualities* in Things, or of *Conceptions* in the Mind of another, whereof he has no Ideas in his own.

Words, in all Mens Mouths (that ſpeak with any Meaning) ſtand for the Ideas which thoſe that uſe them have, and which they would expreſs by them. Thus a Child that takes notice of nothing more in the Metal he hears called *Gold*, than the *Yellow Co-*

lour

lour, Calls the ſame *Colour* in a Peacock's Tail *Gold*. Another, that hath better obſerved, adds to ſhining Yellow, great Weight; and then the Sound *Gold* ſtands, when he uſes it for a *complex Idea* of a ſhining Yellow, and very weighty Subſtance.

Though words ſignify properly nothing but the Ideas in Mens Minds, yet they are in their Thoughts, ſecretly referred to *Two* other Things.

Firſt, They ſuppoſe their Words to be Marks of Ideas in the Minds of other Men with whom they communicate; elſe they could not diſcourſe intelligibly with one another: In this Caſe Men do not trouble themſelves to examine, whether their Ideas, and thoſe of other Men are the ſame; they think it ſufficient that they uſe the Word in the common Acceptation of that Language.

Secondly, They ſuppoſe their Words to ſtand alſo for the *Reality of Things*.

Words, then, being immediately the Signs of Mens Ideas, whereby they expreſs their Thoughts, and Conceptions to others, there ariſes, by conſtant Uſe, ſuch a Connection between certain *Sounds* and the *Ideas* they ſtand for, that their Names are no ſooner heard, than they almoſt, as readily, excite certain Ideas, as if the Objects themſelves, were preſent to the Senſes.

And, becauſe we do not examine preciſely the Signification of Words, we, often, by an inattentive Conſideration, ſet our Thoughts more on Words than Things: Nay, ſome (becauſe we often learn Words before we know the Ideas they ſtand for) ſpeak ſeveral Words no otherewiſe than *Parrots* do, without any Meaning at all. But ſo far as Words are of Uſe and Signification, ſo far there is a conſtant Connection between the *Sound* and the *Idea*; and a Deſignation that the one ſtands for the other; without which Application of them, they are nothing but inſignificant Noiſe.

Since

Here then Words ſignify only peculiar Mens Ideas, and by an *arbitrary Impoſition*, it follows that every Man has an inviolable Liberty to make Words ſtand for what Ideas he pleaſes. It is true common Uſe, by tacit Conſent, appropriates certain Sounds to certain Ideas in all Languages; which ſo far limits the Signification of each Sound, that unleſs a Man applies it to the ſame Ideas, he cannot *ſpeak properly*: And unleſs a Man's Words excite the ſame Ideas, in the Hearer, which he makes them ſtand for in ſpeaking, he cannot *ſpeak Intelligibly*. But what ever is the Conſequence of any Man's Uſe of Words, different either from their publick Uſe, or that of the Perſons to whom he addreſſes them, this is certain, their Signification in his Uſe of them is limited to his Ideas, and they can be Signs of nothing elſe.

CHAP. III.

Of General Terms.

ALL Things that exiſt being Particulars, it might be expected that Words ſhould be ſo too in their Signification: But we find it quite otherwiſe; for moſt of the Words that compoſe all Languages are *General Terms*. This is the Effect of Reaſon and Neceſſity, For,

Firſt, It is impoſſible that every particular Thing ſhould have a diſtinct peculiar Name, becauſe of the Impoſſibility to have a diſtinct Idea of every particular Thing, to retain its Name, with its peculiar Appropriation to that Idea.

Secondly, It would be *Uſeleſs*, unleſs thoſe we converſe with could be ſuppoſed to have theſe ſame Ideas in their Minds. For Names applied to particular Things, whereof I alone have the Ideas in my Mind, could not be ſignificant or intelligible to another, who is not acquainted with thoſe particular Things which had fallen under my Notice.

Thirdly

Thirdly, It would be of no great *Uſe* for the *Improvement of Knowledge*: Which though founded in particular Things, enlarges itſelf by general Views; to which *Things*, reduced into Sorts, under general Names, are properly ſubſervient. In Things where we have occaſion to conſider and diſcourſe of *Individuals*, and *Particulars*, we uſe proper Names; as in *Perſons*, *Countries*, *Rivers*, *Mountains*, &c. Thus we ſee that Jockeys have particular Names for their Horſes, becauſe they often have occaſion to mention, this, or that particular Horſe, when he is out of Sight.

The next Thing to be conſidered is how *general Words* come to be made. Words become general by being made Signs of *general Ideas*: Ideas become general by ſeparating from them the Circumſtances of Time, Place, or any other Ideas that may determine them to this or that particular Exiſtence. By this way of *Abſtraction* they become capable of repreſenting more Individuals than one: Each of which, having a Conformity to that abſtract Idea, is of that Sort.

But it may not be amiſs to trace our Notions and Names from their Beginning; and obſerve by what Degrees we produce and enlarge our Ideas, from our firſt Infancy. It is evident, that the firſt Ideas Children get are only particular, as of the *Nurſe* or *Mother*, and the Names they give them are confined to theſe Individuals. Afterwards obſerving that there are a great many other Things in the World that Reſemble them in Shape and other Qualities, they frame an Idea which they find thoſe many Particulars do partake in; to that they give, with others, the Name *Man*, for Example; in this they make nothing *new*, but only leave out of the complex Idea they had of *Peter*, *James*, *Mary*, &c. that which is peculiar to each, and retain only what is common to all. And thus they come to have a general *Name*, and a general *Idea*.

By the ſame Method they advance to more general Names and Notions. For obſerving ſeveral Things

Things that differ from the Idea of *Man*, and cannot therefore be comprehended under that Name, to agree with Man in ſome certain Qualities, by retaining only thoſe Qualities, and uniting them into one Idea, they have another more general Idea, to which giving a Name, they make a *Term* of a more comprehenſive Extenſion. Thus by leaving out the Shape, and ſome other Properties ſignified by the Name *Man*, and retaining only a Body with Life, Senſe, and ſpontaneous Motion, we form the Idea ſignified by the Name *Animal*. By the ſame Way the Mind proceeds to *Body*, *Subſtance*, and at laſt to *Being*, *Thing*, and ſuch univerſal Terms which ſtand for any Ideas whatſoever. Hence we ſee that the whole Myſtery of *Genus* and *Species* is nothing elſe but *abſtract Ideas*, more or leſs comprehenſive, with Names annexed to them.

This ſhews us the Reaſon why in defining Words we make uſe of the *Genus*; namely to ſave the Labour of enumerating the ſeveral ſimple Ideas, which the next general Term ſtands for. From what has been ſaid it is plain, that *General* and *Univerſal* belong not to the *real* Exiſtence of Things; but are Inventions of the Underſtanding, made by it for its own Uſe, and concern only Signs, either *Words* or *Ideas*.

It muſt be conſidered, in the next place, what Kind of Signification it is that general Words have. It is evident that they do not barely ſignify one particular Thing; for then they would not be general Terms, but proper Names: Neither do they ſignify a *Plurality*; for then *Man* and *Men* would ſignify the ſame Thing, or certain Species; but that which they ſignify is a *Sort* of Things, and this they do by being made a Sign of an *abſtract Idea* in the Mind, to which Idea, as Things exiſting are found to agree, ſo they come to be ranked under that Name, or to be of that Sort. The *Eſſences* then of the Sorts, or Species of Things, are nothing but theſe abſtract Ideas.

It is not denied here that Nature makes Things alike, and ſo lays the Foundation of this Sorting and Claſſing: But the *Sorts* or *Species* themſelves are the Workmanſhip of Human Underſtanding; ſo that every diſtinct *abſtract Idea* is a diſtinct *Eſſence*, and the Names that ſtand for ſuch diſtinct Ideas, are the Names of Things eſſentially different. To make this clearer, it may not be amiſs to conſider the ſeveral Significations of the Word *Eſſence*.

Firſt, It may be taken for the very Being of any Thing whereby it is, what it is, and gives it its Exiſtence: Thus the real internal (but unknown) Conſtitution in *Subſtances*, may be called their *Eſſence*. This is the proper Signification of the Word.

Secondly, In the *Schools* the Word Eſſence has been almoſt wholly applied to the artificial Conſtitution of *Genus* and *Species*: It is true, there is, ordinarily, ſuppoſed a real Conſtitution of the Sorts of Things; and it is paſt Doubt there muſt be ſome real Conſtitution, on which any Collection of *ſimple* Ideas co-exiſting, muſt depend. But it being evident, that Things are ranked into Sorts, under Names only as they agree to certain *abſtract* Ideas, to which we have annexed thoſe Names, the Eſſence of each *Genus* and *Species* is nothing but the abſtract Idea, which the Name ſtands for; this the Word *Eſſence* imports in its moſt familiar Uſe, without any Regard to its real Conſtitution.

Theſe two Sorts of *Eſſence* may not be unfitly termed the one *real*, the other *nominal*. Between the nominal Eſſence and the Name, there is ſo near a Connection, that the Name of any Sort of Things cannot be attributed to any particular Being but what has this Eſſence, whereby it anſwers that *abſtract* Idea, whereof that Name is the Sign.

Concerning the real Eſſences of corporeal Subſtances, there are two Opinions.

Firſt, Some uſing the Word *Eſſence* for they know not what, ſuppoſe a certain Number of thoſe *Eſſences*, according to which all natural Things are made

made, and which they equally partake, and do become of this, or of that Species.

Secondly, Others look on all natural Things to have a real, but unknown Conſtitution of their inſenſible Parts, from whence flow their ſenſible Qualities, which ſerve us to diſtinguiſh them from one another; and according to which we rank them into Sorts, under common Denominations. The former Suppoſition ſeems irreconcilable with the frequent Production of Monſters, in all the Species of Animals: Since it is impoſſible that two Things partaking of the ſame real *Eſſence*, ſhould have different *Properties*. But were there no Reaſon againſt it, yet the Suppoſition of *Eſſences* which cannot be known, and the making them to be that which diſtinguiſheth the Species of Things, is ſo wholly uſeleſs and unſerviceable to any Part of *Knowledge*, that that alone were ſufficient to make us lay it by.

We may further obſerve, that the nominal and real Eſſences of *ſimple* Ideas and Modes are always the ſame; but in *Subſtances*, always quite different. Thus a Figure, including a Space between Three Lines, is the real as well as nominal Eſſence of a Triangle; it being that Foundation from which all its Properties flow, and to which they are inſeparably annexed: But it is far otherwiſe in *Gold*, or any other Sort of *Subſtance*; it is the real Conſtitution of its inſenſible Parts, on which depend all thoſe Properties that are to be found in it; of which Conſtitution, or inſenſible Parts, ſince we know not, nor have any particular Idea, we can have no Name that is the Sign of it. But yet it is its *Colour*, *Weight*, *Fuſibility*, and *Fixedneſs*, &c, which make it to be *Gold*, or gives it a Right to that Name; which is therefore its nominal *Eſſence*, ſince nothing can be called *Gold*, but what has a Conformity to that abſtract, complex Idea, to which that Name is annexed.

That Eſſences are but abſtract Ideas, may farther appear by their being held ingenerable and incorruptible.

corruptible. This cannot be true of the real Conſtitution of Things. All Things in Nature (ſave the *AUTHOR* of it) are liable to change: Their real *Eſſences* and Conſtitutions are deſtroyed and periſh: But as they are Ideas eſtabliſhed in the Mind, they remain immutable. For whatever becomes of *Alexander*, or *Bucephalus*, the Ideas of Man and Horſe remain the ſame. By theſe Means, the Eſſence of a *Species* reſts ſafe and entire, without the Exiſtence of one *Individual* of that Kind.

It is evident then, that this Doctrine of the Immutability of Eſſences proves them to be only abſtract Ideas, and is founded on the Relation eſtabliſhed between them and certain Sounds, as Signs of them, and will always be true, as long as the ſame Name can have the ſame Signification.

CHAP. IV.

Of the Names of ſimple Ideas.

WORDS tho' they ſignify nothing immediately, but the Ideas in the Mind of the Speaker; yet we ſhall find that the Names of ſimple *Ideas*, mixed *Modes*, and natural *Subſtances* have, each of them, ſomething peculiar: And,

Firſt, The Names of *ſimple Ideas* and *Subſtances*, with the abſtract Ideas in the Mind, intimate ſome *real Exiſtence*, from which they were derived as their Original, and Pattern: But the Names of *mixed Modes* terminate in the Idea that is in the Mind, not extending the Thoughts any further.

Secondly, The Names of *ſimple Ideas* and *mixed Modes* ſignify the *real* as well as *nominal* Eſſences of their Species: The Names of *Subſtances* ſignify rarely, if ever, any Thing, but barely the *nominal Eſſences* of thoſe Species.

Thirdly, The Names of *ſimple Ideas* are not capable of *Definitions*; thoſe of *complex Ideas* are: The

The Reaſon of which I ſhall ſhow from the Nature of our Ideas, and the Signification of Words.

It is agreed that a *Definition* is nothing elſe but the ſhowing the Meaning of one Word by ſeveral others, *not ſynonymous Terms*. The Meaning of Words being only the Ideas they are made to ſtand for; the Meaning of any Term is then ſhowed, or the Word defined, when by other Words the Idea it is made the Sign of, is, as it were, repreſented or ſet before the View of another, and thus its Signification aſcertained. The Names then of *ſimple* Ideas are incapable of being defined, becauſe the ſeveral Terms of a Definition ſignifying ſeveral Ideas, they can altogether by no Means repreſent an Idea which has no Compoſition or Parts at all, and therefore a Definition, which is but the ſhowing of the Meaning of one Word, by ſeveral others not ſignifying, each, the ſame Thing, can, in the Names of ſimple Ideas, have no Place.

The not obſerving this Difference in our Ideas, has occaſioned thoſe *trifling* Definitions which are given us of ſome ſimple Ideas; ſuch as is that of *Motion*, viz. *The Act of a Being in Power, as far forth as in Power*.

The Atomiſts who define Motion to be a *Paſſage* from one Place to another, what do they more than put one ſynonymous Word for another? For what is *Paſſage* more than Motion? Nor will the ſucceſſive Application or the Parts of the Superficies of one Body to thoſe of another, which *Carteſians* give us, prove a much better Definition of Motion when well examined.

The Act of Perſpicuous, as far forth as perſpicuous, is another *peripatetick* Definition of a ſimple Idea, which it is certain can never make the Meaning of the Word *Light*, which it pretends to define, to be underſtood by a blind Man. And when the *Carteſians*, tell us that Light is a great Number of little Globules, ſtriking briſkly on the Bottom of the Eye; theſe would never make the Idea the Word Light

Light ſtands for, known to a Man that had it not before.

Simple Ideas then can only be got by the Impreſſions Objects themſelves make on our Minds, by the proper *Inlets* appointed to each Sort. If they are not received this Way, all the Words in the World, will never be able to produce in us the Ideas, they ſtand for. Words being Sounds, can produce in us no other ſimple Ideas than of thoſe very Sounds, nor excite any in us, but by that voluntary Connection, which they have with ſome Ideas, that common Uſe has made them the Signs of: And therefore he that has not before received into his Mind, by the proper Inlet, the ſimple Idea, which any Word ſtands for, can never come to know the Signification of that Word, by any other Words or Sounds whatſoever.

But in *complex* Ideas which conſiſt of ſeveral ſimple ones, the Caſe is quite otherwiſe; for Words ſtanding for thoſe ſeveral ſimple Ideas, that make up the Compoſition, may imprint complex Ideas in the Mind, that never were there before, and ſo make their Names to be underſtood. In them Definitions take Place. Thus the Word *Rainbow*, to one who knew all thoſe Colours, but yet had never ſeen that *Phænomenon*, might, by enumerating the *Figure*, *Largeneſs*, *Poſition*, and *Order* of the *Colours*, be ſo well defined, that it might be perfectly underſtood.

The Names of ſimple *Ideas*, *Subſtances*, and *mixed Modes* have alſo this Difference, that thoſe of *mixed Modes* ſtand for Ideas perfectly arbitrary, being wholly the Creatures of the Mind: Thoſe of *Subſtances* are not perfectly ſo, but refer to a Pattern, tho' with ſome Latitude; and thoſe of ſimple Ideas are perfectly taken from Objects without us, on them we are entirely dependent for their Exiſtence, the Mind, in this Caſe, being wholly paſſive.

The Names of *ſimple Modes* differ little from thoſe of *ſimple Ideas*.

CHAP.

CHAP. V.

Of the Names of mixed Modes and Relations.

THE Names of mixed Modes being general, they ſtand, as has been ſhown, for Sorts or Species of Things, each of which has its peculiar Eſſence. The Eſſence of theſe Species alſo, as has been ſhowed, is nothing but the abſtract Ideas in the Mind, to which the Name is annexed. Thus far the Names and Eſſences of mixed Modes, have nothing but what is common to them, with other Ideas: but if we take a nearer Survey of them, we ſhall find that they have ſomething peculiar, which may deſerve our Attention.

And *Firſt*, The Ideas they ſtand for, or the Eſſences of the ſeveral Species of mixed *Modes*, are made by the Underſtanding; wherein they differ from thoſe of *ſimple* Ideas.

Secondly, They are made arbitrarily, without Patterns, or Reference to any real Exiſtence, wherein they differ from thoſe of *Subſtances*. The Mind unites and retains certain Collections, as ſo many diſtinct ſpecifick Ideas, whilſt other Combinations that as often occur in Nature, and are as plainly ſuggeſted by outward Things, paſs neglected without particular Names, or Specifications.

The Mind in forming theſe complex Ideas, makes no new Idea, but only puts together thoſe which it had before, wherein it performs *three* Things. *Firſt*, it chooſes a certain Number. *Secondly*, it gives them Connection, and combines them into one Idea. *Thirdly*, it unites them together by a Name; all which may be done before any one Individual of that Species of Modes ever exiſted: As the Ideas of *Sacrilege* or *Adultery* might be framed, before either of them was committed; and we cannot doubt but Legiſlators have often made Laws about

about Species of Actions, which were only the Creatures of their own Underſtandings.

But though *mixed Modes* depend on the Mind, and are made arbitrarily; yet they are not made at random, and jumbled together without any Reaſon at all, but are always made for the Convenience of Communication, which is the chief End of Language, and therefore ſuch Combinations are only made, as Men have frequent Occaſions to mention them. Thus Men having joined to the Idea of *Killing*, the Idea of *Father* and *Mother*, and ſo made a diſtinct Species from the killing of a Man's *Son* or *Neighbour*, becauſe of the different Heinouſneſs of the Crime, and the diſtinct Puniſhment due to it, found it neceſſary to mention it by a diſtinct Name, which is the End of making that diſtinct Combination.

In *mixed Modes* it is the Name that ſeems to preſerve their Eſſences, and to give them their laſting Duration. The Collection of Ideas is made by the Mind, but the Name is, as it were, the *Knot* which ties them faſt together: Hence we ſeldom take any other for diſtinct Species of *mixed Modes*, but ſuch as are expreſſed by Names. We muſt obſerve that the Names of *mixed Modes* always ſignify the real Eſſences of their Species, which being nothing but the abſtract complex Ideas, and not referred to the real Exiſtence of Things; there is no Suppoſition of any Thing more ſignified by any Name of a *mixed Mode*, but barely that *complex* Idea the Mind itſelf has formed, which is all it would expreſs by it, and is that on which all the Properties of the *Species* depend, and from which alone they flow; and therefore in theſe the *real* and *nominal* Eſſence are the ſame.

This alſo ſhows the Reaſon why the *Names* of *mixed Modes* are commonly got, before the Ideas they ſtand for are perfectly known: Becauſe there being no Species of theſe ordinarily taken Notice of, but ſuch as have Names, and theſe Species being

complex

complex Ideas made arbitrarily by the Mind, it is convenient, if not neceſſary, to know the Names, before we know the *complex* Ideas; unleſs a Man will fill his Head with a Number of abſtract *complex* Ideas, which others having no Names for, he has nothing to do with, but to lay by and forget again. In the Beginning of Languages it was neceſſary to have the Idea before one gave it the *Name*; and ſo it is ſtill, where a new *complex* Idea is to be made, and a Name given it. But this concerns not the Languages in Uſe, which have provided for the Ideas Mankind want to communicate to each other; and in ſuch, Children learn the Names of *mixed Modes* before they acquire their Ideas. In ſimple Ideas and Subſtances I grant it is otherwiſe; which being ſuch Ideas as have a real Exiſtence and Union in Nature, the Ideas or Names are got, one before the other, as it happens.

What has been ſaid here of *mixed Modes*, is, with very little Difference, applicable to *Relations* alſo: Which ſince every Man himſelf may obſerve, I need not enlarge on.

CHAP. VI.

Of the Names of Subſtances.

THE common *Names* of *Subſtances* ſtand for Sorts as well as other general Terms; that is, for ſuch *complex* Ideas, wherein ſeveral particular Subſtances do, or might agree, by Virtue of which they are capable of being comprehended in one common Conception, and be ſignified by one Name; I ſay, *do*, or *might agree*, for tho' there be but one *Sun* exiſting, yet the Idea of it being abſtracted, ſo that more Subſtances, if there were ſeveral, might each agree in it; is as much a *Sort*, as if there were as many Suns as there are Stars.

The Meaſure and Boundary of each Sort whereby it is conſtituted that *particular Sort*, and diſtinguiſhed

guiſhed from others, is what we call its Eſſence; which is that abſtract Idea to which the Name is annexed, ſo that every Thing contained in that Idea, is eſſential to that Sort. This I call *nominal Eſſence*, to diſtinguiſh it from that real Conſtitution of *Subſtances*, on which this *nominal Eſſence*, and all the Properties of that Sort depend, and may be called its *real Eſſence*: Thus the *nominal Eſſence* of *Gold* is that complex Idea the Word *Gold* ſtands for, let it be for inſtance a *Body*, yellow, weighty, malleable, fuſible, and fixed: But its real *Eſſence* is the Conſtitution of its inſenſible Parts, on which all its other Properties depend, which are wholly unknown to us.

That *Eſſence*, in the ordinary Uſe of the Word, relates to *Sorts*, appears from hence, that if we take away the abſtract Ideas by which we ſort Individuals, and rank them under common Names, then the Thought of any Thing eſſential to any of them inſtantly vaniſhes: We have no notion of the one without the other, which plainly ſhews their Relation. No Property is thought eſſential to any Individual whatſoever, till the mind refers it to ſome *Sort* or *Species* of Things, and then preſently, according to the abſtract Idea of that Sort, ſomething is found eſſential; ſo that eſſential or not eſſential, relate only to our abſtract Ideas, and the Names annexed to them, which ſhows, that whatever particular Thing has not in it thoſe Qualities contained in the *abſtract Idea* which any general Term ſtands for, cannot be ranked under that Species, nor called by that Name; ſince that *abſtract Idea* is the very Eſſence of that *Species*. Thus if the Idea of *Body* with ſome People be bare Extenſion, or Space, then Solidity is not eſſential to Body: If others make the Idea to which they give the Name *Body* to be the Solidity and Extenſion; then Solidity is eſſential alſo to *Body*. That alone, therefore, is conſidered as eſſential, which makes a Part of the *complex Idea*, the Name of a Sort ſtands for,

without which no particular Thing can be reckoned of that Sort, nor to entitled to that Name.

Subſtances are diſtinguiſhed into *Sorts* and *Species* by their *nominal Eſſence*; for it is that alone, that the Name which is the Mark of the Sort ſignifies: And the *Species* of Things to us are nothing but the ranking them under diſtinct Names, according to the *complex Ideas* in *Us*, and not according to preciſe, diſtinct, *real Eſſences* in *Them*.

We cannot rank and ſort Things by their *real Eſſences*, becauſe we know them not: Our Faculties carry us no farther, in the Knowledge of Subſtances, than a Collection of thoſe ſenſible Ideas we obſerve in them. But the internal Conſtitution whereon their Properties depend, is utterly unknown to us. This is evident, when we examine the *Stones* we tread on, or the *Iron* we handle We ſoon find that we know not their Make, and can give no Reaſon of the different Qualities we find in them; and yet how infinitely theſe come ſhort of the fine Contrivances and inconceivable real Eſſences of *Plants* and *Animals*, every one knows. The Workmanſhip of the all-wiſe and powerful GOD, in the great Fabrick of the Univerſe, and every part thereof, farther exceeds the Comprehenſion of the moſt inquiſitive and intelligent Man, than the beſt Contrivance of the moſt ingenious Man, doth the Conceptions of the moſt ignorant of rational Creatures. In vain, therefore, do we pretend to range Things into *Sorts*, and diſpoſe them into certain *Claſſes*, under Names by their *real Eſſences*, that are ſo far from our Diſcovery or Comprehenſion.

But tho' the *nominal Eſſences* of Subſtances are made by the Mind, they are not yet made ſo arbitrarily as thoſe of mixed Modes. To the making of any *nominal Eſſence*, it is neceſſary.

Firſt, That the Ideas whereof it conſiſts, have ſuch an Union as to make but one Idea, how compounded ſoever.

Secondly,

Secondly, That the particular Ideas ſo united be exactly the ſame, neither more nor leſs: For if two abſtract complex Ideas differ either in *Number* or *Sorts*, of their component Parts, they make two different, and not one and the ſame Eſſence.

In the *Firſt* of theſe, the Mind, in making its *complex* Ideas of Subſtances, only follows *Nature*, and puts none together which are not ſuppoſed to have an Union in Nature. For Men obſerving certain Qualities always joined and exiſting together, therein copy Nature, and of Ideas ſo united, make their complex Ones of Subſtance.

Secondly, Tho' the Mind, in making its complex Ideas of Subſtances, never puts any together that do not *really*, or are not ſuppoſed to co-exiſt: Yet the Number it combines depends upon the various Care, Induſtry or Fancy of him that makes it. Men generally content themſelves with ſome few obvious Qualities, and often leave out others as material and as firmly united as thoſe they take in.

In Bodies organized and propagated by Seeds, as *Vegetables* and *Animals*, the *Shape* is that which, to us, is the leading Quality, and moſt characteriſtical Part that determines the *Species*: In moſt other Bodies, not propagated by Seed, it is the *Colour* we chiefly fix on, and are moſt led by. Thus where we find the Colour of *Gold*, we are apt to imagine all the other Qualities, comprehended in our complex Idea of *Gold*, to be there alſo.

Tho' the *nominal* Eſſences of Subſtances are all ſuppoſed to be copied from Nature, yet they are all, or moſt of them, very imperfect: And ſince the Compoſition of the complex Ideas is, in ſeveral Men, very different, we may conclude that theſe Boundaries of Species, are as *Men*, and not as *Nature* makes them; if at leaſt there are in Nature any ſuch prefixed Bounds.

It is true, that many particular Subſtances are ſo made by Nature, that they have no Agreement and Likeneſs, one with another, and ſo afford a Foundation of being ranked into Sorts: But the *ſorting* of Things by us, being, in Order to naming and comprehending them under general Terms, I cannot ſee how it can be properly ſaid, that Nature ſets the *Boundaries* of the Species of Things. But if it be ſo, our *Boundaries* of Species, are not exactly conformable to Nature.

If the firſt Sorting of Individuals depends on the Mind of Man, variouſly collecting the ſimple Ideas, that make the the *nominal* Eſſence of the loweſt Species; it is much more evident that the more *comprehenſive Claſſes*, called *Genera*, do ſo. In forming more general Ideas they may comprehend different Sorts, the Mind leaves out thoſe Qualities which are peculiar to Gold, Silver, &c. and retaining a complex Idea, made up of thoſe that are common to each Species, there is a new *Genus* conſtituted, to which the Name *Metal* is annexed.

So that in this whole Buſineſs of *Genera* and *Species*, the *Genus* or more comprehenſive is but a partial Conception of what is in the *Species*, and the *Species* but a partial Idea of what is to be found in each *Individual*: In all which there is no new Thing made, but only more or leſs comprehenſive Signs, whereby we may be enabled to expreſs, in a few Syllables, great Numbers of particular Things, as they agree in more or leſs general Conceptions, which we have framed for that Purpoſe. If theſe *abſtract general* Ideas be thought to be complete, it can only be in Reſpect of a certain eſtabliſhed Relation between them, and certain Names, which are made Uſe of to ſignify them, and not in Reſpect of any Thing exiſting as made by Nature.

This is adjuſted to the true End of Speech, which is to be the eaſieſt and ſhorteſt Way of communicating

nicating our Notions. This is the proper Buſineſs of *Genus* and *Species*: And this Men do, without any Conſideration of real Eſſences, and ſubſtantial Forms, which come not within the Reach of our Knowledge, when we think of thoſe Things; nor within the Signification of our Words, when we diſcourſe with others.

CHAP. VII.

Of Particles.

BESIDES Words, which are the Names of Ideas in the Mind, there are others made Uſe of to ſignify the *Connection* that the Mind gives to Ideas or Propoſitions, one with another, and to intimate ſome particular *Action* of its own, at that Time, relating to thoſe Ideas. This it does ſeveral Ways; as *is*, *is not*, are Marks of the Mind, affirming or denying. Beſides which, the Mind in declaring its Sentiments to others, connects not only the Parts of Propoſitions, but whole Sentences, one with another, with their ſeveral Relations and Dependencies, to make a coherent Diſcourſe.

The Words ſignifying the Connection, the Mind gives to ſeveral Affirmations and Negations, which it unites in one continued Reaſoning or Narration, are called *Particles*. And it is in the right Uſe of theſe, that more particularly conſiſts the Clearneſs and Beauty of a *good Style*. To expreſs the Dependence of his Thoughts and Reaſonings, one upon another, a Man muſt have Words to ſhow what Connection, Diſtinction, Oppoſition, Emphaſis, *&c.* he gives to each reſpective part of his Diſcourſe.

Theſe cannot be underſtood rightly, without a clear View of the Poſtures, Stands, Turns, Limitations, Exceptions, and ſeveral other Thoughts of the Mind: Of theſe there is a great Variety,

much exceeding the Number of Particles, that moſt Languages have to expreſs them by; for which Reaſon, it happens that moſt of theſe Particles have divers, and, ſometimes, almoſt oppoſite Significations. Thus, the Particle *But*, in *Engliſh*, has ſeveral very different Significations; as, *But to ſay no more:* Here it intimates a Stop of the Mind, in the Courſe it was going, before it came to it. *I ſaw but two Planets:* Here it ſhows, that the Mind limits the Senſe to what is expreſſed, with an Excluſion of all other: *You Pray, but it is not that God would bring you to the true Religion, but that he would confirm you in your own.* The former of theſe intimates a Suppoſition in the Mind of ſomething otherwiſe than it ſhould be: The latter ſhows, that the Mind makes a direct Oppoſition between that and whatever goes before. *All Animals have Senſe, but a Dog is an Animal.* Here it ſignifies the Connection of the latter Propoſition with the former. To theſe, divers other Significations of this Particle, might be added, if it were neceſſary to examine it in its full Latitude.

I intend not here a full Explication of this Sort of Signs, the Inſtances I have produced in this one, may give Occaſion to reflect on their Uſe and Force in Language, and lead us into the Contemplation of ſeveral Actions of our Minds, in diſcourſing, which it has found a Way to intimate to others, by theſe *Particles*, ſome whereof conſtantly, and others in certain Conſtructions, have the Senſe of a whole Sentence contained in them.

CHAP. VIII.

Of abſtract and concrete Terms.

THE Mind, as has been ſhown, has a Power to *abſtract* its Ideas, whereby the Sorts of Things are diſtinguiſhed: Now each *abſtract* Idea being

being diſtinct, ſo that the one can never be the other, the Mind will, by its intuitive Knowledge perceive their difference; and therefore in Propoſitions, no two whole Ideas can ever be affirmed one of another: Nor does the common Uſe of Language permit any two abſtract Words, or Names of *abſtract* Ideas, ſhould be affirmed one of another, *viz. Humanity* is *Rationality*. All our Affirmations are only *inconcrete*, which is the affirming one *abſtract* Idea to be joined to another: Which *abſtract* Ideas in *Subſtances*, may be of any Sort, tho' the moſt of them are of *Powers*: As a *Man is white*, ſignifies, that the Thing, that has the Eſſence of a Man, has alſo in it the Eſſence of *Whiteneſs*, which is only a Power to produce the *Idea* of Whiteneſs in one, whoſe Eyes can diſcover common Objects. In all the reſt theſe are little elſe but *Relations*.

This Diſtinction of Names ſhows alſo the Difference of our Ideas: For, if we obſerve them, we ſhall find that our ſimple Ideas have all *abſtract* as well as *concrete* Names: The one whereof is (to ſpeak in the Language of Grammarians) a Subſtantive, the other an Adjective; as *Whiteneſs*, *white*, *Swectneſs*, *ſweet*, &c. The like alſo holds in our Ideas of Modes and Relations, as *Juſtneſs*, *juſt*, *Equality*, *equal*, &c. But as to our Ideas of Subſtances, we have very few abſtract Names at all. Thoſe few that the Schools have invented, as *Animalitas*, *Humanitas*, &c. hold no Proportion with the infinite Number of Names of Subſtances, and could never get Admittance into common Uſe, or obtain the Licenſe of publick Approbation; which ſeems to intimate the Confeſſion of all Mankind, that they have no Ideas of the real Eſſences of Subſtances, ſince they have no Names for ſuch Ideas. It was only the Doctrine of *ſubſtantial* Forms, and the Confidence of miſtaken Pretenders to a Knowledge they had not, which firſt coined, and then introduced *Animalitas*, *Humanitas*, and

the

the like: which yet went very little farther than in their own Schools, and could never get to be current among underſtanding Men. Indeed, *Humanitas* was a Word familiar amongſt the *Romans*; but in a far different Senſe, and ſtood not for the abſtract Eſſence of ſuch a Subſtance; but was the abſtract of a Mode; and its concrete *Humanus*, not *Homo*.

CHAP. IX.

Of the Imperfection of Words.

TO examine the *Perfection* or *Imperfection* of Words, it is neceſſary to conſider their Uſe and End, which is twofold, *Firſt*, to *record* our own Thoughts: *Secondly*, to *communicate* our Thoughts to others: The *Firſt* is for the Help of our own Memories, whereby we do, as it were, talk to ourſelves: For this Purpoſe any Words may ſerve our turn: Words being *arbitrary Signs*, we may uſe which we pleaſe for this Purpoſe; and there will be no Imperfection in them, if we conſtantly uſe the ſame *Signs* for the ſame *Idea*.

Secondly, As to *Communication* by Words; that too has a double Uſe: *Firſt*, their *civil Uſe*, which is ſuch a Communication of Thoughts and Ideas, by Words, as may ſerve, in common Converſation and Commerce, about the ordinary Affairs and Occurrences of civil Life. *Secondly*, the *Philoſophical* Uſe of Words, by which I mean ſuch an Uſe of them, as may ſerve to convey the preciſe Notion of Things, and to expreſs certain and undoubted Truths in general Propoſitions; which the Mind may reſt upon, and be ſatisfied with, in its Search after true Knowledge: Theſe two Uſes are very diſtinct, and much leſs Exactneſs will ſerve in the one, than in the other.

The End of Language in Communication is to be *underſtood*; that is, to excite by Sounds in the *Hearer*,

Hearer, the ſame Ideas they ſtand for in the Mind of the *Speaker*. The Doubtfulneſs and Uncertainty of their Signification, which is the Imperfection we are here ſpeaking of, has its Cauſe more in the Ideas themſelves, than in any Incapacity in the *Sounds* to ſignify them; for in that Regard they are all equally perfect. That then which makes the Difference, is the Difference of Ideas they ſtand for, which muſt be learned and retained by thoſe who would diſcourſe together intelligibly. Now this is difficult in theſe Caſes.

Firſt, When the Ideas they ſtand for are very complex. Hence the Names of *mixed Modes* are liable to great Uncertainty and Obſcurity in their Signification; for here the Idea being made up of many Parts, it is not eaſy to form and retain it exactly. Of this Sort chiefly are moral Words, which have ſeldom, in two different Men, the ſame preciſe Signification.

Secondly, Where the Ideas they ſtand for, have no certain Connection in Nature, and, therefore, no ſettled *Standard* to rectify and adjuſt them by. This again is the Caſe of the Names of *mixed Modes*, which are the Aſſemblages of Ideas put together at Pleaſure. Common Uſe, indeed, regulates the Meaning of Words pretty well for common Converſation, but it is not ſufficient to adjuſt them to Philoſophical Diſcourſes, there being ſcarce a Name of any very *complex Idea*, which in common Uſe has not a great Latitude; and it is not made the Sign of far different Ideas.

The Way of learning theſe Names greatly contributes to the Doubtfulneſs of their Signification. For we may obſerve that Children are taught the Names of ſimple Ideas, and Subſtances, by having the Things ſhown them; and then they repeat the Name that ſtands for it; as *White*, *Sweet*, *Milk*, *Sugar*, &c. Bur in *mixed Modes*, the Sounds are learned firſt, and Men are to learn afterwards their Signification,

Signification, by their own Obſervation and Induſtry, or the Explication of others, which is the reaſon, that theſe Words are little more than *bare Sounds* in the Minds of moſt, becauſe few are at the Pains to ſettle their Ideas and Notions preciſely; and thoſe which are, make them the Signs of Ideas, different from what others underſtand by them, which is the Occaſion of moſt Diſputes.

Thirdly, Where the Signification of a Word is referred to a *Standard* which is not eaſily known: This is the Caſe of the Names of *Subſtances*, which being ſuppoſed to ſtand for their *real Eſſences*, muſt needs be of uncertain Application, becauſe theſe Eſſences are utterly unknown; and it will be impoſſible to know what is, or is not *Antimony*, when that Word is to ſtand for the real Eſſence of it; whereof we have no Ideas at all.

Or ſuppoſe theſe Names only ſtand for ſimple Ideas, as found to co-exiſt in *Subſtances*, yet thus they will be liable to great Uncertainty too: Becauſe theſe ſimple Ideas, being very numerous, Men frame different Ideas of the ſame Subjects, by putting different Ideas into their complex one; of ſuch Subſtances, ſeveral Men obſerve ſeveral Properties in the ſame Subſtance, and none of them all; who having but imperfect Deſcriptions of Things, can have but uncertain Significations of Words.

Fourthly, When the Signification of the Word, and the real Eſſence of the Thing, are not the ſame, which is ſtill the Caſe of Subſtances. From hence we may obſerve,

Firſt, That the Names of ſimple Ideas are leaſt liable to Miſtake: *Firſt*, Becauſe the Ideas they ſtand for; being each but one ſingle Perception, are eaſier got, and more clearly retained, than the more complex ones of Subſtances and mixed Modes. *Secondly*, Becauſe they are not referred to any other Eſſence, but barely that Perception they immediately ſignify.

Secondly,

Secondly, Names of *ſimple Modes* are next to *ſimple Ideas*, leaſt liable to Doubt or Uncertainty, eſpecially thoſe of *Figure* and *Number*, of which Men have ſo clear and diſtinct *Ideas*.

Thirdly, In *mixed Modes*, when they are compoſed of a few and obvious ſimple Ideas, their Names are clear and diſtinct enough; but when they comprehend a great Number of ſimple Ideas, they are commonly of a very doubtful and uncertain Signification.

Fourthly, The Names of *Subſtances* being annexed to *Ideas*, that are neither the real Eſſences, nor exact Repreſentation of Things, are liable to ſtill greater Imperfection, when we come to a philoſophical Uſe of them.

CHAP. X.

Of the Abuſe of Words.

BESIDES the Imperfection that is naturally in Language, and the Obſcurity and Confuſion that are ſo hard to be avoided in the Uſe of Words, there are ſeveral wilful Faults and Neglects which Men are guilty of, in this Way of Communication, whereby they render theſe Signs leſs clear and diſtinct, in their Signification, than they ought to be.

Firſt, In this Kind, the firſt and moſt palpable Abuſe is, the uſing of Words, without clear and diſtinct Ideas; or, which is worſe, Signs without any Thing ſignified. Of theſe there are two Sorts.

I. One may obſerve, in all Languages, certain Words, that, if examined, will be found, in their firſt Original, and their appropriated Uſe, not to ſtand for any clear and diſtinct Ideas. Theſe, for the moſt Part, the ſeveral Sects of Philoſophy and Religion, have introduced. For their Authors, or Promoters, either affecting ſomewhat ſingular, and out of the Way of common Apprehenſions, or to ſupport ſome ſtrange Opinions, or cover ſome Weakneſs of their Hypotheſis, ſeldom fail to coin new Words,

Words, and ſuch as, when they come to be examined, may juſtly be called *inſignificant Terms*. For, having either had no determinate Collection of Ideas annexed to them, when they were firſt invented; or at leaſt ſuch as, if well examined, will be found inconſiſtent, it is no Wonder, if afterwards, in the vulgar Uſe of the ſame Party, they remain empty Sounds, with little or no Signification, amongſt thoſe who think it enough to have them often in their Mouths, as the diſtinguiſhed Characters of their Church, or School, without much troubling their Heads to examine what are the preciſe Ideas they ſtand for. I ſhall not need here to heap up Inſtances, every one's Reading and Converſation will ſufficiently furniſh him; or, if he wants to be better ſtored, the great Mint-maſters of theſe Kind of Terms, I mean the School-men and Metaphyſicians, (under which I think, the diſputing natural and moral Philoſophers of theſe latter Ages, may be comprehended,) have where-withal abundantly to content him.

II. Others there are, who extend this Abuſe yet farther, who take ſo little Care to lay by Words, which, in their primary Notation, have ſcarce any clear and diſtinct Ideas which they are annexed to, that by an unpardonable Negligence, they familiarly uſe Words, which, the Propriety of Language, has affixed to very important Ideas, without any diſtinct Meaning at all. *Wiſdom*, *Glory*, *Grace*, &c. are Words frequent enough in every Man's Mouth; but if a great many of thoſe who uſe them, ſhould be aſked what they mean by them, they would be at a Stand, and not know what to anſwer: A plain Proof, that though they have learned thoſe Sounds, and have them ready at their Tongue's End, yet there are no determined Ideas laid up in their Minds, which are to be conveyed to others by them.

Men having been accuſtomed from their Cradles to learn Words, which are eaſily got and retained before they knew, or had framed the complex Ideas,

to

to which they were annexed, or which were to be found in the Things they were thought to ſtand for, they uſually continue to do ſo all their Lives, and without taking the Pains neceſſary to ſettle in their Minds determined Ideas, they uſe their Words for ſuch unſteady and confuſed Notions as they have, contenting themſelves with the ſame Words other People uſe; as if their very Sound neceſſarily carried with it conſtantly the ſame Meaning. This, though Men make a Shift within the ordinary Occurrences of Life, where they find it neceſſary to be underſtood, and therefore, they make Signs till they are ſo: yet this Inſignificancy in their Words, when they come to reaſon, concerning either their Tenets or Intereſt, manifeſtly fills their Diſcourſe with Abundance of empty unintelligible Noiſe and Jargon, eſpecially in moral Matters, where the Words, for the moſt Part, ſtanding for arbitrary and numerous Collections of Ideas, not regularly and permanently united in Nature, their bare Sounds are often only thought on, or at leaſt, very obſcure and uncertain Notions annexed to them. Men take the Words they find in Uſe amongſt their Neighbours; and that they may not ſeem ignorant what they ſtand for, uſe them confidently, without much troubling their Heads about a certain fixed Meaning; whereby, beſides the Eaſe of it, they obtain this Advantage, that as in ſuch Diſcourſes they ſeldom are in the right, ſo they are as ſeldom to be convinced that they are in the wrong; it being all one to attempt to draw thoſe Men out of their Miſtakes, who have no ſettled Notions, as to diſpoſſeſs a Vagrant of his Habitation, who has no ſettled Abode. This I gueſs to be ſo; and every one may obſerve in himſelf, and others, whether it be or no.

Secondly, Another great Abuſe of Words, is *Inconſtancy* in the Uſe of them. It is hard to find a Diſcourſe written of any Subject, eſpecially of Controverſy, wherein one ſhall not obſerve, if he read

with Attention, the ſame Words (and thoſe commonly the moſt material in the Diſcourſe, and upon which the Argument turns) uſed ſometimes for one Collection of ſimple Ideas, and ſometimes for another, which is a perfect Abuſe of Language. Words being intended for Signs of my Ideas, to make them known to others, not by any natural Signification, but by a voluntary Impoſition, it is plain Cheat and Abuſe, when I make them ſtand ſometimes for one Thing, and ſometimes for another; the wilful Doing whereof, can be imputed to nothing but great Folly, or greater Diſhoneſty. And a Man, in his Accompts with another, may, with as much Fairneſs, make the Characters of Numbers ſometimes ſtand for one, and ſometimes for another Collection of Units, (*v.g.* this Character 3 ſtand ſometimes for three, ſometimes for four, and ſometimes for eight) as in his Diſcourſe, or Reaſoning, make the ſame Words ſtand for different Collections of ſimple Ideas. If Men ſhould do ſo in their Reckonings, I wonder who would be concerned with them? One who would ſpeak thus, in the Affairs and Buſineſs of the World, and call 8 ſometimes Seven, and ſometimes Nine, as beſt ſerved his Advantage, would preſently be called by one of the two Names Men conſtantly are diſguſted with. And yet in Diſputation, and learned Conteſts, the ſame Sort of Proceeding paſſes commonly for Wit and Learning, but to me it appears a greater Diſhoneſty than the miſplacing of Counters, in the caſting up a Debt; and the Cheat is the greater, in Proportion as Truth is of greater Concernment and Value than Money.

Thirdly, Another Abuſe of Language is, an *affected Obſcurity*, by either applying old Words to new and unuſual Significations, or introducing new and ambiguous Terms, without defining either; or elſe putting them ſo together, as may confound their ordinary Meaning. Though the Peripatetick Philoſophy has been moſt eminent in this Way, yet

other

other Sects have not been wholly clear of it. There is ſcarce any of them that are not cumbered with ſome Difficulties, (ſuch as the Imperfection of human Knowledge) which they have been fain to cover with Obſcurity of Terms, and to confound the Signification of Words, which, like a Miſt before Peoples Eyes, might hinder their weak Parts from being diſcovered. That *Body*, and *Extenſion*, in common Uſe, ſtand for two diſtinct Ideas, is plain to any one that will but reflect a little. For, were their Signification preciſely the ſame, it would be as proper and intelligible to ſay, the *Body of an Extenſion*, as the *Extenſion of a Body*; and yet there are thoſe, who find it neceſſary to confound their Signification. To this Abuſe, and the Miſchiefs of confounding the Signification of Words, Logick, and the liberal Sciences, as they have been handled in the Schools, have given Reputation; and, the admired Art of diſputing, hath added much to the natural Imperfection of Languages, whilſt it has been made Uſe of, and fitted to perplex the Signification of Words, more than to diſcover the Knowledge and Truth of Things: And he that will look into that Sort of learned Writings, will find the Words there, much more obſcure, uncertain, and undetermined, in their Meaning, than they are in ordinary Converſation.

This is unavoidably the Caſe, where Mens Parts and Learning, are eſtimated by their Skill in diſputing. And if Reputation and Reward ſhall attend theſe Conqueſts, which depend moſtly on the Fineneſs and Niceties of Words, it is no Wonder if the Wit of Men ſo employed, ſhould perplex, involve, and ſubtilize the Signification of Sounds, ſo as never to want ſomething to ſay, in oppoſing, or defending any Queſtion; the Victory being adjudged, not to him who had Truth on his Side, but the laſt Word in the Diſpute.

This, though a very uſeleſs Skill, and that which I think the direct Oppoſite to the Ways of Know-

edge, hath yet paſſed hitherto, under the laudable and eſteemed Names of *Subtility* and *Acuteneſs*; and has had the Applauſe of the Schools, and Encouragement of one Part of the learned Men of the World. And no Wonder, ſince the Philoſophers of old, (the diſputing and wrangling Philoſophers, I mean, ſuch as *Lucian* wittily, and with Reaſon, taxes,) and the Schoolmen ſince, aiming at Glory and Eſteem, for their great, and univerſal Knowledge, eaſier, a great deal, to be pretended to, than really acquired, found this a good Expedient to cover their Ignorance, with a curious, and unexplicable Web of perplexed Words, and, procure to themſelves, the Admiration of others, by unintelligible Terms, the apter to produce Wonder, becauſe they could not be underſtood: Whilſt it appears in all Hiſtory, that theſe profound Doctors, were no wiſer, nor more uſeful, than their Neighbours; and brought but ſmall Advantage to human Life, or the Societies wherein they lived: Unleſs the coining of new Words, wherein they produced no new Things to applythem to, or the perplexing, or obſcuring the Signification of old Ones, and ſo bringing all Things into Queſtion and Diſpute, were a Thing profitable to the Life of Man, or worthy Commendation and Reward.

For, notwithſtanding theſe learned Diſputants, theſe all-knowing Doctors, it was to the unſcholaſtick Stateſman, that the Governments of the World, owed their Peace, Defence, and Liberties, and from the illiterate, and contemned Mechanick, a Name of Diſgrace, that they received the Improvements on uſeful Arts. Nevertheleſs, this artificial Ignorace, and learned Gibberiſh, prevailed mightily in theſe laſt Ages, by the Intereſt, and Artifice of thoſe, who found no eaſier Way, to that Pitch of Authority and Dominion, they have attained; than by amuſing the Men of Buſineſs, and Ignorant, with hard Words, or, employing the Ingenious, and Idle, in intricate Diſputes, about unintelligible

Terms,

Terms, and holding them, perpetually entangled, in that endleſs Labyrinth. Beſides, there is no ſuch Way to gain Admittance, or give Defence, to ſtrange and abſurd Doctrines, as to guard them round about with Legions of obſcure, doubtful, and undefined Words: which, yet, make theſe Retreats more like the Dens of Robbers, or Holes of Foxes, than the Fortreſſes of fair Warriours; which, if it be hard to get them out of, it is not for the Strength that is in them, but the Briars and Thorns, and the Obſcurity of the Thickets, they are beſet with. For Untruth, being unacceptable to the Mind of Man, there is no other Defence left for Abſurdity, but Obſcurity.

Thus, learned Ignorance, and this Art of keeping, even inquiſitive Men, from true Knowledge, hath been propagated in the World, and hath much perplexed, whilſt it pretended to inform the Underſtanding. For, we ſee, that other well-meaning, and wiſe Men, whoſe Education, and Parts, had not acquired that Acuteneſs, could intelligibly expreſs themſelves to one another; and in its plain Uſe make a Benefit of Language. But though unlearned Men, well enough underſtood the Words *white*, and *black*, &c. and had conſtant Notions of the Ideas, ſignified by thoſe Words; yet there were Philoſophers found, who had Learning and Subtilty enough to prove, that *Snow was black*, *i. e.* to prove, that *white was black*; whereby they had the Advantage to deſtroy the Inſtruments, and Means of Diſcourſe, Converſation, Inſtruction, and Society; whilſt, with great Art and Subtilty, they did no more than perplex, and confound, the Signification of Words, and thereby, render Language leſs uſeful, than the real Defects of it had made it a Gift, which the Illiterate had not attained to.

Theſe learned Men did equally inſtruct Mens Underſtandings, and profit their Lives, as he, who ſhould alter the Signification of known Characters, and, by a ſubtle Device of Learning, far ſurpaſſing

the Capacity of the Illiterate, Dull, and Vulgar, ſhould, in his Writing, ſhow, that he could put A for B, and D for E, &c. to the no ſmall Admiration, and Benefit of his Reader. It being as ſenſeleſs to put *black*, which, is a Word agreed on, to ſtand for one ſenſible Idea, to put it, I ſay, for another, or the contrary Idea, *i. e.* to call *Snow black*, as to put this Mark A, which is a Character, agreed on, to ſtand for one Modification of Sound, made by a certain Motion of the Organs of Speech, for B, which, is agreed on, to ſtand for another Modification of Sound, made by another certain Motion of the Organs of Speech.

Nor hath this Miſchief ſtopped, in logical Niceties, or curious empty Speculations; it hath invaded the great Concernments of human Life, and Society; obſcured and perplexed, the material Truths of Law, and Divinity; brought Confuſion, Diſorder, and Uncertainty, into the Affairs of Mankind; and if not deſtroyed, yet, in a great Meaſure, rendered uſeleſs, thoſe two great Rules, Religion and Juſtice. What have the greateſt Part of the Comments, and Diſputes, upon the Laws of GOD and Man, ſerved for, but to make the Meaning more doubtful, and perplex the Senſe? What has been the Effect of thoſe multiplied, curious Diſtinctions, and acute Niceties, but Obſcurity and Uncertainty, leaving the Words more unintelligible, and the Reader more at a Loſs? How elſe comes it to paſs, that Princes, ſpeaking, or writing to their Servants, in their ordinary Commands, are eaſily underſtood; ſpeaking to their People, in their Laws, are not ſo? And, as I remarked before, doth it not often happen, that a Man, of an ordinary Capacity, very well underſtands a Text, or a Law, that he reads, till he conſults an Expoſitor, or goes to Council; who, by that Time he hath done explaining them, makes the Word ſignify, either nothing at all, or what he pleaſes?

Whether

Whether any By-intereſt of theſe Profeſſions, have occaſioned this, I will not here examine; but I leave it to be conſidered, whether it would not be well for Mankind, whoſe Concernment it is to know Things as they are, and to do what they ought, and not to ſpend their Lives in talking about them, or toſſing Words to and fro; whether it would not be well, I ſay, that the Uſe of Words were made plain and direct; and that Language, which was given us for the Improvement of Knowledge, and Bond of Society, ſhould not be employed to darken Truth, and unſettle Peoples Rights; to raiſe Miſts, and render unintelligible, both Morality and Religion? Or that at leaſt, if this will happen, it ſhould not be thought Learning, or Knowledge, to do ſo.

Fourthly, Another great Abuſe of Words is, *the taking them for Things*. This, though it in ſome Degree concerns all Names, in general, yet, more particularly affects thoſe of Subſtances. To this Abuſe, thoſe Men are moſt ſubject, who confine their Thoughts to any one Syſtem, and give themſelves up unto a firm Belief, of the Perfection of any received Hypotheſis; whereby, they come to be perſuaded, that the Terms of that Sect, are ſo united to the Nature of Things, that they perfectly correſpond with their real Exiſtence. Who is there, that has been bred up in the Peripatetick Philoſophy, who does not think the ten Names, under which are ranked the ten Predicaments, to be exactly conformable to the Nature of Things? Who is there of that School, that is not perſuaded, that *ſubſtantial Forms*, *vegetative Souls*, *Abhorrence of a Vacuum*, *intentional Species*, &c. are ſomething real? Theſe Words Men have found their ver Entrance upon Knowledge, and have forwarded their Maſters, and Syſtems, lay great Streſs upon them; and therefore, they cannot quit the Opinion, that they are conformable to Nature, and are the Repreſentations of ſomething that really exiſts. The Platoniſts have their *Soul of the World*, and the Epicureans

reans their *Endeavour towards motion* in their Atoms, when at reſt. There is ſcarce any Sect in Philoſophy, that has not a diſtinct Set of Terms, that others underſtand not. But, yet, this Gibberiſh, which is the Weakneſs of human Underſtanding, ſerves ſo well to palliate Mens Ignorance, and cover their Errors, comes, by familiar Uſe amongſt thoſe of the ſame Tribe, to ſeem the moſt important Part of Language, and of all other the Terms, the moſt ſignificant: And ſhould *aerial*, and *ætherial Vehicles*, come once, by the Prevalency of that Doctrine, to be generally received any where, no Doubt, thoſe Terms would make Impreſſions on Mens Minds, ſo ſo as to eſtabliſh them in the Perſuaſion of the Reality of ſuch Things, as much as Peripatetick Forms, and intentional Species have heretofore done.

How much Names taken for Things are apt to miſlead the Underſtanding, the attentive reading of Philoſophical Writers, would abundantly diſcover; and that, perhaps, in Words little ſuſpected of any ſuch miſuſe. I ſhall inſtance, in one only, and that a very familiar one. How many intrinſick Diſputes, have there been about *Matter*, as if there were ſome ſuch Thing really in Nature, diſtinct from *Body*; as it is evident, the Word *Matter*, ſtands for an Idea diſtinct from the Idea of *Body?* For, if the Ideas, theſe two Terms ſtood for, were preciſely the ſame, they might, indifferently, in all Places, be put one for another. But, we ſee, that though it be proper to ſay, there is *one Matter of all Bodies*, one cannot ſay. there is *one Body of all Matters*: we familiarly ſay, one Body is bigger than another; but it ſounds harſh, (and, I think, is never uſed) to ſay, one Matter is bigger than another. Whence comes this then? *viz.* from hence, that though Matter and Body, be not really diſtinct, but, wherever there is the one, there is alſo the other; yet, Matter and Body ſtand for two different Conceptions, whereof, the one is incomplete, and but a Part of the other. For, Body ſtands for a ſolid,

extended,

extended, figured Subſtance, whereof Matter is but a partial, and more confuſed Conception, it ſeeming to me, to be uſed for the Subſtance, and Solidity of Body, without taking in its Extenſion and Figure: and therefore, it is, that, ſpeaking of Matter, we ſpeak of it always as one, becauſe, in Truth, it expreſſly contains nothing, but the Idea of a ſolid Subſtance, which is every where the ſame, every where Uniform. This being our Idea of Matter, we no more conceive, or ſpeak of different Matters in the World, than we do of different Solidities; though we both conceive, and ſpeak of different Bodies, becauſe Extenſion and Figure, are capable of Variation. But, ſince Solidity cannot exiſt without Extenſion and Figure, the taking Matter to be the Name of ſomething, really exiſting, under that Preciſion, has, no Doubt, produced thoſe obſcure and unintelligible Diſcourſes, and Diſputes, which have filled the Heads and Books of Philoſophers, concerning *materia prima*; which Imperfection, or Abuſe, how far it may concern a great many other general Terms, I leave to be conſidered. This, I think, I may at leaſt ſay, that we ſhould have fewer Diſputes in the World, if Words were taken for what they are, the Signs of our Ideas only, and not for Things themſelves. For, when we argue about Matter, or any the like Term, we truly argue only about the Idea, we expreſs by that Sound, whether that preciſe Idea, agree to any Thing, really exiſting in Nature, or no. And, if Men would tell, what Ideas they make their Words ſtand for, there could not be Half that Obſcurity, or wrangling, in the Search or Support of Truth, that there is.

But, whatever Inconvenience follows, from this Miſtake of Words, this I am ſure, that by conſtant, and familiar Uſe, they charm Men into Notions, far remote from the Truth of Things. It would be a hard Matter to perſuade any one, that the Words, which his Father, or Schoolmaſter, the Parſon of

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the Pariſh, or ſuch a reverend Doctor uſed, ſignified nothing that really exiſted in Nature: Which, perhaps, is none of the leaſt Cauſes, that Men are ſo hardly drawn to quit their Miſtakes, even in Opinions purely Philoſophical, and where they have no other Intereſt, but Truth. For, the Words they have a long Time been uſed to, remaining firm in their Minds, it is no Wonder, that the wrong Notions, annexed to them, ſhould not be removed.

Fifthly, Another Abuſe of Words, is the ſetting them in the Place of Things, which they do, or can by no Means ſignify. We may obſerve, that in the general Names of Subſtances, whereof the nominal Eſſences are only known to us, when we put them into Propoſitions, and affirm, or deny, any Thing about them, we do moſt commonly, tacitly ſuppoſe, or intend, they ſhould ſtand for the real Eſſence of a certain Sort of Subſtances. For, when a Man ſays, *Gold is malleable*, he means, and would inſinuate, ſomething more than this, that *what I call Gold is malleable*, (though truly it it amounts to more) but would have this underſtood, *viz.* that *Gold*, i. e. *what has the real Eſſence of Gold, is malleable*; which amounts to thus much, that *Malleableneſs depends on, and is inſeparable from the real Eſſence of Gold.* But a Man, not knowing wherein that real Eſſence conſiſts, the Connection in his Mind of Malleableneſs, is not truly with an Eſſence he knows not, but only with the Sound *Gold* he puts for it. Thus when we ſay, that *Animal rationale* is, and *Animal implume bipes latis unguibus*, is not a good Definition of a Man; it is plain, we ſuppoſe the Name *Man*, in this Caſe, to ſtand for the real Eſſence of a Species, and would ſignify, that a *rational Animal*, better deſcribed that real Eſſence, than *a two legged Animal with broad Nails, and without Feathers.* For elſe, why might not *Plato* as properly make the Word ἄνθρωπος or *Man*, ſtand for, his complex Idea, made up of the Ideas of a Body, diſtinguiſhed from others, by a certain

certain Shape, and other outward Appearances, as Ariſtotle make the complex Idea, to which he gave the Name ἄνθρωπος or *Man*, of Body, and the Faculty of Reaſoning joined together; unleſs the Name ἄνθρωπος or *Man*, were ſuppoſed to ſtand for ſomething elſe, than what it ſignifies; and to be put in the Place of ſome other Thing than the Idea a Man profeſſes he would expreſs by it?

It is true, the Names of Subſtances would be much more uſeful, and Propoſitions made in them, much more certain, were the real Eſſences of Subſtances, the Ideas in our Minds, which thoſe Words ſignified. And it is for Want of thoſe real Eſſences, that our Words convey ſo little Knowledge or Certainty, in our Diſcourſes about them: And therefore, the Mind, to remove that Imperfection, as much as it can, makes them, by a ſecret Suppoſition, to ſtand for a Thing, having that real Eſſence, as if thereby it made ſome nearer Approaches to it. For, though the Word *Man* or *Gold*, ſignify nothing truly, but a complex Idea of Properties, united together in one Sort of Subſtances; yet there is ſcarce any Body in the Uſe of theſe Words, but often ſuppoſes each of thoſe Names to ſtand for a Thing having the real Eſſence, on which thoſe Properties depend. Which is ſo far from diminiſhing the Imperfection of our Words, that by a plain Abuſe it adds to it, when we would make them ſtand for ſomething, which not being in our complex Idea, the Name we uſe can no Ways be the Sign of.

This ſhows us the Reaſon why, in mixed Modes, any of the Ideas that make the Compoſition of the complex one, being left out, or changed, it is allowed to be another Thing, *i. e.* to be of another Species, as is plain in *Chance-medley*, *Man-ſlaughter*, *Murder*, *Parricide*, &c. The Reaſon whereof is, becauſe the complex Idea ſignified by that Name, is the real, as well as nominal Eſſence; and there is no ſecret Reference of that Name to any other Eſſence

ſence but that. But in Subſtances it is not ſo. For, though in that called *Gold*, one puts into his complex Idea, what another leaves out, and *vice verſa*; yet Men do not uſually think that therefore the Species is changed: Becauſe, they ſecretly in their Minds, refer that Name, and ſuppoſe it annexed to a real immutable Eſſence of a Thing exiſting, on which thoſe Properties depend. He that adds to his complex Idea of Gold, that of Fixedneſs, or Solubility, in *aqua regia*, which he put not in it before, is not thought to have changed the Species; but only to have a more perfect Idea, by adding another ſimple Idea, which is always in Fact joined with thoſe other, of which his former complex Idea conſiſted. But this Reference of a Name to a Thing, whereof we have not the Idea, is ſo far from helping, at all, that it only ſerves the more to involve us in Difficulties. For, by this tacit Reference, to the real Eſſence of that Species of Bodies, the Word *Gold* (which, by ſtanding for a more or leſs perfect Collection of ſimple Ideas, ſerves to deſign that Sort of Body, well enough, in civil Diſcourſe) comes to have no Signification at all, being put for ſomewhat, whereof we have no Idea at all, and ſo can ſignify nothing at at all, when the Body itſelf is away. For, however, it may be thought all one; yet, if well conſidered, it will be found a quite different Thing, to argue about Gold in Name, and about a Parcel of the Body itſelf, *v. g.* a Piece of Leaf Gold laid before us; though in Diſcourſe we are fain to ſubſtitute the Name for the Thing.

That, which I think, very much diſpoſes Men to ſubſtitute their Names, for the real Eſſences of Species, is the Suppoſition before mentioned, that Nature works regularly in the Production of Things, and ſets the Boundaries to each of thoſe Species, by giving exactly the ſame real internal Conſtitution to each Individual, which we rank under one general Name. Whereas any one who obſerves their dif-

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ferent Qualities can hardly doubt, that many of the Individuals, called by the ſame Name, are, in their internal Conſtitution, as different, one from another, as ſeveral of thoſe which are ranked under different ſpecifick Names. This Suppoſition, however, that the ſame preciſe internal Conſtitution goes always with the ſame ſpecifick Name, makes Men forward to take thoſe Names, for the Repreſentatives of thoſe real Eſſences, though, indeed, they ſignify nothing but the complex Ideas they have in their Minds, when they uſe them. So that, if I may ſo ſay, ſignifying one Thing, and being ſuppoſed for, or put in the Place of another, they cannot but, in ſuch a Kind of Uſe, cauſe a great deal of Uncertainty in Mens Diſcourſes; eſpecially, in thoſe who have thoroughly imbibed the Doctrine of ſubſtantial Forms, whereby they firmly imagine the ſeveral Species of Things to be determined and diſtinguiſhed.

But however prepoſterous and abſurd it may be, to make our Names ſtand for Ideas we have not, or, which is all one, Eſſences that we know not, it being in Effect, to make our Words the Signs of nothing; yet, it is evident to any one, who ever ſo little reflects on the Uſe Men make of their Words, that there is nothing more familiar. When a Man aſks, whether this, or that Thing he ſees, let it be a Drill, or a monſtrous Fœtus, be a Man, or no; it is evident, the Queſtion is not, whether that particular Thing agree to his complex Idea, expreſſed by the Name *Man*: But whether it has in it the real Eſſence of a Species of Things, which he ſuppoſes his Name *Man*, to ſtand for. In which Way of uſing the Names of Subſtances, there are theſe falſe Suppoſitions contained:

1*ſt*, That there are certain preciſe Eſſences, according to which, Nature makes all particular Things, and by which they are diſtinguiſhed into Species. That every Thing has a real Conſtitution, whereby it is what it is, and on which

its ſenſible Qualities depend, is paſt Doubt: But I think, it has been proved, that this makes not the Diſtinction of Species, as we rank them: nor the Boundaries of their Names.

2dly, This tacitly alſo inſinuates, as if we had Ideas of theſe propoſed Eſſences. For, to what Purpoſe elſe is it, to inquire, whether this, or that Thing, have the real Eſſence of the Species *Man*, if we did not ſuppoſe, that there were ſuch a ſpecifick Eſſence known? Which yet is utterly falſe: And therefore ſuch Application of Names, as would make them ſtand for Ideas which we have not, muſt needs cauſe great Diſorder in Diſcourſes and Reaſonings about them, and be a great Inconvenience in our Communication by Words.

Sixthly, There remains yet another more general, though, perhaps, leſs obſerved, Abuſe of Words; and that is, that Men having, by a long and familiar Uſe, annexed to them certain Ideas, they are apt to imagine, ſo near and neceſſary a Connexion, between the Names and the Signification, they uſe them in, that they forwardly ſuppoſe, one cannot but underſtand what their Meaning is; and, therefore, one ought to acquieſce in the Words delivered, as if it were paſt Doubt, that in the Uſe of theſe common received Sounds, the Speaker and Hearer, had, neceſſarily, the ſame preciſe Ideas. Whence preſuming, that when they have in Diſcourſe uſed any Term, they have thereby, as it were, ſet before others, the very Thing they talk of. And ſo, likewiſe, taking the Words of others, as naturally ſtanding for juſt what they themſelves have been accuſtomed to apply them to, they never trouble themſelves to explain their own, or underſtand clearly, others Meaning. From whence commonly proceeds Noiſe and Wrangling, without Improvement or Information; whilſt Men take Words to be the conſtant regular Marks of agreed Notions, which, in Truth, are no more than the voluntary and un-

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ſteady Signs of their own Ideas. And yet Men think it ſtrange, if in Diſcourſe, or (where it is often abſolutely neceſſary) in Diſpute, one ſometimes aſks the Meaning of their Terms: Though the Arguings, one may, every Day, obſerve in Converſation, make it evident, that there are few Names of complex Ideas, which any two Men uſe for the ſame juſt preciſe Collection. It is hard to name a Word which will not be a clear Inſtance of this. *Life* is a Term, none more familiar. Any one, almoſt would take it for an Affront, to be aſked, what he meant by it. And yet, if it comes in Queſtion, whether a Plant, that lies ready formed in the Seed, have life; whether the Embrio in an Egg, before Incubation, or a Man in a Swoon, without Senſe or Motion, be alive, or no? It is eaſy to perceive, that a clear diſtinct ſettled Idea, does not always accompany the Uſe of ſo known a Word, as that of *Life* is. Some groſs and confuſed Conceptions Men, indeed, ordinarily, have, to which they apply the common Words of their Language, and ſuch a looſe Uſe of their Words, ſerves them well enough in their ordinary Diſcourſes, or Affairs. But this is not ſufficient for Philoſophical Inquiries. Knowledge and Reaſoning, require preciſe determinate Ideas. And, though Men will not be ſo importunately dull, as not to underſtand what others ſay, without demanding an Explication of their Terms; nor ſo troubleſomely critical, as to correct others in the Uſe of the Words they receive from them; yet where Truth and Knowledge, are concerned in the caſe, I know not what Fault it can be, to deſire the Explication of Words, whoſe Senſe ſeems dubious; or why a Man ſhould be aſhamed to own his Ignorance, in what Senſe another Man uſes his Words, ſince he has no other Way of certainly knowing it, but by being informed.

This Abuſe, of taking Words upon Truſt, has no where ſpread ſo far, nor with ſo ill Effects, as amongſt Men of Letters. The Multiplication and Obſtinacy of Diſputes, which has ſo laid waſte the

intellectual World, is owing to nothing more than to this ill Uſe of Words. For, though it be generally believed, that there is great Diverſity of Opinions, in the Volumes and Varieties of Controverſies the World is diſtracted with; yet the moſt I can find, that the contending learned Men of different Parties do, in their Arguings one with another, is, that they ſpeak different Languages. For, I am apt to imagine, that when any of them, quitting Terms, think upon Things, and know what they think, they think all the ſame: Though, perhaps, what they would have be different.

To conclude this Conſideration of the Imperfection and abuſe of Language; the Ends of Language, in our Diſcourſe, with others being chiefly theſe three: 1. To make known one Man's Thoughts, or Ideas, to another. 2. To do it with as much Eaſe and Quickneſs, as is poſſible. And, 3. Thereby to convey the Knowledge of Things. Language is either abuſed, or deficient, when it fails of any of theſe three.

Firſt, Words fail in the firſt of theſe Ends, and lay not open one Man's Ideas to another's View. 1. When Men have Names in their Mouths, without any determined Ideas in their Minds, whereof they are the Signs: Or, 2. When they apply the common received Names of any Language to Ideas, to which the common Uſe of that Language does not apply them: Or, 3. When they apply them very unſteadily, making them ſtand now for one, and, by and by, for another Idea.

Secondly, Men fail of conveying their Thoughts, with all the Quickneſs and Eaſe, that may be, when they have complex Ideas, without having diſtinct Names for them. This is ſometimes the Fault of the Language itſelf, which has not in it a Sound, yet applied to ſuch a Signification; and ſometimes the Fault of the Man, who has not yet learned the Name for that Idea he would ſhow another.

Thirdly,

Thirdly, There is no Knowledge of Things, conveyed by Mens Words, when their Ideas agree not to the Reality of Things. Though it be a Defect, that has its Original in our Ideas, which are not so conformable to the Nature of Things, as Attention, Study, and Application might make them; yet it fails not to extend itself to our Words too, when we use them as Signs of real Beings, which yet never had any Reality or Existence.

First, He that hath Words of any Language, without distinct Ideas in his Mind, to which he applies them, does, so far as he uses them in Discourse, only make a Noise, without any Sense, or Signification, and how learned soever he may seem, by the Use of hard Words, or learned Terms, is not much more advanced thereby in Knowledge, than he would be in Learning, who had nothing in his Study, but the bare Titles of Books, without possessing the Contents of them. For all such Words, however put into Discourse, according to the right Construction of Grammatical Rules, or the Harmony of well turned Periods, do yet amount to nothing but bare Sounds, and nothing else.

Secondly, He that has complex Ideas, without particular Names for them, would be in no better a Case than a Bookseller, who had in his Ware-house, Volumes that lay there unbound, and without Titles; which, he could, therefore, make known to others, only by showing the loose Sheets, and communicate them only by Tale. This Man is hindered in his Discourse, for Want of Words to communicate his complex Ideas, which, he is, therefore, forced to make known, by an Enumeration of the simple Ones that compose them; and so is fain often to Use twenty Words to express, what another Man signifies in one.

Thirdly, He that puts not constantly the same Sign for the same Idea, but uses the same Words, sometimes in one, and sometimes in another Signifi-

tion, ought to paſs in the Schools and Converſation, for as fair a Man, as he does in the Market and Exchange, who ſells ſeveral Things under the ſame Name.

Fourthly, He that applies the Words of any Language to Ideas, different from thoſe to which the common Uſe of that Country applies them, however his own Underſtanding may be filled with Truth and Light, will not, by ſuch Words, be able convey much of it to others, without defining his Terms. For, however, the Sounds are ſuch as are familiarly known, and eaſily enter the Ears of thoſe who are accuſtomed to them; yet, ſtanding for other Ideas, than thoſe they uſually are annexed to, and are wont to excite in the Mind of the Hearers, they cannot make known the Thoughts of him, who thus uſes them.

Fifthly, He that hath imagined to himſelf Subſtances, ſuch as never have been, and filled his Head with Ideas, which have not any Correſpondence, with the real Nature of Things, to which yet, he gives ſettled and defined Names, may fill his Diſcourſe, and perhaps another Man's Head, with the fantaſtical Imaginations of his own Brain, but will be very far from advancing, thereby, one Jot, in real and true Knowledge.

He that hath Names, without Ideas, wants Meaning in his Words, and ſpeaks only empty Sounds. He that hath complex Ideas without Names for them, wants Liberty and Diſpatch, in his Expreſſions, and is neceſſitated to uſe Periphraſes. He that Uſes his Words, looſely and unſteadily, will either be not minded, or not underſtood. He that applies his Name to Ideas, different from their common Uſe, wants Propriety in his Language, and ſpeaks Gibberiſh. And he that hath Ideas of Subſtances, diſagreeing with the real Exiſtence of Things, ſo far wants the Materials of true Knowledge, in his Underſtanding, and hath, inſtead thereof, Chimeras.

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In our Notions, concerning Subſtances, we are liable to all the former Inconveniences: *v. g.* he that uſes the Word *Tarantula*, without having any Imagination, or Idea, of what it ſtands for, pronounces a good Word; but ſo long, means nothing at all by it. 2. He that in a new diſcovered Country, ſhall ſee ſeveral Sorts of Animals and Vegetables, unknown to him before, may have as true Ideas of them, as of a Horſe, or a Stag; but can ſpeak of them only by a Deſcription, till he ſhall either take the Names the Natives call them by, or give them Names himſelf. 3. He that uſes the Word *Body*, ſometimes, for pure Extenſion, and ſometimes, for Extenſion and Solidity, together, will talk very fallaciouſly. 4. He that gives the Name *Horſe*, to that Idea, which common Uſage calls *Mule*, talks improperly, and will not be underſtood. 5. He that thinks the Name *Centaur*, ſtands for ſome real Being, impoſes on himſelf, and miſtakes Words for Things.

In Modes and Relations, generally, we are liable, only, to the four firſt of theſe Inconveniences, *viz.* 1. I may have in my Memory, the Names of Modes, as *Gratitude*, or *Charity*, and yet, not have any preciſe Ideas annexed, in my Thoughts, to thoſe Names. 2. I may have Ideas, and not know the Names that belong to them; *v. g.* I may have the Idea of a Man's Drinking, till his Colour, and Humour be altered, till his Tongue trips, and his Eyes look red, and his Feet fail him, and yet not know, that it is to be called *Drunkenneſs*. 3. I may have the Ideas of *Virtues* or *Vices*, and Names alſo, but apply them amiſs: *v. g.* when I apply the Name *Frugality*, to that Idea, which others call, and ſignify by this Sound, *Covetouſneſs*. 4. I may uſe any of thoſe Names with Inconſtancy. 5. But in Modes and Relations, I cannot have Ideas, diſagreeing to the exiſtence of Things: For, Modes being complex Ideas, made by the Mind at Pleaſure; and Relation being but my Way of conſidering, or comparing

paring two Things together, and ſo, alſo, an Idea of my own making, theſe Ideas can ſcarce be found to diſagree with any Thing exiſting; ſince they are not in the Mind, as the Copies of Things regularly made by Nature, nor as Properties, inſeparably flowing from the internal Conſtitution, or Eſſence of any Subſtance; but, as it were, Patterns lodged in my Memory, with Names annexed to them, to denominate Actions and Relations by, as they come to exiſt. But the Miſtake is commonly in my giving a wrong Name to my Conceptions; and ſo uſing Words in a different Senſe from other People, I am not underſtood, but am Thought to have wrong Ideas of them, when I give wrong Names to them. Only if I put in my Ideas of mixed Modes or Relations, any inconſiſtent Ideas together, I fill my Head alſo with Chimeras; ſince ſuch Ideas, if well examined, cannot ſo much as exiſt in the Mind, much leſs, any real Being be ever denominated from them.

Since Wit and Fancy find eaſier Entertainment in the World, than dry Truth and real Knowledge, figurative Speeches, and Alluſion in Language, will hardly be admitted, as an Imperfection or Abuſe of it. I confeſs, in Diſcourſes, where we ſeek rather Pleaſure and Delight, than Information and Improvement, ſuch Ornaments, as are borrowed from them, can ſcarce paſs for Faults. But yet, if we would ſpeak of things as they are, we muſt allow, that all the Art of Rhetorick, beſides Order and Clearneſs, all the artificial and figurative Application of Words Eloquence hath invented, are for nothing elſe, but to inſinuate wrong Ideas, move the Paſſions, and thereby miſlead the Judgment, and ſo, indeed, are perfect Cheats: And therefore, however laudable, or allowable Oratory may render them in Harangues, and popular Addreſſes, they are certainly, in all Diſcourſes that pretend to inform, or inſtruct, wholly to be avoided; and where Truth,

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and Knowledge are concerned, cannot but be thought a great Fault, either of the Language, or Perſon that makes Uſe of them. What, and how various they are, will be ſuperfluous here to take Notice; the Books of Rhetorick which abound in the World, will inſtruct thoſe who want to be informed. Only I cannot but obſerve, how little the Preſervation, and Improvement, of Truth and Knowledge, is the Care and Concern of Mankind; ſince the Arts of Fallacy are endowed and preferred. It is evident how much Men love to deceive, and be deceived, ſince Rhetorick, that powerful Inſtrument of Errour and Deceit, has its eſtabliſhed Profeſſors, is publickly taught, and has always been had in great Reputation: And, I doubt not, but it will be thought great Boldneſs, if not Brutality, in me, to have ſaid thus much againſt it. Eloquence, like the fair ſex, has too prevailing Beauties in it, to ſuffer itſelf ever to be ſpoken againſt. And it is in vain to find Fault with thoſe Arts of deceiving, wherein Men find Pleaſure to being deceived.

CHAP. XI.

Of the Remedies of the foregoing Imperfections and Abuſes.

THE natural, and improved, Imperfections of Languages, we have juſt given at large; and Speech being the great Bond, that holds Society together, and the common Conduit, whereby the Improvements of Knowledge are conveyed from one Man, and one Generation to another, it would well deſerve our moſt ſerious Thoughts, to conſider what Remedies are to be found for theſe Inconveniences.

The Inconvenience juſt mentioned, is much increaſed in an ill Uſe of Words Men ſuffer in their own private Meditations; but much more manifeſt, are

are the Diſorders which follow from it, in Converſation, Diſcourſe, and Arguings with another. For Language, being the great Conduit, whereby Men convey their Diſcoveries, Reaſonings, and Knowledge, from one to another, he that makes an ill Uſe of it, though he does not corrupt the Fountains of Knowledge, which are in Things themſelves, yet he does, as much as in him lies, break, or ſtop the Pipes, whereby it is diſtributed to the publick Uſe and Advantage of Mankind. He that uſes Words, without any clear and ſteady Meaning, what does he, but lead himſelf and others into Errours? And he that deſignedly does it, ought to be looked on as an Enemy to Truth and Knowledge. And yet, who can wonder, that all the Sciences and Parts of Knowledge, have been ſo over-charged with obſcure, and equivocal Terms, and inſignificant, and doubtful Expreſſions, capable to make the moſt attentive, or quick-ſighted, very little, or not at all, the more knowing or orthodox; ſince Subtilty, in thoſe who make Profeſſion to teach, or defend Truth, hath paſſed ſo much for a Virtue. A Virtue, indeed, which conſiſting for the moſt Part, in nothing but the fallacious, and illuſory Uſe of obſcure, or deceitful Terms, is only fit to make Men more conceited in their Ignorance, and obſtinate in their Errours.

To remedy the Defects of Speech, before-mentioned, to ſome Degree, and to prevent the Inconveniences that follow from them, I imagine the Obſervation of theſe following Rules, may be of Uſe, till Somebody, better able, ſhall judge it worth his while, to think more maturely on this Matter, and oblige the World with his Thoughts on it.

Firſt, A Man ſhould take Care to uſe no Word, without a Signification, no Name, without an Idea for which he makes it ſtand. This Rule will not ſeem altogether needleſs to any one, who ſhall take Pains to recollect how often he has met with ſuch Words;

Words; as Inſtinct, Sympathy, Antipathy, &c. in the Diſcourſe of others, ſo made Uſe of, as he might eaſily conclude, that thoſe who had uſed them, had no Ideas in their Minds, to which they applied them; but ſpoke them only as Sounds.

Secondly, It is not enough, a Man uſes his Words as Signs of ſome Ideas, thoſe Ideas he annexes them to, if they be ſimple, muſt be clear and diſtinct, if complex, muſt be determinate, *i. e.* the preciſe Collection of ſimple Ideas ſettled in the Mind, with that Sound annexed to it, as the Sign of that preciſe determined Collection, and no other. This is very neceſſary in Names of Modes, and eſpecially moral Words; which, having no ſettled Objects in Nature, from whence their Ideas are taken as from their Original, are apt to be very confuſed. *Juſtice*, is a Word in every Man's Mouth, but moſt commonly, with a very undetermined looſe Signification: which will always be ſo, unleſs a Man has in his Mind, a diſtinct Comprehenſion of the component Parts, that complex Idea conſiſts of; and, if it be decompound d, muſt be able to reſolve it ſtill on, till he at laſt comes to the ſimple Ideas that make it up: And unleſs this be done, a Man makes an ill Uſe of the Word, let it be *Juſtice*, for Example, or any other.

In the Names of Subſtances, for a right Uſe of them, ſomething more is required than barely determined Ideas: In theſe the Names muſt alſo be conformable to Things, as they exiſt: This Exactneſs, is abſolutely neceſſary, in Inquiries after Philoſophical Knowledge, and in Controverſies about Truth.

Thirdly, It is not enough that Men have Ideas, determined Ideas, for which they make theſe Signs ſtand; but they muſt alſo take Care, to apply their Words, as near as may be, to ſuch Ideas, as common Uſe has annexed them to. For Words, eſpecially of Languages already framed, are no Man's private Poſſeſſion, but the common Meaſure of Commerce and Communication,

Communication, and therefore it is not for any one, at Pleaſure, to change the Stamp they are current in; nor alter the Ideas they are affixed to; or at leaſt, when there is a Neceſſity to do ſo, he is bound to give Notice of it, in Order to be underſtood, eſpecially in the Names of *moral* words.

Fourthly, When common Uſe has left the Signification of a Word uncertain and ambiguous, or where it is to be uſed in a peculiar Senſe; or where the Term is liable to any Doubtfulneſs or Miſtake, there it ought to be defined, and its Signification aſcertained.

As the Ideas Men's Words ſtand for, are of different Sorts; ſo the Way of making known the Ideas they ſtand for, when there is Occaſion, is alſo different. For though defining be thought the proper Way to make known the proper Signification of Words; yet, there are ſome Words, that will not be defined, as there are others, whoſe preciſe Meaning cannot be made known, but by Definition; and, perhaps, a third, which partake ſomewhat of both the other, as we ſhall ſee in the Names of ſimple Ideas, Modes and Subſtances.

Words ſtanding for ſimple Ideas as has been ſhown, not being *definable*, their Signification muſt be ſhown either, *Firſt*, By a ſynonymous Word, but ſhould that fail, he may ſhow it. *Secondly*, By naming a Subject, wherein that ſimple Idea is to be found. *Thirdly*, By preſenting to the Senſes that Subject, which may produce it in the Mind, and make him actually have the Idea that Word ſtands for. Mixed Modes may be perfectly defined, by exactly enumerating thoſe Ideas that go to each Compoſition. This ought, more eſpecially, to be done in mixed Modes belonging to Morality; ſince Definition is the only Way, whereby the preciſe Meaning of *moral* Words can be known; and yet a Way, whereby their preciſe Meaning may be known certainly, and without leaving any Room for Conteſt about it.

For

For they being Combinations of ſeveral Ideas, that the Mind of Man has arbitrarily put together, (as we do a *Triangle*, or any other Mathematical Figure, whoſe Dependance is on our *Will*, for its *Exiſtence*,) without Reference to any Archetypes, Men may, if they pleaſe, exactly know the Ideas that go to each Compoſition, and ſo both uſe theſe Words in a certain and undoubted Signification, and perfectly declare, when there is Occaſion, what they ſtand for. This, if well conſidered, would lay great Blame on thoſe, who make not their Diſcourſes, about moral Things, very clear and diſtinct.

Upon this Ground, I think, that *Morality* would be as capable of Demonſtration, as *Mathematicks*; ſince the preciſe real Eſſence of the Things, moral Words ſtand for, may be perfectly known: But this is otherwiſe, in *natural Subjects*, where doubtful Terms are hardly to be avoided, as our Ideas are made up of particular Sorts of Subſtances, by collecting ſuch Combinations of ſimple Ideas, as are, by Experience, and the Obſervations of Mens Senſes, taken Notice of, to exiſt together, and are, therefore, ſuppoſed to flow from the particular internal Conſtitution, or unknown Eſſence of the Subſtance, of which we can have no other Idea, than an unknown Support of the Qualities, we find exiſting in ſuch Objects, that, at any Time, are preſented to our Senſes, the Qualities of which, we imagine, cannot ſubſiſt *ſine re Subſtante*, without Something to ſupport them, this we call *Subſtantia*, which, in Engliſh, is no other than *ſtanding under, or upholding*.

For the explaining the Signification of the Names of Subſtances, as they ſtand for the Ideas we have of their diſtinct Species, both the forementioned Ways, *viz.* of ſhowing and defining, are requiſite, in many Caſes, to be made Uſe of. For, there being, ordinarily in each Sort, ſome leading Qualities, to which we ſuppoſe the other Ideas, which make up

our complex Idea of that Species annexed, we forwardly give the ſpecifick Name to that Thing, wherein that characteriſtical Mark is found, which we take to be the moſt diſtinguiſhing Idea of that Species. Theſe leading, or characteriſtical (as I may ſo call them) Ideas, in the Sorts of Animals and Vegetables, is, as has been before remarked, moſtly Figure, and in inanimate Bodies, Colour, and in ſome, both together.

Now, theſe leading Qualities, are beſt made known, by ſhowing, and can hardly be made known otherwiſe. The Shape of a *Horſe*, or *Caſſowary*, will be but imperfectly imprinted on the Mind, by Words: The Sight of the Animals doth it much better. And the Idea of the particular Colour of Gold, is not to be got by any Deſcription of it, but only by the frequent Exerciſe of the Eyes about it. The like may be ſaid of thoſe other ſimple Ideas, peculiar in their Kind to any Subſtance, for which preciſe Ideas, there are no peculiar Names.

But becauſe many of the ſimple Ideas, which make up our ſpecifick Ideas of Subſtances, are Powers which lie not obvious to our Senſes, in the Things, as they ordinarily appear; therefore, in the Signification of our Names of Subſtances, ſome Part of the Signification will be better made known, by enumerating thoſe ſimple Ideas, than in ſhowing the Subſtance itſelf. For he that to the *yellow*, *ſhining Colour of* Gold, got by Sight, ſhall, from my enumerating them, have the Ideas of great *Ductility*, *Fuſibility*, *Fixedneſs*, and *Solubility*, in *Aqua Regia*, will have a more perfect Idea of Gold, than he can have by ſeeing a Piece of Gold, and thereby imprinting in his Mind, only its obvious Qualities. But if the formal Conſtitution of this heavy, ſhining, ductile Thing, (from whence all theſe, its Properties, flow) lay open to our Senſes, as the formal Conſtitution, or Eſſence of a Triangle does, the Signification of the Word *Gold*, might as eaſily be aſcertained, as that of a *Triangle*.

It

It were therefore to be wiſhed, that Men, verſed in Phyſical Inquiries, and acquainted with the ſeveral Sorts of natural Bodies, would ſet down thoſe ſimple Ideas, wherein they obſerve the Individuals of each Sort conſtantly to agree. This would remedy a great deal of that Confuſion, which ariſes from ſeveral Perſons applying the ſame Name to a Collection of a ſmaller, or a greater Number of ſenſible Qualities, proportionably as they have been more, or leſs, acquainted with, or accurate in examining the Qualities of any Sort of Things, which come under one Denomination. But a Dictionary of this Sort, containing, as it were, a natural Hiſtory, requires too many Hands, as well as too much Time, Coſt, Pains, and Sagacity, ever to be hoped for; and till that be done, we muſt content ourſelves with ſuch Definitions of the Names of Subſtances, as explain the Senſe Men uſe them in. And it would be well, where there is Occaſion, if they would afford us ſo much. This, yet, is not uſually done; but Men talk to one another, and diſpute in Words, whoſe Meaning is not agreed between them, out of a Miſtake, that the Signification of common Words, is certainly eſtabliſhed, and the preciſe Ideas, they ſtand for, perfectly known; and that it is a Shame to be ignorant of them.

Such Words, ſtanding for Things, which are known, and diſtinguiſhed, by their outward Shapes, ſhould be expreſſed by little Draughts and Prints made of them. A Vocabulary made after this Manner, would, perhaps, with more Eaſe, and in leſs Time, teach the true Signification of many Terms, eſpecially in Languages of remote Countries, or Ages; and ſettle truer Ideas in Mens Minds, of ſeveral Things, whereof we read the Names in ancient Authors, than all the large and laborious Comments of learned Criticks. *Naturaliſts*, that treat of *Plants* and *Animals*, have found the Benefit of this Method, and, not inſenſible of the Advantage, have been careful in their Works, to give the ſame Helps; and he that conſults them, will find, that

he has a clearer Idea of *Apium* and *Ibex*, from a little Print of that Herb or Beaſt, than he could have from a long Definition of the Names of either of them; and ſo, no doubt, he would have of *Strigil* and *Siſtrum*, if inſtead of a *Curry-comb*, or *Cymbal*, which are the *Engliſh* Names Dictionaries render them by, he could ſee, ſtamped in the Margin, ſmall Pictures of theſe Inſtruments, as they were in Uſe amongſt the Ancients.

Fifthly, The laſt Rule that I ſhall mention is, that in all Diſcourſes, wherein one Man pretends to inſtruct, or convince another, he ſhould uſe the ſame Word, conſtantly in the ſame Senſe; if this were done (which no Body can refuſe without great Diſingenuity) many of the Books extant, might be ſpared; many of the Controverſies in Diſpute, would be at an End; ſeveral of thoſe great Volumes, ſwollen with ambiguous Words, now uſed in one Senſe, and by and by in another, would ſhrink into a very narrow Compaſs: And many of the Philoſophers, (to mention no other) as well as *Poets* Works, might be contained in a *Nutſhell*.

But, however, the Proviſion of Words is ſo ſcanty, in Reſpect of that infinite Variety of Thoughts, that Men, wanting Terms to ſuit their preciſe Notions, will, notwithſtanding their utmoſt Caution, be forced often to uſe the ſame Word, in ſomewhat different Senſes. And, though in the Continuation of a Diſcourſe, or the Purſuit of an Argument, there be hardly Room to digreſs into a particular Definition, as often as a Man varies the Signification of any Term; yet the Import of the Diſcourſe will, for the moſt Part, if there be no deſigned Fallacy, ſufficiently lead candid and intelligent Readers, into the true Meaning of it: But, where that is not ſufficient to guide the Reader, there it concerns the Writer to explain his Meaning, and ſhew in what Senſe he uſes there that Term.

BOOK IV.

CHAP. I.

Of Knowledge in general.

SINCE the Mind, in all its Thoughts and Reaſonings, has no other immediate Object, but its own Ideas, which it alone does, or can contemplate; it is evident, that our Knowledge is only converſant about them. *Knowledge* then, ſeems to be nothing, but *the Perception of the Connection and Agreement, or Diſagreement and Repugnancy of any of our Ideas*, in this alone it conſiſts. Where this Perception is, there is Knowledge; and where it is not, there, though we fancy, gueſs, or believe, yet we always come ſhort of Knowledge. When we know that *White is not Black*, what do we elſe, but perceive, that theſe two Ideas do not agree? When we poſſeſs ourſelves, with the utmoſt Certainty of the Demonſtration, that the three Angles of a *Triangle*, are equal to two right Ones; what do we more, but perceive, that Equality to two right ones, does neceſſarily agree to, and is inſeparable from, the three Angles of a Triangle? But to underſtand a little more diſtinctly, wherein this Agreement or Diſagreement conſiſts; we may reduce it all to theſe four Sorts; Firſt, *Identity* or *Diverſity*; Secondly, *Relation*; Thirdly, *Co-exiſtence*, or neceſſary *Connection*; Fourthly, *real Exiſtence*.

Firſt,

First, As to the first Sort of Agreement, or Disagreement, *viz. Identity* or *Diversity*. It is the first Act of the Mind, when it has any Sentiments, or Ideas, at all, *to perceive its* Ideas; and so far as it perceives them, to know each what it is, and thereby, also, to perceive their Difference; that is, that one is not the other: And this it does without any Pains or Deduction; but at first View, by its natural Power of Perception, and Distinction. This is what Men of Art, have reduced to these general Rules, *viz*, *What is, is.* And, *It is impossible for the same Thing to be, and not to be.* But no *Maxim* can make a Man know clearer, that *Round* is not *Square*, than the bare Perception of those two Ideas, which the Mind, at first Sight, perceives to disagree. This then, is the first Agreement, or Disagreement, which the Mind perceives in its Ideas; which it always perceives at first Sight. And if there ever happen any Doubt about it, it will always be found to be about the Names, and not the Ideas themselves, whose Identity and Diversity, will always be perceived, as soon, and as clearly, as the Ideas themselves are; nor can it possibly be otherwise.

Secondly, The *second* Sort of Agreement, or Disagreement, the Mind perceives in any of its Ideas, may be called *Relative*, and is nothing but *the Perception of the Relation, between any two Ideas*, of what Kind soever. For since all distinct Ideas, must eternally be known not to be the same, and so be universally, and constantly denied, one of another, there could be no Room for any positive Knowledge at all, if we could not perceive any Relation between our Ideas, and find out the Agreement, or Disagreement, they have one with another, in several Ways the Mind takes of comparing them.

Thirdly, The *third* Sort of Agreement, or Disagreement, to be found in our Ideas, which the Perception of the Mind is employed about, is *Coexistence*, or *Non-co-existence*, in the same Subject; and this belongs particularly to Substances. Thus, when

when we pronounce concerning Gold, that it is fixed, it amounts to no more but this; that Fixedneſs, or a Power to remain in the Fire unconſumed, is an Idea that always accompanies that particular Sort of *Yellowneſs*, *Weight*, *Fuſibility*, &c. which makes our complex Idea, ſignified by the Word *Gold*.

Fourthly, The *fourth*, and laſt Sort is, that of *actual real Exiſtence*, agreeing to any Idea. Within theſe four Sorts of Agreement, or Diſagreement, is, I ſuppoſe, contained all the Knowledge we have, or are capable of: For, all the Inquiries that we can make, concerning any of our Ideas, all that we know, or can affirm, concerning any of them, is, that it is, or is not, the ſame with ſome other; that it does, or does not, always co-exiſt with ſome other Idea, in the ſame Subject; that it has this, or that, Relation to ſome other Idea: or that it has a real Exiſtence without the Mind. Thus, *Blue is not Yellow*, is of Identity. *Two Triangles, upon equal Baſis, between two Parallels, are equal*, is of Relation. *Iron is ſuſceptible of magnetical Impreſſions*, is of Co-exiſtence; GOD is, is of real Exiſtence. Though Identity, and Co-exiſtence, are truly nothing but Relations, yet they are ſo peculiar Ways of Agreement, or Diſagreement, of our Ideas, that they deſerve well to be conſidered as diſtinct Heads, and not under Relation in genetal.

There are ſeveral Ways, wherein the Mind is poſſeſſed of Truth, each of which is called Knowledge. *Firſt*, There is *actual Knowledge*, when the Mind has a preſent View of the Agreement, or Diſagreement, of any of its Ideas, or of the Relation they have, one with another. *Secondly*, A Man is ſaid to know any Propoſition, when, having once evidently perceived the Agreement, or Diſagreement of the Ideas, whereof it conſiſts, and ſo lodged it in his Memory, that whenever that Propoſition comes to be reflected on again, the Mind aſſents to it without Doubt or Heſitation, and is cer-

tain of the Truth of it. And this may be called, *habitual Knowledge:* And thus a Man may be ſaid to know all thoſe Truths, which are lodged in his Memory, by a foregoing, clear, and full Perception, whereof the Mind is aſſured paſt Doubt, as often as it has Occaſion to reflect on them. For our finite Underſtandings, being able to think, clearly and diſtinctly, but on one Thing at once, if Men had no Knowledge of any more than what they actually thought on, they would all be very ignorant: And he that knew moſt, would know but one Truth, that being all he was able to think on at one Time.

Of *habitual Knowledge* there are two Sorts: The one is of ſuch Truths, laid up in the Memory, as whenever they occur to the Mind, it actually perceives the Relation that is between thoſe Ideas. And this is in all thoſe Truths, whereof we have an intuitive Knowledge, where the Ideas themſelves, by an immediate View, diſcover their Agreement, or Diſagreement, one with another. The other is of ſuch Truths, whereof the Mind having been convinced, it retains the Memory of the Conviction, without the Proofs. Thus, a Man that remembers certainly, that he once perceived the Demonſtration, that the three Angles of a Triangle, are equal to two right ones; knows it to be true, when that Demonſtration is gone out of his Mind, and poſſibly cannot then recollect it: But he knows it in a different Way from what he did before; namely, not by the Intervention of thoſe intermediate Ideas, whereby the Agreement, or Diſagreement, of thoſe in the Propoſition, was at firſt perceived; but by remembering, *i. e.* knowing that he was once certain of the Truth of this Propoſition, that the three Angles of a Triangle, are equal to two right Ones. The Immutability of the ſame Relations, between the ſame immutable Thing, is now the Idea that ſhows him, that if the three Angles of a Triangle, were once equal to two right

Ones,

Ones, they will always be ſo. And hence he comes to be certain, that what was once true is always true; what Ideas once agreed, will always agree; and, conſequently, what he once knew to be true, he will always know to be true, as long as he can remember that he once knew it. But becauſe the Memory is not always ſo clear as actual Perception, and does, in all Men, more or leſs decay in Length of Time, this amongſt other Differences is one, which ſhows, that *demonſtrative Knowledge* is much more imperfect than *intuitive*.

CHAP. II.

Of the Degrees of our Knowledge.

ALL our Knowledge conſiſts in the view the Mind has of its own Ideas, which is the utmoſt Light, and greateſt Certainty we are capable of: The *different Clearneſs of our Knowledge*, ſeems to lie in the different Way of Perception the Mind has of the Agreement or Diſagreement of any of its Ideas.

When the Mind perceives this Agreement, or Diſagreement of two *Ideas immediately* by themſelves, without the Intervention of any other; we may call it *intuitive Knowledge*, in which Caſes the Mind perceives the Truth, as the Eye doth Light, only by being directed towards it. Thus the Mind perceives that *White is not Black*, that *Three are more than Two*, and *equal to One and Two*. This Part of Knowledge is irreſiſtible, and like the bright Sunſhine, forces itſelf immediately to be perceived as ſoon as ever the Mind turns its View that Way. It is on this *Intuition*, that depends all the Certainty and Evidence of our other Knowledge; which Certainty every one finds to be ſo great, that he cannot imagine, and therefore not require a greater. He that demands a greater Certainty than this, demands he knows not what, and ſhows only that he has a Mind

Mind to be a Sceptick, without being able to be ſo. Certainty depends ſo wholly on this Intuition, that in the next Degree of *Knowledge*, which I call *Demonſtrative*, this Intuition is neceſſary in all the Connections of the intermediate Ideas, without which we cannot attain Knowledge and Certainty.

The next Degree of Knowledge is, where the Mind perceives not this Agreement or Diſagreement, immediately, or by the *Juxta-poſition* as it were of the Ideas, becauſe thoſe Ideas concerning whoſe Agreement or Diſagreement the Inquiry is made, cannot by the Mind be ſo put together, as to ſhow it. In this Caſe, the Mind is fain to diſcover the Agreement or Diſagreement which it ſearches, by the Intervention of other Ideas: And this is that which we call *Reaſoning*; and thus if we would know the Agreement or Diſagreement in Bigneſs, between the three Angles of a Triangle, and two right Angles; we cannot by an immediate View, and comparing them, do it; becauſe the three Angles of a Triangle cannot be brought at once, and be compared with any other one, or two Angles. And ſo of this, the Mind has no immediate or intuitive Knowledge. But we muſt find out ſome other Angles, to which the three Angles of a Triangle have Equality, and finding thoſe equal to two right ones, we come to know the Equality of theſe three Angles to two right ones. Thoſe intervening *Ideas*, which ſerve to ſhow the Agreement of any two others, are called *Proofs*. And where the Agreement or Diſagreement is by this Means plainly and clearly perceived, it is called *Demonſtration*. A Quickneſs in the Mind to find thoſe Proofs, and to apply them right, is, I ſuppoſe, that which is called *Sagacity*.

This Knowledge, though it be certain, is not ſo clear and evident as *intuitive Knowledge*. It requires Pains and Attention, and ſteady Application of Mind, to diſcover the Agreement or Diſagreement

of

of the *Ideas* it conſiders, and there muſt be a Progreſſion by Steps and Degrees, before the Mind can in this Way arrive at Certainty, and perceive the Agreement or Repugnancy between two Ideas that need Proofs and the Uſe of Reaſon to ſhew it. Before Demonſtration there was a Doubt, which in *intuitive Knowledge* cannot happen to the Mind, that has its Faculty of Perception left to a Degree capable of diſtinct *Ideas*, no more than it can be a Doubt to the Eye (that can diſtinctly ſee *White* and *Black)* whether this Ink and Paper be all of a Colour.

Now in every Step that Reaſon makes in *Demonſtrative Knowledge*, there is an *intuitive Knowledge* of that Agreement or Diſagreement it ſeeks with the next intermediate *Idea*, which it uſes as a Proof; for if it were not ſo, that yet would need a Proof; ſince without the Perception of ſuch Agreement or Diſagreement, there is no Knowledge produced, if it be perceived by itſelf, it is intuitive Knowledge: If it cannot be perceived by itſelf, there is Need of ſome intervening Idea, as a common Meaſure to ſhow their Agreement or Diſagreement. By which it is evident, that every Step in Reaſoning, that produces Knowledge, has *intuitive Certainty*; which when the Mind perceives, there is no more required but to remember it, to make the Agreement or Diſagreement of the *Ideas* concerning which we inquire, viſible and certain, ſo that to make any Thing a Demonſtration, it is neceſſary to perceive the immediate Agreement of the intervening Ideas, which is then *intuitive Knowledge*. This *intuitive Perception* of the Agreement or Diſagreement of the intermediate *Ideas* in each Step and Progreſſion of the Demonſtration, muſt alſo be exactly carried in the Mind; and a Man muſt be ſure that no Part is left out; which in long Deductions, the Memory cannot eaſily retain; ſo that this Knowledge becomes more imperfect than *intuitive*; and Men often embrace Falſhoods for Demonſtrations.

It

It has been generally taken for granted, that *Mathematicks* alone are capable of demonſtrative Certainty. But to have ſuch an Agreement or Diſagreement as may be *intuitively* perceived, being, as I imagine, not the Privilege of the *Ideas* of *Number*, *Extenſion* and *Figure* alone; it may poſſibly be the Want of due Method and Application in us, and not of ſufficient Evidence in Things, that Demonſtration has been thought to have ſo little to do in other Parts of Knowledge. For in whatever *Ideas* the Mind can perceive the Agreement or Diſagreement immediately, there it is capable of *intuitive Knowledge:* And where it can perceive the Agreement or Diſagreement of any two *Ideas*, by an *intuitive Perception* of the Agreement or Diſagreement they have with any intermediate *Ideas*, there the Mind is capable of Demonſtration, which is not limited to the *Ideas* of Figure, Number, Extenſion or their Modes. The Reaſon why it has been generally ſuppoſed to belong to them only, is becauſe in comparing their Equality or Exceſs, the *Modes of Numbers* have every, the leaſt, Difference, very clear and perceivable: And in *Extenſion*, tho' every, the leaſt, Exceſs is not ſo perceptible, yet the Mind has found out Ways to diſcover the juſt Equality of two Angles, Extenſions or Figures; and both, that is Numbers and Figures, can be ſet down by viſible and laſting Marks, wherein the Ideas under conſideration are perfectly determined, which for the moſt Part they are not, where they are marked only by Names and Words.

But in other ſimple *Ideas*, whoſe Modes and Differences are made and counted by Degrees, and not Quantity, we have not ſo nice and accurate a Diſtinction of their Differences, as to perceive or find Ways to meaſure their juſt Equality, or the leaſt Differences. For thoſe other ſimple *Ideas* being Appearances or Senſations produced in us, by the *Size*, *Figure*, *Number*, and *Motions* of minute Corpuſcles ſingly

ſingly inſenſible; their different Degrees alſo depend on the Variation of ſome, or all of thoſe Cauſes, which ſince it cannot be obſerved by us in Particles of Matter, whereof each is too ſubtile to be perceived, it is impoſſible for us to have any exact Meaſures of the different Degrees of theſe ſimple *Ideas*. Thus, for Inſtance, not knowing what Number of Particles, nor what Motion of them is fit to produce any preciſe Degree of *Whiteneſs*; we cannot demonſtrate the certain Equality of any two Degrees of *Whiteneſs*, becauſe we have no certain Standard to meaſure them by, nor Means to diſtinguiſh every, the leaſt, Difference: The only Help we have being from our own Senſes, which in this Point fail us.

But where the Difference is ſo great as to produce in the Mind *Ideas* clearly diſtinct; there *Ideas* of *Colours*, as we ſee in different Kinds, *Blue* and *Red* (for Inſtance) are as capable of Demonſtration, as *Ideas* of Number and Extenſion. What is here ſaid of Whiteneſs and Colours, I think, holds true in all ſecondary Qualities, Theſe two then, *Intuition* and *Demonſtration*, are the Degrees of our *Knowledge*; whatever comes ſhort of one of theſe, with what Aſſurance ſoever embraced, is but *Faith*, or *Opinion*, not *Knowledge*; at leaſt in all *general Truths*. There is indeed another Perception of the Mind employed about the *particular Exiſtence of finite Beings* without us, which going beyond Probability, but not reaching to either of the foregoing Degrees of Certainty, paſſes under the Name of Knowledge.

Nothing can be more certain, than that the *Idea* we receive from an external Object is in our Minds This is *intuitive Knowledge*; but whether we can thence certainly infer the Exiſtence of any Thing without us, correſponding to that *Idea*, is that whereof ſome Men think there may be a Queſtion made, becauſe Men may have ſuch an *Idea* in their Minds, when no ſuch Thing exiſts, no ſuch Object

affects their Senſes. But 'tis evident that we are invincibly conſcious to ourſelves of a different Perception, when we look upon the *Sun* in the Day, and think on it by Night; when we actually taſte *Wormwood*, or ſmell a *Roſe*, or only think on that *Savour* or *Odour*: So that, I think, we may add to the two former Sorts of Knowledge, this alſo of the Exiſtence of particular external Objects, by that Perception and Conſciouſneſs we have, of the actual Entrance of *Ideas* from them, and allow theſe three Degrees of Knowledge, *viz. Intuitive*, *Demonſtrative* and *Senſitive*: In each of which, there are different Degrees and Ways of Evidence and Certainty.

But ſince our Knowledge is founded on, and employed about our *Ideas* only, will it not follow thence, that it muſt be conformable to our *Ideas*, and that where our *Ideas* are clear and diſtinct, obſcure and confuſed, there our Knowledge will be ſo too? *I anſwer No:* For our Knowledge conſiſting in the Perception of the Agreement or Diſagreement of any two *Ideas*; its Clearneſs or Obſcurity conſiſts in the Clearneſs or Obſcurity of that Perception, and not in the Clearneſs or Obſcurity of the *Ideas* themſelves. A Man (for Inſtance) that has a clear *Idea* of the Angles of a Triangle, and of Equality to two right ones, may yet have but an obſcure Perception of their Agreement; and ſo have but a very obſcure Knowledge of it. But obſcure and confuſed *Ideas* can never produce any clear or diſtinct Knowledge; becauſe, as far as any *Ideas* are obſcure or confuſed, ſo far the Mind can never perceive clearly, whether they agree or diſagree: Or, to expreſs the ſame Thing in a Way leſs apt to be miſunderſtood: He that hath not determined *Ideas* to the Words he uſes, cannot make Propoſitions of them, of whoſe truth he can be certain.

CHAP.

CHAP. III.

Of the Extent of Human Knowledge.

FROM what has been ſaid concerning Knowledge, it follows, *Firſt*, That we can have no Knowledge farther than we have *Ideas*.

Secondly, That we have no Knowledge farther than we can have Perception of that Agreement, or Diſagreement: Which Perception being, 1. Either by *Intuition*, or the immediate comparing any two Ideas; or, 2. By *Reaſon*, examining the Agreement or Diſagreement of two Ideas, by the Intervention of ſome others: Or, 3. By *Senſation*, perceiving the Exiſtence of particular Things: Hence it alſo follows,

Thirdly, We cannot have an *intuitive* Knowledge that ſhall extend itſelf to all our *Ideas*, and all that we would know about them; becauſe we cannot examine and perceive all the Relations they have one to another, by Juxtapoſition, or an immediate Compariſon one with another. Thus we cannot *intuitively* perceive the Equality of two Extenſions, the Difference of whoſe Figures makes their Parts incapable of an exact, immediate Application; and therefore there is need of ſome intervening Quantities to meaſure them by, which is Demonſtration, or rational Knowledge.

Fourthly, Our *rational* Knowledge cannot reach to the whole Extent of our *Ideas*, becauſe, between two different *Ideas* we would examine, we cannot always find ſuch *Proofs* as we can connect one to another, with an *intuitive Knowledge* in all the Parts of the Deduction; and where-ever that fails, we come ſhort of Knowledge and Demonſtration.

Fifthly, *Senſitive* Knowledge reaching no farther than the Exiſtence of Things actually preſent to

our Senſes, is yet much narrower than either of the former.

Sixthly, From all which it is evident, that the *Extent of our Knowledge*, comes not only ſhort of the Reality of *Things*, but even of the Extent of our own *Ideas*. We have the *Ideas* of a *Square*, a *Circle* and *Equality*, and yet perhaps ſhall never be able to find a *Circle equal to a Square*, and certainly know that it is ſo.

However human Knowledge, under the preſent Circumſtances of our Beings and Conſtitutions may be carried much farther, than it hitherto has been, if Men would ſincerely, and with Freedom of Mind, employ all that Induſtry and Labour of Thought, in improving the Means of diſcovering Truth, which they do for the Colouring or Support of Falſhood, to maintain a Syſtem, Intereſt, or Party, they are engaged in.

The Affirmations or Negations we make concerning the *Ideas* we have, being reduced to the four Sorts above-mentioned. *viz. Identity*, *Co-exiſtence*, *Relation*, and *real Exiſtence*; I ſhall examine how far our Knowledge extends in each of theſe.

Firſt, As to *Identity and Diverſity*, our *intuitive Knowledge* is as far extended as our *Ideas* themſelves; and there can be no *Idea* in the Mind, which it does not preſently, by an *intuitive Knowledge*, perceive to be what it is, and to be different from any other.

Secondly, As to the Agreement or Diſagreement of our *Ideas* in *Co-exiſtence:* In this our Knowledge is very ſhort, though in this conſiſts the greateſt and moſt material Part of our Knowledge, concerning *Subſtances*; for our *Ideas* of *Subſtances* being, as I have ſhewn, nothing but certain *Collections of ſimple* Ideas united, and *Co-exiſting in one Subject*, (our *Idea of Flame*, for Inſtance, is a Body *hot*, *luminous*, and *moving upward*). When we would know any

Thing

Thing farther concerning this or any other Sort of Subſtance, what do we but inquire what other Qualities or Powers theſe Subſtances have or have not? which is nothing elſe but to know what other ſimple *Ideas* do, or do not *co-exiſt*, with thoſe that make up that complex *Idea*. The Reaſon of this is, becauſe the ſimple *Ideas* which make up our complex *Ideas* of Subſtances, which for the moſt Part have no viſible neceſſary Connection or Inconſiſtence with other ſimple *Ideas*, whoſe Co-exiſtence with them we would inform ourſelves about. Theſe *Ideas* being likewiſe for the moſt Part *ſecondary Qualities* which depend upon the *primary* Qualities of their minute or inſenſible Parts, or on ſomething yet more remote from our Comprehenſion; it is impoſſible we ſhould know which have a neceſſary Union, or Inconſiſtency one with another, ſince we know not the Root from whence they ſpring, or the Size, Figure and Texture of Parts on which they depend, and from which they reſult.

Beſides this, there is no *diſcoverable Connection* between any *ſecondary* Quality, and thoſe *primary* Qualities that it depends on. And if we know theſe primary Qualities of Bodies, we might have Reaſon to hope, we might be able to know a great deal more of theſe Operations of them one upon another: But our Minds not being able to diſcover any Connection betwixt theſe primary Qualities of Bodies, and the Senſations that are produced in us by them, we can never be able to eſtabliſh certain and undoubted Rules, of the Conſequence or Co-exiſtence of any ſecondary Qualities, though we could diſcover the Size, Figure, or Motion of thoſe inviſible Parts, which immediately produce them. We are ſo far from knowing what Figure, Size, or Motion produces (for Inſtance) a *yellow Colour*, or *ſweet Taſte* or a *ſharp Sound*, that we can by no Means conceive how any *Size*, *Figure*, or *Motion*, can poſſibly produce in us the *Idea* of any *Colour*, *Taſte*, or *Sound* whatſoever; and there is no conceivable Connection between the one and the other.

Our Knowledge therefore of Co-exiſtence reaches little farther than *Experience*. Some few indeed of the *primary* Qualities have a neceſſary Dependence, and viſible Connection one with another: As *Figure* neceſſarilly ſuppoſes *Extenſion*, *receiving or communicating Motion by Impulſe*, ſuppoſes *Solidity*. But Qualities co-exiſtent in any Subject, without this Dependence and Connection, cannot *certainly* be known to co-exiſt any farther, than Experience by our Senſes informs us: Thus, tho' upon Trial we find *Gold* yellow, weighty, malleable, fuſible and fixed, yet becauſe none of theſe have any evident Dependence, or neceſſary Connection with the other; we cannot certainly know, that where any *four* of theſe are, the *fifth* will be there alſo, how highly probable ſoever it may be: But the higheſt Degree of *Probability*, amounts not to *Certainty*; without which there can be no true Knowledge: For this Co-exiſtence can be no farther known, than it is perceived; and it cannot be perceived, but either in *particular* Subjects, by the Obſervation of our Senſes; or in *general*, by the neceſſary Connection of the *Ideas* themſelves.

As to *Incompatibility*, or *Repugnancy to Co-exiſtence*, we may know that any Subject can have of each Sort of *primary* Qualities, but one Particular at at once. One Extenſion, one Figure; and ſo of ſenſible *Ideas* peculiar to each Senſe: For whatever of each Kind is preſent in any Subject, excludes all others of that Sort: For Inſtance, one Subject cannot have *two Smells*, or *two Colours* at the ſame Time. For, it is as impoſſible that the very ſame Particle of any Body, ſhould, at the ſame Time, differently modify or reflect the Rays of Light, as that it ſhould have two different Figures and Textures at the ſame Time.

As to *Powers of Subſtances*, which make a great Part of our Inquiries about them, and are no inconſiderable Branch of our Knowledge: Our Knowledge, as to theſe, reaches little farther than *Experience*;

Experience; becauſe they conſiſt in a Texture and Motion of Parts, which we cannot by any Means, come to diſcover; and I doubt whether with thoſe *Faculties* we have; we ſhall ever be able to carry our general Knowledge much farther in this Part. *Experience* is that which in this Part we muſt depend on; and it were to be wiſhed that it were more improved: We find the Advantages ſome Mens generous Pains, have this Way brought to the Stock of *natural Knowledge*. And if others, eſpecially the *Philoſophers by Fire*, who pretend to it, had been ſo acute in their Obſervations, and ſincere in their Reports, as thoſe who call themſelves *Philoſophers*, ought to have been: Our Acquaintance with the Bodies here about us, and our Inſight into their Powers and Operations would have been yet much greater.

As to the third Sort, the *Agreement* or *Diſagreement of our* Ideas *in any other Relation*: This is the largeſt Field of Knowledge, and it is hard to determine how far it may extend. This Part depending on our Sagacity in finding intermediate Ideas, that may ſhow the Habitudes and Relations of Ideas: It is an hard Matter to tell when we are at an End of ſuch Diſcoveries. They that are ignorant of *Algebra* cannot imagine what Wonders in this Kind are to be done by it: And what farther Improvements and Helps, advantageous to other Parts of Knowledge, the ſagacious Mind of Man may yet find out, it is not eaſy to determine. This at leaſt I believe, that the Ideas of *Quantity*, are not thoſe alone that are capable of Demonſtration and Knowledge: And that other, and perhaps more uſeful Parts of Contemplation, would afford us Certainty, if Vices, Paſſions, and domineering Intereſt did not oppoſe or menace Endeavours of this Kind.

The Idea of a *ſupreme Being*, infinite in Power, Goodneſs and Wiſdom, whoſe Workmanſhip we are, and on whom we depend; and the Idea of *ourſelves*, as underſtanding rational Creatures, being

being ſuch as are clear in us, would, I ſuppoſe, if duly conſidered, afford ſuch Foundations of our *Duty*, and *Rules of Action*, as might place *Morality* among the Sciences capable of Demonſtration. Wherein I doubt not but from Principles as inconteſtable as thoſe of the *Mathematicks*, by neceſſary Conſequences, the Meaſure of *right* and *wrong* might be aſcertained, to any one that will apply himſelf with the ſame Indifference and Attention to the One, as he does to the other of theſe Sciences. The Relations of other Modes may certainly be perceived as well as thoſe of Number and Extenſion, and I cannot ſee why they ſhould not alſo be capable of Demonſtration, if due Methods were thought on to examine, or purſue their Agreement or Diſagreement. *Where there is no Property, there is no Injuſtice*, is a Propoſition as certain as any Demonſtration in *Euclid:* For the Idea of *Property*, being a Right to any Thing; and the Idea of *Injuſtice*, being the Invaſion or Violation of that Right: It is evident that thoſe Ideas being thus eſtabliſhed, and theſe Names annexed to them, I can as certainly know this Propoſition to be true, as that a *Triangle has three Angles equal to two right Ones*. Again, *No Government allows abſolute Liberty*. The Idea of *Government* being the Eſtabliſhment of Society upon certain Rules or Laws, which require Conformity to them; and the Idea of *abſolute Liberty*, being for any one to do whatever he pleaſes, I am as capable of being certain of the Truth of this Propoſition, as of any in *Mathematicks*.

That which has given the Advantage to the Ideas of *Quantity*, whether of *Extenſion* or *Number*, and made them thought more capable of *Certainty* and *Demonſtration*, is,

Firſt, That they can be repreſented by ſenſible Marks, which have a nearer Correſpondence with them, than any Words or Sounds. *Diagrams* and *Cyphers* drawn on Paper, are Copies of the Ideas

in

in the Mind, and not liable to the Uncertainty that Words carry in their Signification; moreover they can be reconſidered and examined, without any Danger of the leaſt Alteration or Change in the Idea, occaſioned by their Repreſentation. This cannot be done in *moral Ideas*, as we have no ſenſible Marks that reſemble them, whereby we can ſet them down; we have nothing but Words to expreſs them by; which though, when written, they remain the ſame; yet the Ideas they ſtand for, may change in the ſame Man; and it is very ſeldom that they are not different in different Perſons.

Secondly, *Moral Ideas* are commonly more complex than Figures; whence theſe two Inconveniencies follow: *Firſt*, that their Names are of more uncertain Signification; the preciſe Collection of ſimple Ideas they ſtand for, not being ſo eaſily agreed on, and ſo the Sign that is uſed for them in Communication always, and in Thinking often, does not ſteadily carry with it the ſame Idea, as in a given Number, or a many ſided Figure, where the leaſt Variation in either is ſo perceptible, as with Eaſe to avoid Deception. *Secondly*, The Mind cannot eaſily retain thoſe preciſe Combinations ſo exactly and perfectly as is neceſſary; in the Examination of the Habitudes and Correſpondencies, Agreements or Diſagreements of ſeveral of them one with another, eſpecially where it is to be judged of by long Deductions, and the Intervention of ſeveral other complex Ideas, to ſhew the Agreement or Diſagreement of two remote ones, in which Particulars Mathematicks have the Advantage.

Now one Part of theſe Diſadvantages in *moral Ideas*, which has made them be thought not capable of Demonſtration, may, in a good Meaſure, be remedied by *Definitions*, ſetting down that Collection of ſimple Ideas which every Term ſhall ſtand for, and then uſing the Terms ſteadily and conſtantly for that preciſe Collection. But much of this is not to be expected, whilſt the Deſire of Eſteem

Eſteem, Riches, or Power, makes Men eſpouſe the well endowed Opinions in Faſhion, and then ſeek Arguments, either to make good their Beauty, or varniſh over and cover their Deformity. Nothing being ſo beautiful to the Eye, as Truth is to the Mind; nothing ſo deformed or irreconcileable to the Underſtanding, as a Falſehood.

As to the fourth Sort of Knowledge, *viz. of the real actual Exiſtence of Things*, we have an *intuitive* Knowledge of our *own Exiſtence:* a *demonſtrative* Knowledge of *the Exiſtence of God*; and a *ſenſitive* Knowledge of the *Objects that preſent themſelves to our Senſes*, which extends no farther than as our Senſes are affected by their Appearances.

From what has been ſaid, the State of our Mind is diſcoverable, and if we look a little into the dark Side, and take a View of our Ignorance; which being infinitely larger than our Knowledge, may ſerve much to the quieting of Diſputes, and Improvement of uſeful Knowledge. The cleareſt and moſt enlarged Underſtandings of thinking Men, find themſelves puzzled, and at a Loſs, in every Particle of Matter. We ſhall the leſs wonder to find it ſo, when we conſider the Cauſes of our Ignorance, which from what has been ſaid, I ſuppoſe, will be found to be chiefly theſe three: *Firſt*, Want of Ideas; *Secondly*, Want of a diſcoverable Connection between the Ideas we have; *Thirdly*, Want of tracing and examining our Ideas.

Firſt, There are ſome Things, and thoſe not a few, we are ignorant of for *want of Ideas*. All the ſimple Ideas we have, are confined to thoſe we receive from corporeal Objects by *Senſation*, and from the Operations of our own Minds as the Objects of *Reflection*. But how much theſe few and narrow Inlets are diſproportionate to the whole vaſt Extent of all Beings, will not be hard to perſuade thoſe who are not ſo fooliſh as to think their Span the Meaſure of all Things. What other Ideas it is poſſible other Creatures

Creatures may have, by the Aſſiſtance other Senſes, and Faculties more or perfecter than we have, or different from ours, it is not for us to determine; but to ſay or think there are no ſuch, becauſe we conceive nothing of them, is no better an Argument, than if a blind Man ſhould be poſitive in it, that there was no ſuch Thing as Sight and Colours, becauſe he had no Manner of Idea of any ſuch Thing. What Faculties therefore other Species of Creatures have to penetrate into the Nature and inmoſt Conſtitutions of Things, we know not. This we know and certainly find, that we want other Views of them, beſides thoſe we have, to make Diſcoveries of them more perfect. And we may be convinced that the Ideas, we can attain to by our Faculties, are very diſproportionate to Things themſelves, when a poſitive, clear, diſtinct one of Subſtance itſelf, which is the Foundation of all the reſt, is concealed from us. The *intellectual* and *ſenſible* World are in this perfectly alike, that the Parts which we ſee of either of them, hold no Proportion with that we ſee not; and whatſoever we can reach with our Eyes, or our Thoughts of either of them, is but a Point, almoſt nothing, in Compariſon of the reſt.

Secondly, Another great Cauſe of Ignorance, is the *Want of* Ideas *that we are capable of*. As the Want of Ideas, which our Faculties are not able to give us, ſhuts us wholly from thoſe Views of Things, which it is reaſonable to think other Beings, perfecter than we have, of which we know nothing; ſo the Want of Ideas, I now ſpeak of, keeps us in Ignorance of Things we conceive capable of being known to us. *Bulk*, *Figure*, and *Motion*, we have Ideas of. But though we are not without Ideas of theſe primary Qualities of Bodies in general, yet not knowing, what is the particular Bulk, Motion and Figure of the greateſt Part of the Bodies of the Univerſe, we are ignorant of the ſeveral Powers, Efficacies and Ways of Operation, whereby the Effects

Effects which we daily ſee, ate produced. Theſe are hid from us in ſome Things by being *too remote*, in others by being *too minute*.

When we conſider the vaſt Diſtance of the known and viſible Parts of the World, and the Reaſons we have to think that what lies within our Knowledge, is but a ſmall Part of the immenſe Univerſe; we ſhall then diſcover an huge Abyſs of Ignorance. What are the particular Fabricks of the great Maſſes of Matter, which make up the whole ſtupendous Frame of corporeal Being, how far they are extended, and what is their Motion, and how continued, and what influence they have upon one another, are Contemplations that at firſt Glimpſe our Thoughts loſe themſelves in in. If we confine our Thoughts to this little Canton, I mean this Syſtem of our Sun, and the groſſer Maſſes of Matter that viſibly move about it; what ſeveral Sorts of Vegetables, Animals, and intellectual corporeal Beings, infinitely different from thoſe of our little Spot of Earth, may there probably be in other *Planets*, to the Knowledge of which, even of their outward Figures and Parts, we can no way attain, whilſt we are confined to this Earth, there being no natural Means, either by Senſation or Reflection, to convey their certain Ideas into our Minds?

There are other Bodies in the Univerſe, no leſs concealed from us by their *Minuteneſs*, than thoſe we have juſt mentioned for their Remoteneſs. Theſe inſenſible Corpuſcles being the active Parts of Matter, and the great Inſtruments of Nature, on which depend all their *ſecondary* Qualities and Operations, our Want of preciſe diſtinct Ideas of their primary Qualities, keeps us in incurable Ignorance of what we deſire to know about them. I doubt not but if we could diſcover the Figure, Size, Texture, and Motion of the minute conſtituent Part of any two Bodies, we ſhould know without Trial ſeveral of their Operations one upon another, as we do now the Properties of a Square, or a Triangle. Did we know

know the mechanical Affections of *Rhubarb* and *Opium*, we might as eaſily account for their Operations of *Purging* or *cauſing Sleep*, as a Watch-maker can for the Motions of his Watch. The diſſolving of Silver in *Aqua Fortis*, or Gold in *Aqua Regia*, and not *vice-verſâ*, would be then perhaps no more difficult to know, than it is to a *Smith*, to underſtand why the turning of one Key will open a Lock, and not the turning of another. But whilſt we are deſtitute of Senſes acute enough to diſcover the minute Particles of Bodies, and to give us Ideas of their mechanical Affections, we muſt be content to be ignorant of their Properties and Operations; nor can we be aſſured about them any farther, than ſome few Trials we make, are able to reach: But whether they will ſucceed again another Time, we cannot be certain. This hinders our certain Knowledge of univerſal Truths concerning natural Bodies: And our Reaſon carries us herein very little beyond particular Matters of Fact. And therefore I am apt to doubt, that how far ſoever human Induſtry may advance uſeful and *experimental Philoſophy* in phyſical Things, yet *ſcientifical* will ſtill be out of our Reach; becauſe we want perfect and adequate Ideas of thoſe very Bodies which are nearer to us, and moſt under our Command. Diſtinct Ideas of the ſeveral Sorts of Bodies, that fall under the Examination of our Senſes, perhaps, we may have: But adequate Ideas, I ſuſpect, we have not of any one amongſt them. And though the former of theſe will ſerve us for common Uſe and Diſcourſe, yet whilſt we want the latter, we are not capable of ſcientifical Knowledge; nor ſhall ever be able to diſcover general, inſtructive, unqueſtionable Truths concerning them. Certainty and Demonſtration are Things we muſt not, in theſe Matters, pretend to.

This, at firſt Sight, ſhows us how diſproportionate our Knowledge is to the whole Extent, even of *material* Being: To which, if we add the Conſi-

deration of that infinite Number of Spirits that may be, and probably are, which are yet more remote from our Knowledge, whereof we have no Cognizance; we ſhall find this Cauſe of Ignorance conceal from us, in an impenetrable Obſcurity, almoſt the whole *intellectual* World; a greater, certainly, and more beautiful World than the *material*. Excepting ſome very few, and thoſe, if I may ſo call them, ſuperficial Ideas of Spirit, which by Reflection we get of our own, and from thence, the beſt we can collect, of the *Father of all Spirits*, the eternal, independent Author of them, and us, and all Things; we have no certain Information, ſo much as of the Exiſtence of other Spirits, but by Revelation. But that there are Degrees of Spiritual Beings between us and the great God, who is there that, by his own Search and Ability, can come to know? Much leſs have we diſtinct Ideas of their different Natures, States, Powers, and ſeveral Conſtitutions, wherein they agree or differ one from another, and from us. And therefore in what concerns their different Species and Properties, we are under an abſolute Ignorance.

The *ſecond* Cauſe of Ignorance is the *Want of diſcoverable Connexion* between thoſe Ideas we have; where we want that, we are utterly incapable of univerſal and certain Knowledge; and are, as in the former Caſe, left only to *Obſervation* and *Experiment*: Which, how narrow and confined it is, how far from general Knowledge, we need not be told. Thus the mechanical Affections of Bodies, having no Affinity at all with the Ideas they produce in us, (there being no conceivable Connexion between any Impulſe of any Sort of Body, and any Perception of a Colour or Smell, which we find in our Minds,) we can have no diſtinct Knowledge of ſuch Operations beyond our Experience, and can reaſon no otherwiſe about them, than as the Effects or Appointment of an infinitely *wiſe Agent*, which perfectly ſurpaſs our Comprehenſions.

As

As the Ideas of ſenſible ſecondary Qualities which we have in our Minds, can, by us, be no way deduced from bodily cauſes, nor any Correſpondence or Connexion be found between them and thoſe primary Qualities which (Experience ſhows us) produce them in us; ſo on the other Hand, the Operation of our Minds upon our Bodies, is as inconceivable. How any *Thought* ſhould produce a Motion in *Body*, is as remote from the Nature of our Ideas, as how any *Body* ſhould produce any Thought in the *Mind*. That it is ſo, if Experience did not convince us, the Conſideration of the Things themſelves would never be able, in the leaſt, to diſcover to us, there appearing no neceſſary Dependence one on the other.

In ſome of our Ideas there are certain Relations, Habitudes, and Connexions, ſo viſibly included in the Nature of the Ideas themſelves, that we cannot conceive them ſeparable from them by any Power whatſoever: In theſe only we are capable of certain and univerſal Knowledge. Thus the Idea of a *right-lin'd Triangle*, neceſſarily carries with it an *Equality of its Angles to two right ones*. Nor can we conceive this Relation, this Connexion of theſe two Ideas, to be poſſibly mutable, or to depend on any arbitrary power, which of Choice made it thus, or could make it otherwiſe. But the Coherence and Continuity of the Parts of Matter; the Production of Senſation in us, of *Colours* and *Sounds*, &c. by Impulſe and Motion, being ſuch wherein we can diſcover no natural Connexion with any Ideas we have, we cannot but aſcribe them to the arbitrary Will and good Pleaſure of the wiſe Architect. I need not, I think, here mention the Reſurrection of the dead, the future ſtate of this Globe of Earth, and ſuch other Things, which are by every one acknowledged to depend wholly on the Determination of a free Agent.

The Things that we obſerve conſtantly to proceed regularly, we may conclude to act by a Law

ſet them; but yet by a Law that we know not; whereby, tho' Cauſes work ſteadily, and Effects conſtantly flow from them; yet their Connexions and Dependencies being not diſcoverable in our Ideas, we can have but an experimental Knowledge of them. Several Effects come every Day within the Notice of our *Senſes*, of which we have ſo far *ſenſitive* Knowledge. From all which it is eaſy to perceive, what a Darkneſs we are involved in, how little it is of Being, and the Things that are, that we are capable to know. But the Cauſes, Manner, and Certainty of their Production, we muſt, for the foregoing Reaſons, be content to be ignorant of. In theſe we can go no farther than particular *Experience* informs us of Matter of Fact, and, by *Analogy*, gueſs what Effects the like Bodies are, upon other Trials, like to produce. But as to the perfect Knowledge of *natural Bodies* (not to mention *ſpiritual* Beings) we are, I think, ſo far from being capable of any ſuch Thing, that I conclude it loſt Labour to ſeek after it.

The *third*, Where we have adequate Ideas, and where there is a certain and diſcoverable Connexion between them, yet we are often ignorant, for *Want of tracing thoſe Ideas we have*, or may have; and finding out thoſe intermediate Ideas which may ſhow us what Habitude of Agreement or Diſagreement they may have one with another; and thus many are ignorant of *mathematical* Truths, for want of Application in inquiring, examining, and, by due Ways, comparing thoſe Ideas. That which has moſt contributed to hinder the due tracing of our Ideas, and finding out their Relations, and Agreements or Diſagreements one with another, has been, I ſuppoſe, the ill Uſe of Words. It is impoſſible that Men ſhould ever truly ſeek, or certainly diſcover the Agreement or Diſagreement of Ideas themſelves, whilſt their Thoughts are employed only about Sounds of doubtful and uncertain Significations. Mathematicians, abſtracting their Thoughts from

from Names, and accuſtoming themſelves to ſet before their Minds the Ideas themſelves that they would conſider, and not Sounds inſtead of them, have avoided thereby a great Part of that Perplexity, Obſcurity, and Confuſion, which have ſo much hindered Mens Progreſs in other Parts of Knowledge.

Hitherto we have examined the *Extent* of our Knowledge, in Reſpect of the ſeveral Sorts of Beings that are. There is another *Extent of it, in Reſpect of Univerſality*, which will alſo deſerve to be conſidered; and in this Regard our Knowledge follows the Nature of our Ideas. If the Ideas are abſtract, whoſe Agreement or Diſagreement we perceive, our Knowledge is univerſal. For what is known of ſuch general Ideas, will be true of every particular Thing in which that *Eſſence*, that is, that *abſtract* Idea, is to be found: And what is once known of ſuch Ideas, will be perpetually, and for ever true. So that as to all general Knowledge, we muſt ſearch and find it only in our own Minds: And it is only the examining of our own Ideas, that furniſhes us with that. Truths belonging to Eſſences of Things (that is, to *abſtract* Ideas) are *eternal*, and are to be found out by the Contemplation only of thoſe Eſſences; as the Exiſtence of Things is to be known only from Experience. But I ſhall ſay more of this in the following Chapters, where I ſhall ſpeak of *general* and *real* Knowledge.

CHAP. IV.

Of the Reality of our Knowledge.

I Doubt not but my Reader by this Time, may be apt to think that I have been all this While only building a *Caſtle* in the Air; and be ready to object, though it ſhould be true, that all Knowledge lies only in the Preception of the Agreement or Diſagreement of our own Ideas, as the Viſions of an

Enthuſiaſt, and the Reaſonings of a *ſober* Man will be equally certain: It is no Matter how Things are, ſo a Man obſerve but the Agreement of his own Imaginations, and talk conformably, it is all Truth, all Certainty. Such Caſtles in the Air, will be as ſtrong Holds of Truth, as the Demonſtrations of *Euclid*. That an *Harpy* is not a *Centaur*, is by this Way as certain Knowledge, and as much Truth, as that a Square is not a Circle. But of what Uſe is all this fine Knowledge of Mens own Imaginations, to a Man who inquires after the Reality of Things? It matters not what Mens fancies are, it is the Knowledge of Things that is only to be prized: It is this alone gives a Value to our Reaſonings, and Preference to one Man's Knowledge over another's, that it is of Things as they really are, and not of Dreams and Fancies.

To which *I anſwer*, That if our Knowledge of our Ideas ſhould terminate in them, and reach no farther, where there is ſomething farther intended, our moſt ſerious Thoughts would be of little more Uſe than the *Reveries* of a crazy Brain; and the Truths built thereon of no more Weight than the Diſcourſes of a Man aſleep. But I hope, before I have done, to make it evident, that this Way of Certainty by the Knowledge of our own Ideas, goes a little farther than bare imagination: And that all the Certainty of general Truths a Man has, lies in nothing elſe but this Knowledge of our Ideas.

'Tis evident that the Mind knows not things immediately, but by the Intervention of the Ideas it has of them. Our Knowledge therefore is *real*, only ſo far as there is a Conformity between our Ideas, and the Reality of Things. But how ſhall we know when our Ideas agree with Things themſelves? I anſwer, there are *two Sorts* of Ideas that we may be aſſured agree with Things: Theſe are,

Firſt, *Simple* Ideas; which ſince the Mind can by

by no Means make to itſelf, muſt be the Effect of Things operating upon the Mind in a natural Way; and producing therein thoſe Perceptions, which by the Will of our Maker, they are ordained and adapted to. Hence it follows, the ſimple Ideas are not Fictions of our Fancies, but the natural and regular Productions of Things without us, really operating upon us; which carry with them all the Conformity our State requires, which is to repreſent Things under thoſe Appearances they are fitted to produce in us. Thus the Idea of *Whiteneſs*, as it is in the Mind, exactly anſwers that Power which is in any Body to produce it there. And this Conformity between our *ſimple* Ideas, and the Exiſtence of Things is ſufficient for real Knowledge.

Secondly, All our *complex Ideas*, except thoſe of *Subſtances*, being *Archetypes* of the Mind's own making, and not referred to the Exiſtence of Things as to their Originals, cannot want any Conformity neceſſary to real Knowledge. For that which is not deſigned to repreſent any Thing but itſelf, can never be capable of a wrong Repreſentation: Here the Ideas themſelves are conſidered as *Archetypes*, and Things no otherwiſe regarded, than as they are conformable to them. Thus the *Mathematician* conſiders the Truth and Properties belonging to a *Rectangle* or *Circle*, only as they are Ideas in his own Mind, which poſſibly he never found outwardly exiſting Mathematically, that is, preciſely true; yet his Knowledge is not only certain, but real; becauſe real Things are no farther concerned nor intended to be meant by any ſuch Propoſitions, than as Things really agree to thoſe *Archetypes* in his Mind. It is true of the Idea of a *Triangle*, *that its three Angles are equal to two right Ones*; it is true alſo of a *Triangle* where ever it *exiſts*; what is true of thoſe Figures, that have barely an ideal Exiſtence in his Mind, will hold true of them alſo, when they come to have a real Exiſtence in Matter.

Hence

Hence it follows, that moral Knowledge is as capable of *real Certainty* as *Mathematicks*. For *Certainty* being nothing but the Perception of the Agreement or Diſagreement of our Ideas, and Demonſtration nothing but the Perception of ſuch Agreement by the Intervention of other Ideas; our *moral Ideas* as well as *Mathematical*, being *Archetypes* themſelves, and ſo adequate or complete Ideas, all the Agreement or Diſagreement we ſhall find in them, will produce *real* Knowledge as well as in *Mathematical Figures*. That which is requiſite to make our Knowledge *certain*, is the Clearneſs of our Ideas; and that which is required to make it *real*, is, that they anſwer their *Archetypes*. I preſume, upon Examination, it will be found to be general Propoſitions, and Notions in which Exiſtence is not at all concerned. All the Diſcourſes of the Mathematicians, about the ſquaring of a Circle, conick Sections, or any other Part of Mathematicks, concern not the Exiſtence of any of thoſe Figures; but their Demonſtrations, which depend on their Ideas, are the ſame, whether there be any Square or Circle exiſting in the World, or no. In the ſame Manner, the Truth and Certainty of moral Diſcourſes abſtracted from the Lives of Men, and the Exiſtence of thoſe Virtues in the World, whereof they treat may be proved; nor are *Tully*'s Offices leſs true, becauſe there is not any one in the World that exactly practiſes his Rules, and lives up to the Pattern of that virtuous Man, which he has given us, and which no where exiſted, when he wrote, but in his imagination.

But it will here be ſaid, That if *moral* Knowledge be placed in the Contemplation of our own *moral* Ideas; and thoſe, as other Modes, be of our own making, what ſtrange Notions will there be of *Juſtice* and *Temperance*? What Confuſion of *Virtues* and *Vices*, if every Man may make what Ideas of them he pleaſes? *I anſwer*, No Confuſion nor Diſorder in the Things themſelves, nor the Reaſonings about

about them, no more than in Mathematicks, there would be a Change in the Properties of Figures and their Relations one to another, if a Man ſhould make a *Triangle* with four Corners, or a *Trapezium* with four right Angles; that is, in plain *Engliſh*, change the Names of the Figures, and call that by one Name, which commonly Mathematicians called by another. The Change of Name will indeed at firſt diſturb him, who knows not what Idea it ſtands for: But as ſoon as the Figure is drawn, the Conſequences and Demonſtration are plain and clear. Juſt the ſame is it in *moral* Knowledge: Let a Man have the Idea of taking from others, without their Conſent, what they are juſtly poſſeſſed of, and call this *Juſtice* if he pleaſes; he that takes the Name here, without the Idea put to it, will be miſtaken by joining another Idea of his own to that Name; but ſtrip the Idea of that Name or take it ſuch as it is in the Speaker's Mind; and the ſame Thing will agree to it, as if you called it *Injuſtice*. Indeed, wrong Names, in moral Diſcourſes, occaſion uſually more Diſorder, becauſe they are not ſo eaſily rectified as in Mathematicks, where the Figure, once drawn and ſeen, makes the Name uſeleſs and of no Force. For what Need of a Sign, when the Thing ſignified is preſent and in View?

One Thing we are to take Notice of, That where God, or any other Law-maker, has defined any *moral Names*, there they have made the Eſſence of that *Species* to which that Name belongs: And there it is not ſafe to apply, or uſe them otherwiſe. But in other Caſes it is bare Impropriety of Speech, to apply them contrary to the common Uſage of the Country they are uſed in.

Thirdly, But the complex Ideas which we refer to *Archetypes* without us, may differ from them, and ſo our Knowledge about them may come ſhort of being real: And ſuch are our *Ideas* of *Subſtances*. Theſe muſt be taken from ſomething, that does exiſt

iſt, or has exiſted, and not be made up of Ideas arbitrarily put together, without any real Pattern. Herein therefore is founded the Reality of our Knowledge of *Subſtances*, that all our complex *Ideas* of them muſt be ſuch, and ſuch only, as are made up of ſuch ſimple ones, as have been diſcovered to co-exiſt in Nature. But in our Ideas of other mixed Modes, as of *Sacrilege*, or *Perjury*, &c. they are as real and true Ideas before, as after the Exiſtence of any ſuch mixed Mode. And our Ideas being thus true, tho' not perhaps very exact Copies, are the whole of our *real* Knowledge of Subſtances. Whatever Ideas we have, the Agreement we find they have with others will be Knowledge. If thoſe Ideas be abſtract, it will be *general* Knowledge: But to make it *real* concerning *Subſtances*, the Ideas muſt be taken from the real Exiſtence of Things Where-ever, therefore, we perceive the Agreement or Diſagreement of our Ideas, there is *certain Knowledge*: And where-ever we are ſure thoſe Ideas agree with the Reality of Things, there is *certain, real Knowledge*. So neceſſary is it to quit the common Notion of Species and Eſſences, if we will truly look into the Nature of Things, and examine them, by what our Faculties can diſcover in them as they exiſt, and not by groundleſs Fancies, that have been taken up about them.

I have mentioned this here, becauſe I think we cannot be too cautious that *Words* and *Species*, in the ordinary Notions which we have been uſed to of them, impoſe not upon us. For I am apt to think, therein lies one great Obſtacle to our clear and diſtinct Knowledge, eſpecially in Reference to Subſtances; and from thence has roſe a great Part of the Difficulties about Truth and Certainty. Would we accuſtom ourſelves to ſeparate our Contemplations and Reaſonings from Words, we might, in a great Meaſure, remedy this Inconvenience within our own Thoughts. But yet it would ſtill diſturb us in our Diſcourſe with others, as long as we retained the Opinion,

Opinion, that Species and their Eſſences were any Thing elſe but our abſtract Ideas, (ſuch as they are) with Names annexed to them, to be the Signs of them.

CHAP. V.

Of Truths in general.

WHAT is TRUTH, was an inquiry many Ages ſince; and it being that which all Mankind either do, or pretend to ſearch after, it cannot but be worth our while carefully to examine wherein it conſiſts; and ſo acquaint ourſelves with the nature of it, as to obſerve how the Mind diſtinguiſhes it from Falſehood.

Truth, in the proper Import of the Word, ſignifies the joining or ſeparating of Signs, as the Things ſignified by them, do agree or diſagree one with another. The joining or ſeparating of Signs, is what we call *Propoſitions*; ſo that *Truth* properly belongs only to *Propoſitions*; whereof there are *two* Sorts, *mental* and *verbal*, as there are *two* Sorts of Signs commonly made Uſe of, *viz. Ideas* and *Words*.

'Tis difficult to treat of *mental* Propoſitions without *verbal*: Becauſe in ſpeaking of *mental*, we muſt make Uſe of *Words*, and then they become *verbal*. Again, Men, commonly, in their Thoughts and Reaſonings, uſe *Words* inſtead of *Ideas*; eſpecially if the ſubject of their Meditations contains in it *complex Ideas*. Which is a great Evidence of the Imperfection and Uncertainty of our Ideas of that Kind, and may, if attentively made Uſe of, ſerve for a Mark to ſhow us, what are thoſe Things, we have clear and perfect eſtabliſhed Ideas of, and what not. If we have Occaſion to form *mental* Propoſitions about *white*, *black*, *Circle*, &c. we can, and often do, frame in our Minds the Ideas themſelves, without

out reflecting on the *Names*. But when we would conſider, or make Propoſitions about the more *complex Ideas*, as of a *Man*, *Vitriol*, *Fortitude*, *Glory*, &c. we uſually put the *Names* for the *Ideas*; becauſe the *Ideas* theſe *Names* ſtand for, being for the moſt Part confuſed, imperfect, and undetermined, we reflect on the *Names* themſelves, as being more clear, certain aud diſtinct, and readier to occur to our Thoughts than pure *Ideas*: And ſo we make Uſe of theſe *Words* inſtead of the *Ideas* themſelves, even when we would meditate and reaſon within ourſelves, and make tacit *mental Propoſitions*. In Subſtances, as has been already noted, this is occaſioned by the Imperfection of our Ideas; we making the Name ſtand for the real Eſſence, of which we have no Idea at all. In Modes, it is occaſioned by the great Number of ſimple Ideas, that go to the making them up. For many of them being compounded, the Name occurs much eaſier than the complex Idea itſelf, which requires Time and Attention to be recollected, and exactly repreſented to the Mind, even in thoſe Men who have formerly been at the Pains to do it; and is utterly impoſſible to be done by thoſe, who though they have ready in their Memory the greateſt Part of the common Words of their Language, yet perhaps, never troubled themſelves, in all their Lives, to conſider what preciſe Ideas the moſt of them ſtood for. Some confuſed or obſcure Notions have ſerved their Turns; and many who talk very much of Religion and Conſcience, of Church and Faith, of Power and Right, of Obſtructions and Humours, Melancholy and Choler, would, perhaps, have little left in their Thoughts and Meditations, if one ſhould deſire them to think only of the Things themſelves, and lay by thoſe Words, with which they ſo often confound others, and not ſeldom themſelves alſo.

We muſt then obſerve two Sorts of *Propoſitions*, that we are capable of making. *Firſt*, *Mental Propoſitions*,

Propoſitions, wherein the Ideas in our Underſtandings are without the Uſe of Words put together, or ſeparated by the Mind, perceiving or judging of their Agreement or Diſagreement. *Secondly*, *verbal Propoſitions*, which are Words, the Signs of our Ideas put together, or ſeparated in Affirmative or Negative Sentences. By which Way of affirming or denying, theſe Signs made by Sounds, are, as it were, put together or ſeparated one from another. So that *Propoſition* conſiſts in joining or ſeparating Signs: And *Truth* conſiſts in putting together or ſeparating theſe Signs according as the Things they ſtand for, agree or diſagree. So that it will be altogether as true a Propoſition, to ſay *all Centaurs are Animals*, as that *all Men are Animals*; and the Certainty of one, as great as the other. For in both the Propoſitions, the Words are put together according to the Agreement of the Ideas in our Minds: And the Agreement of the Idea of *Animal* with that of *Centaur*, is as clear and viſible to the Mind as the Agreement of the Idea of *Animal* with that of *Man*; and ſo theſe Propoſitions are equally true, equally certain. But of what Uſe is all ſuch Truth to us? What has been already ſaid, to diſtinguiſh real Truth from imaginary Knowledge, will be ſufficient to diſtinguiſh real Truth from chimerical.

Truth as well as Knowledge may well come under the Diſtinction of *verbal* and *real*; That being only *verbal Truth*, wherein Terms are joined according to the Agreement or Diſagreement of the Ideas they ſtand for, without regarding whether our Ideas are ſuch as really have, or are capable of having an Exiſtence in Nature. But then it is they contain *real Truth*, when theſe Signs are joined, as our Ideas agree; and when our Ideas are ſuch as we know, are capable of having an Exiſtence in Nature; which in *Subſtances* we cannot know, but by knowing that ſuch have exiſted. *Truth*, is the marking down in Words the Agreement or Diſagree-

ment of Ideas, as it is. *Falſehood*, is the marking down in Words the Agreement or Diſagreement of Ideas, otherwiſe than it is; and ſo far as theſe Ideas, thus marked by Sounds, agree to their *Archetypes*, ſo far only is the *Truth real*. The Knowledge of this *Truth* conſiſts in knowing what Ideas the Words ſtand for, and the Perception of the Agreement or Diſagreement of thoſe Ideas, according as it is marked by thoſe Words.

Beſides *Truth* taken in the ſtrict Senſe beforementioned, there are other Sorts of *Truths:* As, *Firſt*, *Moral Truth*, which is ſpeaking of Things according to the Perſuaſion of our own Minds, though the Propoſition we ſpeak of, agree not to the Reality of Things. *Secondly*, *Metaphyſical Truth*, which is nothing but the real Exiſtence of Things conformable to the Ideas to which we have annexed their Names.

Theſe Conſiderations of *Truth* either having been before taken Notice of, or not being much to our preſent Purpoſe, it may ſuffice here only to have mentioned them.

CHAP. VI.

Of Univerſal Propoſitions, their Truth and Certainty.

THOUGH the examining and judging of Ideas by themſelves, their Names being quite laid aſide, be the beſt and ſureſt way to clear and diſtinct Knowledge; yet through the prevailing Cuſtom of uſing *Sounds* for *Ideas*, as it is even when Men think and reaſon within their own Breaſts, makes the Conſideration of *Words* and *Propoſitions* ſo neceſſary a Part of the Treatiſe of Knowledge, that it is very hard to ſpeak intelligibly of the one, without explaining the other. And ſince *general Truths*, which with Reaſon are moſt ſought after, can never be

be well made known, and are ſeldom apprehended, but as conceived and expreſſed by Words; it is not out of our Way, in the examination of our own Knowledge, to inquire into the *Truth* and *Certainty* of *univerſal Propoſitions*. But it muſt be obſerved, that Certainty is twofold, Certainty of *Truth*, and Certainty of *Knowledge*.

Certainty of *Truth* is, when Words are ſo put together in *Propoſitions*, as exactly to expreſs the Agreement or Diſagreement of the Ideas they ſtand for, as really it is. Certainty of *Knowledge*, is to perceive the Agreement or Diſagreement of Ideas as expreſſed in any *Propoſition*. This we uſually call *knowing*, or being certain of the Truth of any *Propoſition*.

Now becauſe we cannot be certain of the Truth of any *general Propoſition*, unleſs we know the preciſe Bounds and Extent of the *Species*, its Terms ſtand for; it is neceſſary we ſhould know the Eſſence of each *Species*, which is that which conſtitutes and bounds it. This in all *ſimple Ideas* and *Modes* is not hard to do; for in theſe the *real* and *nominal* Eſſence being the ſame, there can be no doubt how far the *Species* extends, or what Things are comprehended under each Term: Which it is evident are all that have an exact Conformity with the Idea it ſtands for, and no other. But in *Subſtances* wherein a *real* Eſſence, diſtinct from the *nominal*, is ſuppoſed to conſtitute, and bound the *Species*, the Extent of the general Word is very uncertain; becauſe not knowing this real Eſſence, we cannot know what is, or is not of that *Species*, and conſequently what may, or may not with Certainty be affirmed of it. For Man, or Gold, taken in this Senſe, and uſed for Species of Things, conſtituted by real Eſſences, different from the complex Idea in the Mind of the Speaker, ſtand for we know not what, and the Extent of theſe Species, with ſuch Boundaries, are ſo unknown and undetermined, that it is impoſſible with any Certainty, to affirm,

that all Men are rational, or that all Gold is yellow. But where the nominal Eſſence is kept to, as the Boundary of each Species, and Men extend the Application of any general Term no farther than to the particular Things, in which the complex Idea it ſtands for is to be found, there they are in no Danger to miſtake the Bounds of each Species, nor can be in Doubt, on this Account, whether any Propoſitions be true, or no. I have choſen to explain this Uncertainty of Propoſitions in this ſcholaſtick way, and have made Uſe of the Terms of *Eſſences* and *Species*, on Purpoſe to ſhow the Abſurdity and Inconvenience there is to think of them, as of any other Sort of Realities, than barely abſtract Ideas with Names to them.

Hence we may ſee that the Names of Subſtances, when made to ſtand for *Species*, ſuppoſed to be conſtituted by *real Eſſences*, which we know not, are not capable of conveying Certainty to the Underſtanding. Of the *Truth* of *general Propoſitions* made up of ſuch Terms, we cannot be ſure. For how can we be ſure, that this or that Quality is in *Gold*, for Inſtance, when we know not what is, or is not *Gold*; that is, what has, or has not the *real Eſſence* of *Gold*, whereof we have no Idea at all. On the other Side, the Names of Subſtances when made Uſe of for the *complex Ideas* Men have in their Minds, tho' they carry a clear and determinate Signification with them, yet will not ſerve us to make any univerſal *Propoſitions*, of whoſe Truth we can be certain: Becauſe the *ſimple Ideas*, out of which the *complex* are combined, carry not with them any diſcoverable Connection or Repugnancy, but with a very few other Ideas. For Inſtance, *All Gold is fixed*, is a Propoſition we cannot be certain of, how univerſally ſoever it be believed: For if we take the Term *Gold* to ſtand for a *real Eſſence*, it is evident we know not what particular Subſtances are of that *Species*, and ſo cannot, with Certainty affirm, any

any Thing univerſally of *Gold*. But if we make the Term *Gold* ſtand for a *Species*, determined by its *nominal Eſſence*, be its *complex Idea* what it will; for Inſtance, a Body *yellow*, *fuſible*, *malleable* and *very heavy*; no Quality can with Certainty be affirmed or denied univerſally of it, but what has a diſcoverable Connexion, or Inconſiſtency with that *nominal Eſſence*: *Fixedneſs*, for Inſtance, having no neceſſary Connexion that we can diſcover with any *ſimple Idea* that make the *complex* one, or with the whole Combination together; it is impoſſible that we ſhould certainly know the Truth of this Propoſition, *All Gold is fixed*.

But is not this an univerſal certain Propoſition, *All Gold is malleable?* I anſwer, it is ſo, if *Malleableneſs* be a Part of the *complex Idea*, the Word *Gold* ſtands for: But then there is nothing affirmed of *Gold*, but that, that Sound ſtands for an Idea in which *Malleableneſs* is contained. And ſuch a Sort of Truth and Certainty it is, to ſay a *Centaur is four-footed*. But if *Malleableneſs* makes not a Part of the ſpecifick Eſſence the Name *Gold* ſtands for, it is plain, *all Gold is malleable*, is not a certain Propoſition. Becauſe, let the complex Idea of Gold, be made up of which ſoever of its other Qualities you pleaſe, Malleableneſs will not appear to depend on that complex Idea, nor follow from any ſimple one contained in it. I imagine amongſt all the ſecondary Qualities of Subſtances, and the Powers relating to them, there cannot any two be named, whoſe neceſſary Co-exiſtence, or Repugnance to co-exiſt, can be certainly known, unleſs in thoſe of the ſame Senſe, which neceſſarily exclude one another. Thus by the Colour we cannot certainly know what *Smell*, *Taſte*, &c. any Body is of. 'Tis no Wonder then that Certainty is to be found but in a very few general Propoſitions concerning Subſtances: Our Knowledge of the Qualities and Properties goes very ſeldom farther than our Senſes reach, or inform us. Inquiſitive and obſerving Men may, by Strength of

Judgment, penetrate farther; and on Probabilities, taken from wary Obſervations, and Hints well laid together, often gueſs right at what Experience has not yet diſcovered to them: But this is but *gueſſing* ſtill; it amounts only to *Opinion*; and has not that Certainty which is requiſite to *Knowledge*, which muſt continue, unleſs we had ſuch Ideas of Subſtances, as to know what real Conſtitutions produce thoſe ſenſible Qualities we find in them, and how thoſe Qualities neceſſarily flowed from them.

To conclude: General Propoſitions of what kind ſoever, are then only capable of Certainty, when the Terms uſed in them, ſtand for ſuch Ideas whoſe Agreement or Diſagreement, as there expreſſed, is capable to be diſcovered by us. And we are then certain of their Truth or Falſehood, when we perceive the Ideas they ſtand for, to agree or not agree, according as they are affirmed or denied one of another; whence we may take Notice, that general Certainty is never to be found but in our *Ideas*. Whenever we go to ſeek it elſewhere, in Experiment, or Obſervations without us, our Knowledge goes not beyond Particulars. It is the Contemplation of our own abſtract Ideas, that alone is able to afford us general Knowledge.

CHAP. VII.

Of Maxims.

THERE are a Sort of Propoſitions, which under the Names of *Maxims* and *Axioms*, have paſſed for Principles of Science: And becauſe they are ſelf-evident, have been ſuppoſed *innate*. It may be worth While to inquire into the Reaſon of their Evidence, and examine how far they influence our other Knowledge.

Knowledge being but the Perception of the Agreement or Diſagreement of Ideas, where that Agreement

ment or Diſagreement is perceived immediately, without the Intervention or Help of any other Ideas, there our *Knowledge* is *ſelf-evident*: This will appear to be ſo to any one, who will but conſider any of thoſe Propoſitions, which, without any Proof, he aſſents to at firſt Sight; for in all of them he will find, that the Reaſon of his Aſſent, is from that Agreement or Diſagreement, which the Mind, by an immediate comparing them, finds in thoſe Ideas anſwering the Affirmation or Negation in the Propoſition. This Self-Evidence is viſible not only in *Maxims*, but in an infinite Number of other Propoſitions For,

In reſpect of *Identity* and *Diverſity*, we may have as many Self-evident Propoſitions as we have diſtinct *Ideas*. 'Tis the firſt Act of the Mind, to know every one of its Ideas by itſelf, and diſtinguiſh it from others. Every one finds in himſelf, that he knows the Ideas he has; that he knows alſo when any one is in his Underſtanding, and what it is; and that when more than one are there, he knows them diſtinctly and unconfuſedly, one from another; ſo that all Affirmations, or Negations, concerning them are made without any Poſſibility of Doubt or Uncertainty; and muſt neceſſarily be aſſented to as ſoon as underſtood; that is, as ſoon as we have in our Minds the Ideas clear and diſtinct, which the Terms in the Propoſition ſtand for. Thus a *Circle is a Circle*, *Blue is not Red*, are as ſelf-evident Propoſitions, as thoſe general ones, *what is, is*; and *'tis impoſſible for the ſame Thing to be, and not to be*. Nor can the Conſideration of theſe *Axioms* add any Thing to the Evidence, or Certainty of our Knowledge of them.

As to the Agreement or Diſagreement of our Ideas of *Co-exiſtence*, the Mind has an immediate Perception of this, but in very few of them; and therefore, in this Sort we have very little *intuitive* Knowledge; tho' in ſome few Propoſitions we have. *Two Bodies cannot be in the ſame Place*, I think is a ſelf-evident

evident Propoſition. The Idea of filling a Place equal to the Contents of its Superficies being annexed to our Idea of Body.

As to the Relations of *Modes*, Mathematicians have framed many Axioms concerning that one Relation of Equality; as *Equals taken from Equals, the Remainder will be equal*, &c. which however received for Axioms, yet I think have not a clearer Self-evidence than theſe, that *one and one are equal to two*: That if from the five Fingers of one Hand you take two, and from the five Fingers of the other Hand two, the remaining Numbers will be equal. Theſe and a thouſand other ſuch Propoſitions may be found in Numbers, which carry with them an equal, if not greater Clearneſs than thoſe Mathematical Axioms.

As to *real Exiſtence*, ſince that has no Connexion with any other of our *Ideas*, but that of ourſelves and of a *firſt Being*; we have not ſo much as a Demonſtrative, much leſs a Self-evident Knowledge, concerning the *real Exiſtence* of other Beings.

In the next Place, let us conſider what Influence theſe Maxims have upon the other Parts of our Knowledge. The Rules eſtabliſhed in the Schools, That all Reaſonings are *ex præcognitis & præconceſſis*, ſeem to lay the Foundation of all other Knowledge in theſe Maxims, and to ſuppoſe them to be *præcognita*; whereby I think are meant two Things: *Firſt*, that theſe Axioms are thoſe Truths that are firſt known to the Mind: *Secondly*, that upon them the other Parts of our Knowledge depend.

Firſt, That theſe Axioms are not the Truths firſt known to the Mind, is evident from Experience: For who knows not, that a *Child perceives that a Stranger is not its Mother*, long before he knows, *that it is impoſſible for the ſame Thing to be, and not to be?* And how many Truths are there about Numbers, which the Mind is perfectly acquainted with, and fully convinced of, before it ever thought on theſe general

Maxims?

Maxims? Of this the Reaſon is plain; for that which makes the Mind aſſent to ſuch Propoſitions, being nothing but the Perception it has of the Agreement or Diſagreement of its *Ideas*, according as it finds them affirmed or denied in Words one of another; and every *Idea* being known to be what it is; and every two diſtinct *Ideas* not to be the ſame, it muſt neceſſarily follow, that ſuch ſelf-evident Truths muſt be firſt known, which conſiſt of *Ideas*, that are firſt in the Mind; and the *Ideas* firſt in the Mind, it is evident, are thoſe of particular Things; from whence, by ſlow Degrees, the Underſtanding proceeds to ſome few general ones, which being taken from the ordinary and familiar Objects of Senſe, are ſettled in the Mind, with general Names to them. Thus particular *Ideas* are firſt received and diſtinguiſhed, and ſo Knowledge got about them; and next to them, the leſs general or ſpecifick, which are next to particular ones.

For *abſtract Ideas* are not ſo obvious or eaſy to *Children*, or the yet unexerciſed Mind as particular ones. If they ſeem ſo to grown *Men*, 'tis only becauſe, by conſtant and familiar Uſe they are made ſo. It is true, the Mind, in this imperfect State, has need of ſuch Ideas, and makes all the Haſte to them it can, for the Conveniency of Communication and Enlargement of Knowledge; to both which it is, naturally, very much inclined. But yet one has reaſon to ſuſpect ſuch Ideas are Marks of our Imperfection; at leaſt this is enough to ſhow, that the moſt abſtract and general Ideas are not thoſe that the Mind is firſt and moſt eaſily acquainted with, nor ſuch as its earlieſt Knowledge is converſant about.

Secondly, From what has been ſaid, it plainly follows, that theſe magnified *Maxims* are not the Principles and Foundations of all our other Knowledge: For if there be a great many other Truths as ſelf-evident as they, and a great many that we know before them, it is impoſſible that they ſhould be the Principles,

Principles, from which we deduce all other Truths. Thus, that *one and two are equal to three*, is as evident, and eaſier known than that the *whole is equal to all its parts*. Nor after the Knowledge of this Maxim, do we know that *one and two are equal to three*, better, or more certainly than we did before. For if there be any Odds in theſe *Ideas*, the *Ideas* of whole and *Parts* are more obſcure, or, at leaſt, more difficult to be ſettled in the Mind, than thoſe of *one*, *two and three*. And indeed, I think, I may aſk theſe Men, who will needs have all Knowledge beſides thoſe general Principles themſelves, to depend on general innate, and ſelf-evident Principles, what Principle is requiſite to prove, that *one* and *one* are *two*, that *two* and *two* are *four*, that *three* times *two* are *ſix*? Which being known without any Proof, do evince, that either all Knowledge does not depend on certain *præcognita*, or general Maxims, called Principles, or elſe ſuch as theſe, (*that one and one are two*, *that two and two are four*, &c.) and a great Part of Numeration will be ſo. To which if we add all the ſelf-evident Propoſitions that may be made about all our diſtinct *Ideas*; Principles will be almoſt infinite, at leaſt innumerable, which Men arrive to the Knowledge of, at different Ages; and a great many of thoſe innate Principles, they never come to know all their Lives. But whether they come in view earlier or later, they are all known by their native Evidence, and receive no Light, nor are capable of any Proof, one from another; much leſs the more particular from the more general; or the more ſimple from the more compounded: The more ſimple and leſs abſtract, being the moſt familiar, and eaſier and earlier apprehended.

Theſe *general Maxims* then, are only of Uſe in Diſputes, to ſtop the Mouths of Wranglers; but not of much Uſe to the Diſcovery of unknown Truths; or to help the Mind forwards in its Search after Knowledge. Several general Maxims are no more than bare verbal Propoſitions; and teach us nothing

nothing but the Reſpect and Import of Names, one to another; as, *The Whole is equal to all its Parts*: What real Truth does it teach us more, than what the Signification of the Word *Totum*, or *Whole*, does of itſelf import?

They are not of Uſe to help Men forward in the Advancement of Sciences, or new Diſcoveries of yet unknown Truths. Mr. *Newton*, in his never enough to be admired Book, has demonſtrated ſeveral Propoſitions, which are ſo many new Truths, before unknown to the World, and are farther Advances in Mathematical Knowledge: But for the Diſcovery of theſe, it was not the general Maxims, *what is, is*; or, *the whole is bigger than a Part*, or the like, that helped him. Theſe were not the Clues that led him into the Diſcovery of the Truth and Certainty of thoſe Propoſitions. Nor was it by them that he got the Knowledge of thoſe Demonſtrations; but by finding out intermediate Ideas, that ſhowed the Agreement or Diſagreement of the Ideas, as expreſſed in the Propoſitions he demonſtrated. This is the great Exerciſe and Improvement of human Underſtanding in the enlarging of Knowledge, and advancing the Sciences; wherein they are far enough from receiving any Help from the Contemplation of theſe, or the like magnified Maxims.

But yet, *Mathematicians* do not without Reaſon place this, and ſome other Axioms, amongſt their *Maxims*; that their Scholars having, in the Entrance perfectly acquainted their Thoughts with theſe Propoſitions, made in ſuch general Terms, may have them ready to apply to all particular Caſes: Not that if they be equally weighed, they are more clear and evident, than the particular Inſtances they are brought to confirm; but that being more familiar to the Mind, the very naming them is enough to ſatisfy the Underſtanding. But this, I ſay, is more from our Cuſtom of uſing them, than the different Evidence of the Things.

So

So that, if rightly conſidered, I think we may ſay, that where our *Ideas* are clear and diſtinct, there is little, or no Uſe at all of theſe *Maxims*, to prove the Agreement or Diſagreement of any of them. He that cannot diſcern the Truth, or Falſehood of ſuch Propoſitions, without the Help of theſe and the like Maxims, will not be helped by theſe Maxims to do it. He that needs any Proof to make him certain, and give his Aſſent to this Propoſition, that *two are equal to two*, or that *white is not black*, will alſo have need of a Proof to make him admit that, *what is, is:* or, *that it is impoſſible for the ſame Thing to be, and not to be.*

And as theſe *Maxims* are of little Uſe, where we have clear and diſtinct *Ideas*; ſo they are of dangerous Uſe where our *Ideas* are confuſed; and where we uſe Words that are not annexed to clear and diſtinct *Ideas*, but to ſuch as are of a looſe and wandering Signification, ſometimes ſtanding for one, and ſometimes for another *Idea*; from which follows Miſtake and Errour, which theſe Maxims (brought as Proofs to eſtabliſh Propoſitions wherein the Terms ſtand for confuſed and uncertain *Ideas*) do, by their Authority, confirm and rivet.

CHAP. VIII.

Of trifling Propoſitions.

WHETHER the Maxims treated of in the foregoing Chapter, be of that Uſe to real Knowledge as is generally ſuppoſed, I leave to be conſidered. This, I think, may confidently be affirmed, that there are univerſal Propoſitions, which though they be certainly true, yet they add no Light to our Underſtandings, bring no Increaſe to our Knowledge: Such are,

Firſt, All *purely identical Propoſitions*. Theſe, at firſt Sight, appear to contain no Inſtruction in them

them: For when we affirm the ſame Term of itſelf, it ſhows us nothing but what we muſt certainly know before, whether ſuch a Propoſition be either made by, or propoſed to us.

Secondly, Another Sort of trifling Propoſitions is, when a *Part of the complex* Idea *is predicated of the Name of the whole*; a Part of the Definition, of the Word defined, as, *Lead is a Metal*, *Man an Animal*. Theſe carry no Information at all, to thoſe who know the complex *Ideas*, the Names *Lead* and *Man* ſtand for: Indeed to a Man that knows the Signification of the Word *Metal*, and not of the Word *Lead*, it is a ſhorter Way to explain the Signification of the Word *Lead*, by ſaying it is a *Metal*, which at once expreſſes ſeveral of its ſimple Ideas, than to enumerate them one by one, telling him it is a Body very *heavy*, *fuſible*, and *malleable*.

Alike trifling it is, to predicate any other Part of the Definition of the Term defined, or to affirm any one of the ſimple Ideas of a complex one, by the Name of the Whole complex Idea: As *all Gold is fuſible*; for Fuſibility being one of the ſimple Ideas that goes to the making up the complex one, the Sound *Gold* ſtands for; what can it be but playing with Sounds, to affirm that of the Name *Gold*, which is comprehended in its received Signification? It would be thought little better than ridiculous, to affirm gravely, as a Truth of Moment, that *Gold is yellow*; and I ſee not how it is any Jot more material to ſay, *it is fuſible*, unleſs that Quality be left out of the complex Idea, of which the ſound *Gold* is the Mark in ordinary Speech. What Inſtruction can it carry, to tell one, that which he is ſuppoſed to know before? For I am ſuppoſed to know the Signification of the Word, another uſes to me, or elſe he muſt explain it.

The general Propoſitions that are made about Subſtances, if they are certain, are for the moſt Part but *trifling*; and if they are inſtructive, are

uncertain, and ſuch as we can have no Knowledge of their real Truth, how much ſoever conſtant Obſervation and Analogy may aſſiſt our Judgments in *gueſſing*. Hence it comes to paſs, that one may often meet with very clear and coherent Diſcourſes, that yet amount to nothing. For Names of ſubſtantial Beings, as well as others, having ſettled Significations affixed to them, may with great Truth be joined negatively and affirmatively in Propoſitions, as their Definitions make them fit to be ſo joined; and Propoſitions conſiſting of ſuch Terms, may, with the ſame Clearneſs, be deduced one from another, as thoſe that convey the moſt real Truths; and all this, without any Knowledge of the Nature or Reality of Things exiſting without us. Thus he that has learned the following Words, with their ordinary Acceptations annexed to them, *viz. Subſtance*, *Man*, *Animal*, *Form*, *Soul*, *Vegetative*, *Senſitive*, *Rational*, may make ſeveral undoubted Propoſitions about the Soul, without any Knowledge at all of what the Soul really is. And of this Sort a Man may find an infinite Number of Propoſitions, Reaſonings and Concluſions in Books of *Metaphyſicks*, *School-Divinity*, and ſome Part of *Natural Philoſophy*; and after all, know as little of *God*, *Spirits*, or *Bodies*, as he did before he ſet out.

Thirdly, The worſt Sort of *trifling is to uſe Words looſely and uncertainly*, which ſets us yet farther from the Certainty of Knowledge we hope to attain to by them, or find in them. That which occaſions this, is, That Men may find it convenient to ſhelter their Ignorance or Obſtinacy, under the Obſcurity and Perplexedneſs of their Terms; to which, perhaps, Inadvertency and ill Cuſtom do, in many Men, much contribute.

To conclude, barely *verbal Propoſitions* may be known by theſe following Marks.

Firſt, All Propoſitions, wherein two abſtract Terms are affirmed one of another, are barely about the

the Signification of Sounds. For ſince no abſtract Idea can be the ſame with any other, but itſelf; when its abſtract Name is affirmed of any other Term, it can ſignify no more than this, that it may, or ought to be called by that Name; or that theſe two Names ſignify the ſame Idea. Thus ſhould any one ſay, that *Parſimony is Frugality*, that *Gratitude is Juſtice*; that this or that Action is or is not *Temperance*; however ſpecious theſe and the like Propoſitions may at firſt Sight ſeem, yet when we come to preſs them, and examine nicely what they contain, we ſhall find that it all amounts to nothing, but the Signification of thoſe Terms.

Secondly, All Propoſitions, wherein a Part of the complex Idea, which any Term ſtands for, is affirmed of that Term, are only *verbal*: *v. g.* to ſay, *that Gold is a Metal*, or *heavy*. And thus all Propoſitions wherein more comprehenſive Terms called *Genera*, are affirmed of ſubordinate, or leſs comprehenſive, called *Species* or *Individuals*, are barely *verbal*. When by theſe two Rules we examine the Propoſitions that make up the Diſcourſes we ordinarily meet with, both in and out of books; we ſhall perhaps find, that a greater Part of them, than is uſually ſuſpected, are merely about the Signification of Words, and contain nothing in them, but the Uſe and Application of theſe Signs.

This, I think, I may lay down for an infallible Rule, that where-ever the diſtinct Idea any Word ſtands for, is not known and conſidered, and ſomething not contained in the Idea, is not affirmed, or denied of it, there our Thoughts ſtick wholly in Sounds, and are able to attain no real Truth or Falſehood. This, perhaps, if well heeded, might ſave us a great deal of uſeleſs Amuſement and Diſpute; and very much ſhorten our Trouble and Wandering in the Search of real and true Knowledge.

CHAP. IX.

Of our Knowledge of Exiſtence.

HItherto we have only conſidered the *Eſſences* of Things, which being only *abſtract* Ideas, and thereby removed in our Thoughts from particular Exiſtence, (that being the proper Operation of the Mind, in Abſtraction, to conſider an Idea under no other Exiſtence, but what it has in the Underſtanding) give us no Knowledge of real *Exiſtence* at all. We proceed now to inquire concerning our *Knowledge of the Exiſtence* of Things, and how we came by it.

I ſay then, that we have the Knowledge of our *own Exiſtence*, by *Intuition*; of the *Exiſtence of God*, by *Demonſtration*; and of *other Things*, by *Senſation*. As for our own *Exiſtence*, we perceive it ſo plainly, that it neither needs, nor is capable of any Proof. *I think*; *I reaſon*; *I feel Pleaſure and Pain*: Can any of theſe be more evident to me than my *own Exiſtence?* If I doubt of all other Things, that very *Doubt* makes me perceive my *own Exiſtence*, and will not ſuffer me to doubt of that. If I know I doubt, I have as certain a Perception of the *Thing* doubting, as of that *Thought* which I call *Doubt*. Experience then convinces us that we have an *intuitive Knowledge of our own Exiſtence*; and an internal infallible Perception that we are. In every Act of Senſation, Reaſoning, or Thinking, we are conſcious to ourſelves of our Being, and in this Matter come not ſhort of the higheſt Degree of *Certainty*.

CHAP. X.

Of our Knowledge of the Exiſtence of a God.

THOUGH *God* has given us no *innate Ideas* of himſelf; though he has ſtamped no original Characters on our Minds, wherein we may read his Being; yet having furniſhed us with thoſe Faculties our Minds are endowed with, he hath not *left himſelf without a Witneſs*, ſince we have Senſe, Perception, and Reaſon, and cannot want a clear Proof of him, as long as we carry ourſelves about us: Nor can we juſtly complain of our Ignorance in this great Point, ſince he has ſo plentifully provided us with Means to diſcover, and know him, ſo far as is neceſſary to the End of our Being, and the great Concernment of our Happineſs. But though this be the moſt obvious Truth that Reaſon diſcovers, and though its Evidence be, if I miſtake not, equal to Mathematical Certainty; yet it requires Thought and Attention: And the Mind muſt apply itſelf to a regular Deduction of it, from ſome Part of our *intuitive* Knowledge, or elſe we ſhall be as ignorant of this, as of other Propoſitions which are, in themſelves, capable of clear Demonſtration. To ſhow therefore, that we are capable of knowing, that is, *being certain*, that *there is a God*, and how we may come by this Certainty, I think we need go no farther than ourſelves, and that undoubted Knowledge we have of our own *Exiſtence*.

I think it is beyond Queſtion, that *Man has a clear Perception of his own Being*: He knows certainly that he exiſts, and that he is ſomething. In the next Place, Man knows by an *intuitive* Certainty, that *bare Nothing can no more produce any real Being, than it can be equal to two right Angles*. If therefore we know there is ſome real Being, it is an evident Demonſtration, that *from Eternity there has been Something*; ſince what was not from Eternity,

had a Beginning; and what had a Beginning muſt be produced by ſomething elſe. Next it is evident, *that what has its Being from another, muſt alſo have all that which is in, and belongs to its Being, from another too:* All the Powers it has, muſt be owing to, and received from the ſame Source. This eternal Source then of all Being, muſt be alſo the Source and Original of all Power; and ſo this *Eternal Being* muſt be alſo the *moſt powerful.*

Again, Man finds in himſelf *Perception* and *Knowledge:* We are certain then, that there is not only ſome Being, but ſome knowing, intelligent Being in the World. There was a Time then, when there was no knowing Being, and when Knowledge began to be; or elſe there has been a knowing Being from Eternity. If it be ſaid, there was a Time when that eternal Being had no Knowledge: I reply, that then it is impoſſible there ſhould ever have been any Knowledge: It being as impoſſible that Things wholly void of Knowledge, and operating blindly, and without any Perception, ſhould produce a knowing Being, as it is, that a Triangle ſhould make itſelf three Angles, bigger than two right ones.

Thus from the Conſideration of ourſelves, and what we infallibly find in our own Conſtitutions, our Reaſon leads us to the Knowledge of this Certain and evident Truth, that *there is an eternal, moſt powerful, and knowing Being*, which, whether any one will pleaſe to call GOD, it matters not. The Thing is evident, and from this Idea, duly conſidered, will eaſily be deduced all thoſe other *Attributes* we ought to aſcribe to this *eternal Being.*

From what has been ſaid, it is plain to me we have a more certain Knowledge of the Exiſtence of a *God*, than of any Thing our Senſes have not immediately diſcovered to us. Nay, I preſume I may ſay, that we may more certainly know that there is a *God*, than that there is any Thing elſe without us. When I ſay, we know, I *mean*, there is ſuch a Knowledge within our Reach, which we cannot miſs,

miſs, if we will but apply our Minds to that, as we do to ſeveral other Inquiries. For the *inviſible Things of God are clearly ſeen from the Creation of the World, being underſtood by the Things that are made, even his eternal Power and God-head.*

It being then unavoidable for all rational Creatures to conclude, that *Something has exiſted from Eternity*; let us next ſee what *Kind of Thing* that muſt be. There are but two Sorts of Beings in the World, that Man knows or conceives: *Firſt*, Such as are purely material, without Senſe or Perception, as the Clippings of our Beards, and Parings of our Nails. *Secondly*, Senſible perceiving Beings; ſuch as we find ourſelves to be. Theſe two Sorts we ſhall hereafter call *cogitative* and *incogitative* Beings: Which to our preſent Purpoſe are better than *material* and *immaterial*.

If then there muſt be ſomething *eternal*, it is very obvious to Reaſon, that it muſt neceſſarily be a *cogitative* Being; becauſe it is as impoſſible to conceive that ever bare *incogitative* Matter ſhould produce a *thinking* intelligent Being, as that Nothing ſhould of itſelf produce Matter. Let us ſuppoſe any Parcel of Matter *eternal*, we ſhall find it, in itſelf, unable to produce any Thing. Let us ſuppoſe its Parts firmly at reſt together: If there were no other Being in the World, muſt it not eternally remain ſo, a dead inactive Lump? Is it poſſible to conceive it can add Motion to itſelf, or produce any Thing? *Matter* then, by its own Strength, cannot produce in itſelf, ſo much as *Motion*. The Motion it has muſt alſo be from Eternity, or elſe added to Matter by ſome other Being, more powerful than Matter: Matter, as is evident, having not Power to produce Motion in itſelf. But let us ſuppoſe Motion eternal too, yet Matter, *incogitative* Matter and Motion could never produce *Thought: Knowledge* will ſtill be as far beyond the *Power* of *Motion* and *Matter* to produce, as Matter is beyond the Power of Nothing to produce. And I appeal to every

every one's own Thoughts, whether he cannot as eaſily conceive Matter produced by *Nothing*, as Thought to be produced by pure Matter, when before there was no ſuch Thing as Thought, or an intelligent Being exiſting. Divide *Matter* into as minute Parts, as you will. vary the Figure and Motion of it, as much as you pleaſe, it will operate no otherwiſe upon other Bodies of proportionable Bulk, than it did before this Diviſion. The minuteſt Particles of Matter, knock, impel, and reſiſt one another, juſt as the greater do, and that is all they can do, ſo that if we will ſuppoſe *Nothing eternal*, *Matter can never begin to be.* If we ſuppoſe *bare Matter* without Motion, *eternal Motion can never begin to be.* If we ſuppoſe only Matter and Motion eternal, *Thought can never begin to be*: For it is impoſſible to conceive, that Matter, either with or without Motion, could have originally in and from itſelf, Senſe, Perception, and Knowledge, as is evident from hence, that then Senſe, Perception and Knowledge, muſt be a Property eternally inſeparable from Matter and every Particle of it. Since therefore whatſoever is the firſt eternal Being, muſt neceſſarily be *cogitative*; and whatſoever is *firſt* of all Things, muſt neceſſarily contain in it, and actually have, at leaſt, all the Perfections that can ever after exiſt, it neceſſarily follows, that the *firſt eternal Being cannot be Matter.*

If therefore it be evident, that ſomething neceſſarily muſt exiſt from Eternity, it is alſo evident that, that *ſomething muſt neceſſarily be a cogitative Being.* For it is as impoſſible that *incogitative Matter* ſhould produce a *cogitative Being*, as that Nothing, or the the Negation of all Being, ſhould produce a poſitive Being or Matter.

This Diſcovery of the neceſſary Exiſtence of an eternal Mind, does ſufficiently lead us into the Knowledge of *God.* For it will hence follow, that all other knowing Beings, that have a Beginning, muſt depend on him, and have no other Ways of Knowledge

Knowledge or Extent of Power, than what he gives them: And therefore if he made thoſe, he made alſo the leſs excellent Pieces of this Univerſe, all *inanimate Bodies*, whereby his *Omniſcience*, *Power*, and *Providence* will be eſtabliſhed, and from thence all his other Attributes neceſſarily follow.

CHAP. XI.

Of our Knowledge of the Exiſtence of other Things.

THE Knowledge of our own Being we have by *Intuition*: The Exiſtence of a *God*, *Reaſon* clearly makes known to us, as has been ſhown: The *Knowledge of the Exiſtence* of any other Thing, we can have only by Senſation; for there being no neceſſary Connexion of *real Exiſtence* with any *Idea* a Man hath in his Memory; nor of any other Exiſtence, but that of *God*, with the Exiſtence of any particular Man; no particular Man can know the Exiſtence of any other Being, but only, when by actually operating upon him, it makes itſelf be perceived by him. The having the *Idea* of any Thing in our Mind, no more proves the Exiſtence of that Thing, than the Picture of a Man evidences his Being in the World, or the Viſions of a Dream, make thereby a true Hiſtory. It is therefore the actual receiving of *Ideas* from without, that gives us Notice of the Exiſtence of other Things, and makes us know that ſomething doth exiſt at that time without us, which cauſes that Idea in us, though perhaps we neither know nor conſider how it does it; for it takes not from the *Certainty* of our Senſes, and the *Ideas* we received by them, that we know not the Manner wherein they are produced: This *Notice* we have by our *Senſes* of the exiſting of Things without us, tho it be not altogether ſo certain as our *Intuitive* Knowledge, or the Deductions of our *Reaſon*, employed about the clear

abſtract

abſtract Ideas of our Minds, which is *Demonſtration*, deſerves the name of Knowledge, if we perſuade ourſelves that our Faculties act and inform us right, concerning the Exiſtence of thoſe Objects that affect them: It cannot paſs for an ill-grounded Confidence. But beſides the Aſſurance we have from our *Senſes* themſelves, that they do not err in the Information they give us of the Exiſtence of Things without us, we have other concurrent Reaſons: As, *Firſt*, It is plain thoſe Perceptions are produced in us, by exterior Cauſes affecting our Senſes, becauſe thoſe that want the *Organs* of any *Senſe*, never can have the *Ideas* belonging to that Senſe produced in their Minds. This is too evident to be doubted, and therefore we cannot but be aſſured, that they come in by the Organs of that Senſe, and no other Way.

Secondly, Becauſe we find ſometimes that we cannot avoid the having thoſe *Ideas* produced in our Minds; when my Eyes are ſhut, I can at pleaſure recall to my Mind the *Ideas* of *Light* or the *Sun* which former Senſations had lodged in my Memory; but if I turn my Eyes towards the *Sun* I cannot avoid the *Ideas* which the *Light* or the *Sun* then produces in me: Which ſhows a manifeſt Difference between thoſe *Ideas* laid up in the Memory, and ſuch as force themſelves upon us, and we cannot avoid having. And therefore it muſt needs be ſome *exterior* Cauſe, whoſe Efficacy I cannot reſiſt, that produces thoſe *Ideas* in my Mind, whether I will or no.

Beſides, there is no Body who doth not perceive the Difference in himſelf, between actually looking upon the *Sun*, and contemplating the *Idea* he has of it in his Memory; and therefore he hath certain Knowledge, that they are not both Memory or Fancy; but that actual Seeing has a Cauſe without.

Thirdly, Add to this, that many *Ideas* are produced in us with Pain, which we afterwards remember

ber without the leaſt Offence. Thus the Pain of *Heat* or *Cold*, when the *Idea* of it is received in our Minds, gives us no Diſturbance; which when felt was very troubleſome; and we remember the Pain of *Hunger*, *Thirſt*, *Head-ach*, &c. without any Pain at all; which would either never diſturb us, or elſe conſtantly do it, as often as we thought of it, were there nothing more but *Ideas* floating in our Minds, and Appearances entertaining our Fancies, without the real Exiſtence of Things affecting us from abroad. The ſame may be ſaid of Pleaſure, accompanying ſeveral actual Senſations, and though mathematical Demonſtration depends not upon Senſe, yet the examining them by Diagrams, gives Credit to the Evidence of our Sight, and ſeems to give it a Certainty approaching to that of Demonſtration itſelf.

Fourthly, Our *Senſes* in many Caſes bear Witneſs to the Truth of each others Report, concerning the Exiſtence of ſenſible Things without us: He that doubts when he ſees a *Fire*, whether it be *Real*, may if he pleaſes feel it too; and by the exquiſite Pain, he will be convinced that it is not a bare *Idea* or *Phantom*. Whence it is evident, that they are not barely the Sport and Play of our Imagination, when I find that the Characters which I made on Paper, at the Pleaſure of my own Thoughts, do not obey them; nor yet ceaſe to be, whenever I ſhall fancy it, but continue to affect my Senſes conſtantly and regularly, according to the Figures I made them. To which, if we will add, that the Sight of thoſe ſhall, from another man, draw ſuch Sounds as I before-hand deſigned they ſhall ſtand for, there will be little Reaſon left to doubt, that thoſe Words I write do really exiſt without me, when they cauſe a long Series of regular Sounds to affect my Ears, which could not to be the Effect of my Imagination, nor could my Memory retain them in that Order.

If,

If, after all this, any one will be ſo *Sceptical*, as to diſtruſt his Senſes, and to queſtion the Exiſtence of all Things, or our Knowledge of any Thing; let him conſider that the Certainty of Things exiſting in *rerum natura*, when we have the Teſtimony of our Senſes for it, is not only as great as our Frame can attain to, but as our Condition needs. From our *Faculties* being not ſuited to the full Extent of Being, nor a clear comprehenſive Knowledge of all Things, but to the Preſervation of us, in whom they are, and accommodated to the Uſe of Life; they ſerve our Purpoſe well enough, if they will but give us certain Notice of thoſe Things, that are convenient or inconvenient to us. For he that ſees a *Candle* burning, and has experimented the Force of the Flame, by putting his Finger in it, will little doubt that this is Something exiſting without him, which does him Harm and puts him to Pain, which is Aſſurance enough; when no man requires greater Certainty to govern his Actions by, than what is as certain as his Actions themſelves: So that this Evidence is as great as we can deſire, being as certain to us as our Pleaſure or Pain, that is, *Happineſs* or *Miſery*, beyond which we have no Concernment either of Knowledge or Being. Such an Aſſurance of the Exiſtence of Things without us, is ſufficient to direct us in the attaining the Good, and avoiding the Evil, which is cauſed by them, which is the important Concernment we have of being made acquainted with them.

In fine, when our Senſes do actually convey into our Underſtandings any *Idea*, we are aſſured that there is Something at that Time *really exiſting* without us. But this Knowledge extends only as far as the preſent Teſtimony of our Senſes, employed about particular Objects, that do then affect them, and no farther. My ſeeing a *Man* a Minute ſince, is no certain Argument of his preſent Exiſtence.

As when our Senſes are actually employed about any Object, we know that it does exiſt; ſo by our Memory

Memory we may be assured, that, heretofore, Things that affected our *Senses*, *have existed*: And thus we have the Knowledge of the past Existence of several Things; whereof our *Senses* have informed us, our Memories still retain the *Ideas*: And of this we are past all Doubt, so long as we remember well.

As to the Existence of Spirits, our having *Ideas* of them, does not make us know, that any such Things do exist without us; or that there are any *finite Spirits*; or any other spiritual Beings but the eternal God. We have Ground from *Revelation*, and several other Reasons, to believe, with Assurance, that there are such Creatures: but our Senses not being able to discover them, we want the Means of knowing their particular Existence; for we can no more know that there are *finite Spirits* really existing, by the *Idea* we have of such Beings, than by the *Ideas* any one has of *Fairies* or *Centaurs*, he can come to know that Things answering those *Ideas*, do really exist.

And therefore concerning the Existence of finite Spirits, as well as several other Things, we must content ourselves with the Evidence of Faith; but universal certain Propositions concerning this Matter, are beyond our Reach. For however true it may be, *v. g.* that all the intelligent Spirits that God ever created do still exist; yet it can never make a Part of our certain Knowledge. These, and the like Propositions we may assent to, as highly probable, but are not, I fear, in a State capable of knowing. We are not then to put others upon demonstrating, nor ourselves upon Search of universal Certainty in all those Matters wherein we are not capable of any other Knowledge, but what our Senses give us in this or that particular.

Hence we may gather, that there are *two Sorts* of Propositions, *one* concerning the Existence of any Thing answerable to such an *Idea* as that of an *Elephant*, *Phœnix*, *Motion* or *Angel*, *viz.* Whether such

a Thing does any where exiſt: And this Knowledge is only of *Particulars*, and not to be had of any Thing without us, but only of *God*, any other Way than by our *Senſes*.

Another Sort of Propoſition is, wherein is expreſſed the Agreement or Diſagreement of our *abſtract Ideas*, and their Dependence on one another. And theſe may be *univerſal* and certain: So having the *Idea* of *God* and *myſelf*, of *Fear* and *Obedience*, I cannot but be ſure that *God is to be feared and obeyed by me*; and this Propoſition will be certain concerning *Man* in general, if I have made an *abſtract Idea* of ſuch a *Species*, whereof I am one Particular. But ſuch a Propoſition, how certain ſoever, proves not to me the Exiſtence of men in the World; but will be true of all ſuch Creatures, whenever they do exiſt: Which *Certainty* of ſuch general Propoſitions, depends on the Agreement or Diſagreement diſcoverable in thoſe *abſtract Ideas*. In the former Caſe, our Knowledge is the Conſequence of the *Exiſtence of Things*, producing *Ideas* in our Minds by our Senſes: In the latter, the Conſequences of the *Ideas* that are in our *Minds*, and producing theſe general Propoſitions, many whereof are called *eternæ veritates*; and all of them indeed are ſo, not from being written all, or any of them in the Minds of all Men, or that they were, any of them, Propoſitions in any one's Mind, till he, having got the *abſtract Ideas*, joined or ſeparated them by Affirmation or Negation: But whereſoever we can ſuppoſe ſuch a Creature as *Man* is, endowed with ſuch Faculties, and thereby furniſhed with ſuch *Ideas* as we have, we muſt conclude, he muſt needs, when he applies his Thoughts to the Conſideration of his *Ideas*, know the Truth of certain Propoſitions, that will ariſe from the Agreement or Diſagreement he will perceive in his own *Ideas*. Such Propoſitions being once made about *abſtract Ideas*, ſo as to be true, are called *eternal Truths*, as they will, whenever they can be ſuppoſed to be made again, at any Time paſt, or to

to come, by a Mind having thoſe Ideas, always be true. For Names being ſuppoſed to ſtand perpetually for the ſame *Ideas*; and the ſame *Ideas* having immutably the ſame Habitudes one to another; Propoſitions concerning any *abſtract Ideas* that are once true, muſt needs be *eternal Verities*.

CHAP. XII.

Of the Improvement of our Knowledge.

IT being the received Opinion amongſt Men of Letters, that *Maxims are the Foundation of all Knowledge*, and that Sciences are, each of them, built upon *Præcognita*, from whence the Underſtanding was to take its Riſe, and by which it was to conduct itſelf in its Inquiries in the Matter belonging to that *Science*, the beaten Road of the Schools has been to lay down, in the Beginning, more or more general Propoſitions, called *Principles*, as Foundations whereon to build the Knowledge that was to be had of that Subject.

That which gave Occaſion to this Way of Proceeding, was, I ſuppoſe, the good Succeſs it ſeemed to have in *Mathematicks*, which of all other Sciences, have the greateſt Certainty, Clearneſs, and Evidence in them. But if we conſider it, we ſhall find that the great *Advancement* and Certainty of *real Knowledge* Men arrived to in theſe *Sciences*, was not owing to the Influence of theſe Principles, but to the clear, diſtinct, and complete *Ideas* their Thoughts were employed about; and the Relation of *Equality* and *Exceſs*, ſo clear between ſome of them, that they had an *intuitive Knowledge*; and by that a Way to diſcover it in others; and this without the Help of thoſe *Maxims*. For I aſk, is it not poſſible for a Lad to know that his whole Body is bigger than his little Finger, but by Virtue of this Axiom, *The whole is bigger than the Part*; nor

be assured of it, till he has learned that *Maxim?* Let any one consider, from what has been elsewhere said, which is known first and cleareſt by most People, the *particular* Instance, or the *general* Rule; and which it is that gives Life and Birth to the other. These *general Rules* are but the comparing our more general and *abstract Ideas*, which Ideas are made by the Mind, and have Names given them, for the easier Dispatch in its Reasonings: But Knowledge began in the Mind, and was founded on *Particulars*, tho' afterwards perhaps no Notice be taken thereof: It being natural for the Mind, to lay up those general Notions, and make the proper Use of them, which is to disburden the Memory of the cumbersome Load of Particulars.

The Way to *improve in Knowledge*, is not to receive Principles, with an implicit Faith, and without Examination, which would be apt to mislead Men, instead of guiding them into truth; but to get and fix in our Minds *clear* and *complete* Ideas, as far as they are to be had, and annex to them *proper* and *constant* Names: And thus barely by considering our Ideas, and comparing them together, observing their Agreement or Disagreement, their Habitudes and Relations, we shall get more true and clear Knowledge by the Conduct of this one *Rule*, than by taking up *Principles*, and thereby putting our Minds into the Disposal of others.

We must therefore, if we will proceed as *Reason* advises, adapt our Methods of Inquiry to the Nature of the Ideas we examine, and the Truth we search after. *General* and *certain Truths*, are only founded in the Habitudes and Relations of *abstract* Ideas. Therefore a sagacious methodical Application of our Thoughts for the finding out these Relations, is the only Way to discover all that can, with Truth and Certainty, be put into general Propositions. By what Steps we are to proceed in these, is to be learned in the Schools of the *Mathematicians*, who

who, from very plain and eaſy Beginnings, by gentle Degrees, and a continued Chain of Reaſonings, proceed to the Diſcovery and Demonſtration of *Truths*, that appear at firſt Sight beyond human Capacity. This, I think, I may ſay, that if other Ideas, that are *real* as well as *nominal* Eſſences of their *Species*, were purſued in the Way familiar to *Mathematicians*, they would carry our Thoughts farther, and with greater Evidence and Clearneſs, than, poſſibly, we are apt to imagine. This gave me the Confidence to advance that Conjecture, which I ſuggeſt, *Chapter* the Third, viz. that *Morality is capable of Demonſtration*, as well as *Mathematicks*: For *moral* Ideas being real Eſſences, that have a diſcoverable Connexion and Agreement one with another, ſo far as we can find their Habitudes and Relations, ſo far we ſhall be poſſeſſed of *real* and *general* Truths.

In our Knowledge of *Subſtances*, we are to proceed after a quite different Method: The bare Contemplation of their *abſtract* Ideas (which are but *nominal* Eſſences) will carry us but a very little Way, in the Search of Truth and Certainty. Here Experience muſt teach us what Reaſon cannot; and it is by trying alone, that we can certainly know, what other Qualities co-exiſt with thoſe of our *complex* Idea; (for Inſtance) whether that *yellow*, *heavy*, *fuſible* Body I call *Gold*, be *malleable* or no: Which Experience (however it prove in that particular Body we examine) makes us not certain that it is ſo in all, or any other *yellow*, *heavy*, *fuſible* Bodies, but that which we have tried; becauſe it is no Conſequence, one Way or the other, from our *complex* Idea: The Neceſſity, or Inconſiſtence of *Malleability*, hath no viſible Connexion with the Combination of that *Colour*, *Weight*, and *Fuſibility* in any Body. What I have here ſaid of the *nominal* Eſſence of Gold, ſuppoſed to conſiſt of a Body of ſuch a determinate *Colour*, *Weight*, and *Fuſibility*, will hold true, if other Qualities be added to it. Our Reaſonings from thoſe Ideas, will carry us but a little Way in

the certain Diſcovery of the other *Properties*, in thoſe Maſſes of Matter wherein all thoſe are to be found. As far as our Experience reaches, we may have certain Knowledge, and no farther.

I deny not, but a Man, accuſtomed to rational and regular Experiments, ſhall be able to ſee farther into the Nature of Bodies, and their unknown Properties, than one that is a Stranger to them. But this is but *Judgment* and *Opinion*, not *Knowledge* and *Certainty*. This makes me ſuſpect that *natural Philoſophy* is not capable of being made a *Science:* From Experiments and hiſtorical Obſervations we may draw Advantages of Eaſe and Health, and thereby increaſe our Stock of Conveniencies for this Life: But beyond this, I fear our *Talents* reach not; nor are our Faculties, as I gueſs, able to advance.

From whence it is obvious to conclude, that ſince our Faculties are not fitted to penetrate the *real Eſſences* of Bodies, but yet plainly to diſcover to us the *Being* of a *God*, and the *Knowledge* of *ourſelves*; enough to give us a clear Diſcovery of our *Duty*, and great Concernment; it will become us, as rational Creatures, to employ our Faculties, about what they are moſt adapted to, and follow the Direction of Nature, where it ſeems to point us out the Way. For it is rational to conclude, that our proper Employment lies in thoſe Inquiries, and that Sort of Knowledge which is moſt ſuited to our natural Capacities, and carries in it our greateſt Intereſt, that is *the Condition of our eternal State:* And therefore it is, I think, that *Morality* is the proper Science and Buſineſs of *Mankind* in general (who are both concerned and fitted to ſearch out their *ſummum bonum*) as ſeveral *Arts* converſant about the ſeveral Parts of Nature, are the Lot and private Talent of particular Men, for the common Uſe of human Life, and their own particular Subſiſtence in this World.

The

The Ways to enlarge our Knowledge, as far as we are capable, ſeem to me to be *theſe two*: The *Firſt* is to get and ſettle in our Minds, as far as we can, clear, diſtinct, and conſtant Ideas of thoſe Things we would conſider and know. For it being evident that our Knowledge cannot exceed our Ideas, where they are either imperfect, confuſed, or obſcure, we cannot expect to have certain, perfect, or clear Knowledge. The *other* is the Art of finding out the intermediate Ideas, which may ſhow us the Agreement or Repugnancy of other Ideas, which cannot be immediately compared.

That theſe *two* (and not the relying on *Maxims*, and drawing Conſequences from ſome general Propoſitions) are the right Method of improving our Knowledge, in the Ideas of other *Modes*, beſides thoſe of Quantity, the Conſideration of *Mathematical* Knowledge will eaſily inform us. Where, *Firſt*, We ſhall find that he that has not clear and perfect Ideas of thoſe *Angles* or *Figures*, of which he deſires to know any Thing, is utterly, thereby, incapable of any Knowledge about them. Suppoſe a Man not to have an exact Idea of a *right Angle*, *Scalenum*, or *Trapezium*, and it is clear, that he will in vain ſeek any Demonſtration about them. And *farther* it is evident, that it was not the Influence of *Maxims* or *Principles*, that has led the Maſters of the *Sciences* into thoſe wonderful Diſcoveries they have made. Let a Man of good Parts know all the *Maxims* of *Mathematicks* ever ſo well, and contemplate their Extent and Conſequences as much as he pleaſes, he will by their Aſſiſtance, I ſuppoſe, ſcarce ever come to know, that the Square of the *Hypotenuſe, in a right angled Triangle, is equal to the Squares of the two other Sides.* This and other *mathematical* Truths have been diſcovered by the Thoughts, otherwiſe applied. The Mind has other Objects, other Views before it, far different from thoſe *Maxims* which Men well enough acquainted with

with thoſe received *Axioms*, but ignorant of their Method, who firſt made theſe Demonſtrations, can never ſufficiently admire. And who knows what Methods, to enlarge our Knowledge in other Parts of Science, may hereafter be invented, anſwering that of Algebra in Mathematicks, which ſo readily finds out Ideas of Quantities to meaſure others by, whoſe Equality or Proportion we could otherwiſe very hardly, or perhaps never come to know?

CHAP. XIII.

Some farther Conſiderations concerning Knowledge.

OUR *Knowledge*, as in other Things, ſo in this, has a great Conformity with our *Sight*, that it is neither wholly *neceſſary*, nor wholly *voluntary*. Men that have Senſes cannot chooſe but receive ſome Ideas by them; and if they have Memory, they cannot but retain ſome of them; and, if they have any diſtinguiſhing Faculty, cannot but perceive the Agreement or Diſagreement of ſome of them, one with another. As he that has Eyes, if he will open them by Day, cannot but ſee ſome Objects, and perceive a Difference in them; yet he may chooſe whether he will turn his Eyes towards an Object, curiouſly ſurvey it, and obſerve accurately all that is viſible in it. But what he does ſee, he cannot ſee otherwiſe than he does: It depends not on his *Will*, to ſee that *black*, which appears *yellow*, nor to perſuade himſelf, that what actually *ſcalds* him, feels *cold*. Juſt thus it is with our *Underſtanding*: All that is voluntary in our Knowledge is the employing or with-holding any of our Faculties from this or that Sort of *Objects*; and a more or leſs accurate Survey of them: But they being employed, our *Will* hath no Power to determine the Knowledge of the Mind, one Way or another. That is done only by the *Objects* themſelves, as far as they are

are clearly discovered. And therefore, as far as Mens Senses are conversant about external Objects, the Mind cannot but receive those Ideas which are presented by them, and be informed of the Existence of things without; and so far as Mens Thoughts converse with their own determined Ideas, they cannot but, in some Measure, observe the Agreement and Disagreement that is to be found amongst some of them, which is, so far, *Knowledge*: And if they have Names for those Ideas which they have thus considered, they must needs be assured of the Truth of those Propositions, which express that Agreement or Disagreement they perceive in them, and be undoubtedly convinced of those Truths. For what a Man sees, he cannot but see, and what he perceives, he cannot but know that he perceives.

Thus he that has got the Ideas of *Numbers*, and hath taken the Pains to compare *one*, *two* and *three* to *six*, cannot choose but know that they are equal. He that hath got the Idea of a Triangle, and found the Ways to measure its Angles, and their Magnitudes, is certain that its three Angles are equal to two right ones: And can as little doubt of that, as of this Truth, that *it is impossible for the same Thing to be, and not to be.*

He also that hath the Idea of an intelligent, but weak and frail *Being*, made by, and depending on another, who is *eternal*, *omnipotent*, perfectly *wise* and *good*, will as certainly know that *Man* is to honour, fear, and obey *God*, as that the Sun shines when he sees it. For if he hath but the Ideas of two such Beings in his Mind, and will turn his Thoughts that Way, and consider them, he will as certainly find, that the inferiour, finite, and dependent, is under an Obligation to obey the supreme and infinite, as he is certain to find, that *three*, *four*, and *seven* are less than *fifteen*, if he will consider and compute those Numbers; nor can he be surer in a clear Morning that the Sun is risen, if he will but open

open his Eyes and turn them that Way. But yet theſe Truths, be they ever ſo certain, ever ſo clear, he may be ignorant of either or both of them, who will not take the pains to employ his Faculties as he ſhould, to inform himſelf about them.

CHAP. XIV.

Of Judgment.

THE *underſtanding Faculties* being given to Man, not barely for Speculation, but alſo for the Conduct of his Life; a Man would be at a great Loſs if he had nothing to direct him but what has the Certainty of true Knowledge. For that being very ſhort and ſcanty, as we have ſeen, he would be often utterly in the dark, and, in moſt of the Actions of his Life, perfectly at a ſtand, had he nothing to guide him, in the Abſence of clear and certain Knowledge. He that will not *eat* till he has Demonſtration that it will nouriſh him; nor *ſtir* till he is infallibly aſſured of Succeſs in his Buſineſs, will have little elſe to do but *ſit ſtill and periſh*.

Therefore as God hath ſet ſome Things in broad *Day-light*; as he has given us ſome certain Knowledge, tho' limited to a few Things, in Compariſon, (probably as a Taſte of what *intellectual* Creatures are capable of, to excite in us a Deſire and Endeavour after a better State) ſo in the greateſt Part of Concernment, he has afforded us only the *Twilight*, as I may ſo ſay, of *Probability*, ſuitable to that State of *Mediocrity* and *Probationſhip*, he has been pleaſed to place us in here; wherein, to check our over-Confidence and Preſumption, we might, by every Day's Experience, be made ſenſible of our ſhort-ſightedneſs, and liableneſs to Errour; the Senſe whereof might be a conſtant Admonition to us, to ſpend the Days of this our Pilgrimage with Induſtry and Care, in the Search, and following of that Way which

which might lead us to a State of greater Perfection. It being highly rational to think, even where Revelation is ſilent in the Caſe, that as Men employ thoſe Talents GOD has given them here, they ſhall accordingly receive their Rewards at the Cloſe of the Day, when their Sun ſhall ſet, and Night ſhall put an End to their Labours.

The Faculty which *God* has given *Man* to enlighten him next to certain Knowledge is *Judgment*, whereby the Mind takes its Ideas to agree or diſagree; or, which is the ſame, any Propoſition to be true or falſe, without perceiving a Demonſtrative Evidence in the Proofs. The Mind exerciſes this Judgment, ſometimes out of *Neceſſity*, where demonſtrative Proofs, and certain Knowledge are not to be had; and ſometimes out of *Laxineſs*, Unſkilfulneſs, or Haſte, even where they are to be had. Men often ſtay not, warily, to examine the Agreement or Diſagreement of two Ideas, which they are deſirous or concerned to know; but either incapable of ſuch Attention as is requiſite in a long Train of Gradations, or impatient of Delay, lightly caſt their eyes on, or wholly paſs by the Proofs; and ſo, without making out the Demonſtration, determine of the Agreement or Diſagreement of two Ideas, as it were by a View of them as they are at a Diſtance, and take it to be the one or the other. as ſeems moſt likely to them upon ſuch a looſe Survey.

This Faculty of the Mind, when it is exerciſed immediately about Things, is called *Judgment*; when about Truths, delivered in Words, is moſt commonly called *Aſſent* or *Diſſent*: Which being the moſt uſual Way wherein the Mind has occaſion to employ this Faculty, I ſhall, under theſe Terms, treat of it as leaſt liable, in our Language, to Equivocation.

Thus the Mind has *two Faculties* converſant about Truth and Falſehood; *Firſt*, *Knowledge*, whereby

whereby it certainly perceives, and is undoubtedly ſatisfied of the Agreement or Diſagreement of any Ideas. *Secondly*, *Judgment*, which is the putting *Ideas* together, or ſeparating them from one another in the Mind, when their certain Agreement or Diſagreement, is not *perceived*, but preſumed to be ſo, before it certainly appears. And if it ſo unites or ſeparates them, as in reality Things are, it is *right Judgment*.

CHAP. XV.

Of Probability.

AS *Demonſtration* is the ſhowing the Agreement or Diſagreement of two Ideas by the Intervention of one or more Proofs, which have a conſtant, immutable, and viſible Connexion one with another; ſo *Probability* is nothing but the Appearance of the Agreement or Diſagreement of two Ideas, by the Intervention of Proofs, whoſe Connexion is not conſtant, and immutable; or is not perceived to be ſo; but is, or appears, for the moſt Part, to be ſo, and is enough to induce the Mind to judge the Propoſition to be *true* or *falſe*, rather than the contrary.

Of *Probability* there are Degrees from the Neighbourhood of *Certainty* and *Demonſtration*, quite down to *Improbability* and *Unlikelineſs*, even to the Confines of *Impoſſibility*: And alſo Degrees of *Aſſent* from certain Knowledge and, what is next it, *full Aſſurance* and *Confidence*, quite down to *Conjecture*, *Doubt*, *Diſtruſt*, and *Diſbelief*.

That Propoſition then is *probable*, for which there are Arguments or Proofs to make it paſs, or be received for *true*. The Entertainment the mind gives to this Sort of Propoſitions, is called *Belief*, *Aſſent* or *Opinion*, which is the admitting or receiving any Propoſition for true, upon Arguments or Proofs that are found to perſuade us to receive it as true, without

without certain Knowledge that it is ſo. And herein lies the Difference between *Probability* and *Certainty*, *Faith* and *Knowledge*, that in all the Parts of Knowledge, there is Intuition; each immediate Idea, each Step has its viſible and certain Connexion; in Belief not ſo. That which makes me believe, is ſomething extraneous to the Thing I believe; ſomething not evidently joined in both Sides to, and ſo not manifeſtly ſhowing the Agreement or Diſagreement of thoſe Ideas that are under Conſideration.

Probability then, being to ſupply the Defect of our Knowledge, is always converſant about Propoſitions, whereof we have no *Certainty*, but only ſome *Inducements* to receive them for true. The *Grounds* of it are *theſe two* following.

Firſt, The *Conformity* of any Thing with our own Knowledge, Experience, or Obſervation.

Secondly, The *Teſtimony* of others, vouching their Obſervations and Experience; in the *Teſtimony* of others, is to be conſidered; *Firſt*; the Number; *Secondly*, the Integrity; *Thirdly*, the Skill of the Witneſſes; *Fourthly*, the Deſign of the Author, if it be a Teſtimony cited out of a Book; *Fifthly*, the Conſiſtency of the Parts and Circumſtances of the Relation; *Sixthly*. contrary Teſtimonies.

Probability wanting that intuitive Evidence which infallibly determines the Underſtanding, and produces certain Knowledge, the Mind, if it would proceed rationally, ought to examine all the Grounds of *Probability*, and ſee how they make more or leſs, for or againſt any Propoſition, before it aſſents to, or diſſents from it, and upon a due balancing the Whole, reject or receive it, with a more or leſs firm Aſſent, proportionably to the Preponderancy of the greater Grounds of Probability on one Side or the other. For Example:

If I myſelf ſee a Man walk on the Ice, it is paſt *Probability*, it is *Knowledge*: But if another tells me he ſaw a Man in *England*, in the midſt of a ſharp Winter, walk upon Water hardened with Cold; this has ſo great Conformity with what is uſually obſerved to happen, that I am diſpoſed, by the Nature of the Thing itſelf, to aſſent to it, unleſs ſome manifeſt Suſpicion attend the Relation of that Matter of Fact. But if the ſame Thing be told to one born between the Tropicks, who never ſaw nor heard of any ſuch Thing before, there the whole Probability relies on Teſtimony: And as the Relaters are more in Number, and of more Credit, and have no Intereſt to ſpeak contrary to the Truth, ſo that Matter of Fact is like to find more or leſs Belief.

Upon theſe Grounds depends the *Probability* of any Propoſition: And as the Conformity of our Knowledge, as the Certainty of Obſervations, as the Frequency and Conſtancy of Experience, and the Number and Credibility of Teſtimonies, do more or leſs agree or diſagree with it, ſo is any Propoſition in itſelf, more or leſs probable. There is another, I confeſs, which though, by itſelf, it be no true Ground of *Probability*, yet is often made uſe of for one, by which Men moſt commonly regulate their Aſſent, and upon which they pin their Faith more than any Thing elſe, and that is *the Opinions of others*: Though there cannot be a more dangerous Thing to rely on, nor more likely to miſlead one, ſince there is much more Falſehood and Errour among Men, than Truth and Knowledge. And if the Opinions and Perſuaſions of others, whom we know and think well of, be a Ground of Aſſent Men have Reaſon to be Heathens in *Japan*, Mahometans in *Turkey*, Papiſts in *Spain*, Proteſtants in *England*, and Lutherans in *Sweden*. But of this wrong Ground of Aſſent, I ſhall have Occaſion to ſpeak more at large in another Place.

CHAP.

CHAP. XVI.

Of the Degrees of Aſſent.

THE *Grounds* of *Probability* laid down in the foregoing *Chapter*, as they are the Foundations on which our *Aſſent* is built, ſo are they alſo the Meaſure whereby its ſeveral *Degrees* are (or ought to be) regulated. Only we are to take Notice, that no Grounds of Probability operate any farther on the Mind, which ſearches after Truth, and endeavours to judge right, than they appear, at leaſt, in the firſt Judgment, or Search that the Mind makes. It is indeed in many Caſes impoſſible, and in moſt very hard, even for thoſe who have admirable Memories, to retain all the Proofs, which, upon a due Examination, made them embrace that Side of the Queſtion. It ſuffices that they have once, with Care and Fairneſs, ſifted the Matter as far as they could; and having once found on which Side the *Probability* appeared to them, they lay up the Concluſion in their Memories, as a *Truth* they have diſcovered; and, for the future, remain ſatisfied with the Teſtimony of their Memories, that this is the Opinion, that, by the Proofs they have once ſeen of it, deſerves ſuch a *Degree* of their *Aſſent* as they afford it.

This is all that the greateſt Part of Men are capable of doing, in regulating their Opinions and Judgments, ſo that it is unavoidable but that the Memory muſt be depended on in this Caſe, and that Men be perſuaded of ſeveral *Opinions*, whereof the Proofs are not actually in their Thoughts, nay, which, perhaps, they are not able actually to recall, from the great Number of intermediate Ideas, that were neceſſary in the Deduction. Without this the greateſt Part of Men, muſt be either *Scepticks*, or change every Moment, when any one offers them Arguments, which, for want of Memory, they are not preſently able to anſwer.

It muſt be owned that Mens relying too much on their paſt Determinations, is often the Cauſe of great *Obſtinacy* in Errour and Miſtake. But the Fault is not, that they rely on their Memories for what they have before well conſidered, but becauſe they made their Concluſions before they had been well examined. May we not find a great Number (not to ſay the greateſt Part) of Men, that think they have formed right Judgments of ſeveral Matters, and that for no other Reaſon, but becauſe they never thought otherwiſe? That imagine themſelves to have judged right, only becauſe they never queſtioned, never examined, their own Opinions? Which is indeed to think they judged right, becauſe they never judged at all: And yet theſe, of all Men, hold their Opinions with the greateſt Stiffneſs; thoſe being generally the moſt fierce and firm in their Tenets, who have leaſt examined them. What we once know, we are certain is ſo; and we may be ſecure that there are no latent Proofs undiſcovered, which may overturn our Knowledge, or bring it in Doubt. But in Matters of Probability, it is not in every Caſe we can be ſure that we have all the Particulars before us, that any Way concern the Queſtion; and that there is no Evidence behind, and yet unſeen, which may caſt the Probability on the other Side, and out-weigh all that, at preſent, ſeems to preponderate with us. Who, almoſt, is there that hath the Leiſure, Patience, and Means to collect together, all the Proofs concerning moſt of the Opinions he has, ſo as, ſafely, to conclude that he has a clear and full View, and that there is no more to be offered for his further Information? And yet we are forced to determine ourſelves on one Side or other: The Conduct of our Lives, and the Management of our great Concerns, will not bear Delay. For thoſe depend, for the moſt Part, on the Determination of our Judgment in Points wherein we are not capable of certain Knowledge, and wherein it is neceſſary for us to embrace one Side or the other.

Since

Since therefore, it is unavoidable to the greateſt Part of Men, if not all, to have ſeveral Opinions, without certain and indubitable Proofs of their Truths; and it carries too great an Imputation of Ignorance, Lightneſs, or Folly, for Men to quit and renounce their former Tenets, preſently, upon the Offer of an Argument which they cannot immediately anſwer, and ſhow the Inſufficiency of; it would methinks become all Men to maintain Peace, and the common Offices of Humanity and Friendſhip, in the Diverſity of Opinions, ſince we cannot reaſonably expect, that any one ſhould readily, and obſequiouſly, quit his own Opinion, and embrace ours, with a blind Reſignation to an Authority which the Underſtanding of Man acknowledges not. For however it may often miſtake, it can own no other Guide but Reaſon, nor blindly ſubmit to the Will and Dictates of another. Thoſe who have fairly and truly examined, and are thereby got paſt Doubt in all the Doctrines they profeſs, and govern themſelves by, would have a juſter Pretence to require others to follow them: But theſe are ſo few in Number, and find ſo little Reaſon to be magiſterial in their Opinions, that nothing inſolent and imperious is to be expected from them: And there is Reaſon to think, that if Men were better inſtructed themſelves, they would be leſs impoſing on others.

But to return to the Grounds of Aſſent, and the ſeveral Degrees of it, we are to take Notice, that the Propoſitions we receive upon Inducements of *Probability*, are of *two Sorts*: *Firſt*, concerning ſome particular Exiſtence, or Matter of *Fact*, which falling under our Obſervation, is capable of *human Teſtimony*. *Secondly*, concerning Things, which, being beyond the Diſcovery of our *Senſes*, are not capable of human Teſtimony.

Concerning the firſt of theſe, *viz.* *Particular Matter of Facts*.

Firſt, Where any particular Thing conſonant to the conſtant Obſervation of ourſelves, and others in the like Caſe, comes atteſted with the concurrent Reports of all that mention it, we receive it as eaſily, and build as firmly upon it, as if it were certain Knowledge: And we reaſon, and act thereupon, with as little Doubt, as if it were perfect *Demonſtration*. Thus, if all *Engliſhmen*, who have occaſion to mention it, ſhould report, that it *froze* in *England* laſt Winter, or the like, I think a Man would as little doubt of it, as that *ſeven and four are eleven*.

The *Firſt*, and *higheſt* Degree of *Probability*, then is, when the general Conſent of all Men, in all Ages, as far as can be known, concurs with a Man's own conſtant Experience in the like Caſes, to confirm the Truth of any particular Matter of Fact, atteſted by fair Witneſſes: Such are the ſtated *Conſtitutions*, and *Properties* of Bodies, and the regular Proceedings of *Cauſes* and *Effects* in the ordinary Courſe of *Nature*; this we call an *Argument* from the Nature of Things themſelves. For what we, and others, always obſerve to be after the ſame Manner, we conclude, with Reaſon, to be the Effects of ſteady and regular *Cauſes*, though they come not within the Reach of our Knowledge. As that Fire warmed a Man, or made *Lead fluid*; that *Iron* ſunk in Water, ſwam in Quick-ſilver. A Relation affirming any ſuch Thing to have been, or a Predication that it will happen again in the ſame Manner, is very true. Theſe Probabilities riſe ſo near to Certainty, that they govern our Thoughts as abſolutely, and influence all our Actions as fully, as the moſt evident Demonſtration; and in what concerns us, we make little or no Difference between them, and certain Knowledge. Our *Belief* thus grounded, riſes to *Aſſurance*.

Secondly, The next Degree of *Probability* is, when by my own Experience, and the Agreement of all others to mention it, a *Thing* is found to be, for the moſt Part, ſo; and that the particular Inſtance of it

is

is atteſted by many and undoubted *Witneſſes*. Thus *Hiſtory* giving us ſuch an Account of Men in all Ages, and my own Experience confirming it, that moſt Men prefer their own private Advantage to the Publick, if all Hiſtorians that writ of *Tiberius*, ſay that he did ſo, it is extremely probable: And, in this Caſe, our *Aſſent* riſes to a Degree which we may call *Confidence*.

Thirdly, In Matters happening indifferently, as that a *Bird* ſhould fly this or that Way: When any particular Matter of Fact comes atteſted by the concurrent Teſtimony of unſuſpected *Witneſſes*, there our *Aſſent* is alſo unavoidable. Thus that there is in *Italy* ſuch a City as *Rome*; that about one thouſand and ſeven Years ago, there lived ſuch a Man in it as *Julius Cæſar*, &c. A Man can as little doubt of this, and the like, as he does of the Being, and Actions of his own Acquaintance, whereof he himſelf is a Witneſs.

Probability, on theſe Grounds, carries ſo much Evidence with it, that it leaves us as little Liberty to believe or diſbelieve, as Demonſtration does, whether we will know or be ignorant. But the Difficulty is, when Teſtimonies contradict common Experience, and the Reports of Witneſſes claſh with the ordinary Courſe of Nature, or with one another. Here Diligence, Attention, and Exactneſs are required to form a *right Judgment*, and to proportion the *Aſſent* to the Evidence and *Probability* of the Thing, which riſes and falls, according as the two foundations of Credibility favour, or contradict it. Theſe are liable to ſuch Variety of contrary Obſervations, Circumſtances, Reports, Tempers, Deſigns, Overſights, &c. of Reporters, that it is impoſſible to reduce to preciſe Rules, the various Degrees wherein Men give their *Aſſent*. This in general may be ſaid, That as the *Proofs*, upon due Examination, ſhall, to any one, appear, in a greater or leſs Degree, to preponderate on either Side, ſo they are fitted to produce in the Mind ſuch different Entertainments,

tertainments, as are called *Belief*, *Conjecture*, *Gueſs*, *Doubt*, *Wavering*, *Diſtruſt*, *Diſbelief*, &c.

It is a *Rule*, generally approved, that any Teſtimony, the farther off it is removed from the Original Truth, the leſs Force it has: And in *traditional* Truths, each Remove weakens the Force of the *Proof*. There is a *Rule* quite contrary to this, advanced by ſome Men, who look on *Opinions* to gain Force by growing *older*. Upon this Ground, Propoſitions evidently falſe, or doubtful in their firſt Beginning, come, by an inverted *Rule* of *Probability*, to paſs for *authentick* Truths; and thoſe which deſerved little Credit from the Mouths of their firſt Relaters, are thought to grow *venerable* by Age, and are urged as undeniable.

I would not be thought, by this Remark, to leſſen the Credit and Uſe of Hiſtory: It is all the Light we have in many Caſes; and we receive from it a great Part of the uſeful Truths we have, with a convincing Evidence. I think nothing more valuable than the Records of Antiquity: I wiſh we had more of them, and more uncorrupted. But certain it is, that no *Probability can riſe above its firſt Original*. What has no other Evidence than the ſingle Teſtimony of *one Witneſs*, muſt ſtand or fall by his *only* Teſtimony, tho' afterwards cited by Hundreds of others; and is ſo far from receiving any Strength thereby, that it becomes the weaker. Becauſe Paſſion, Intereſt, Inadvertency, Miſtake of his Meaning, and a thouſand odd Reaſons, which capricious Mens Minds are acted by, may make one Man quote another's Words or Meaning wrong. This is certain, that what, in one Age, was affirmed upon ſlight Grounds, can never after come to be more valid in future Ages by being often repeated. But the farther ſtill it is from the Original, the leſs valid it is, and has always leſs Force in the Mouth or Writing of him that laſt made Uſe of it, than in his from whom he received of it.

The

The Probabilities we have hitherto mentioned, are only ſuch as concern Matter of Fact, and ſuch Things as are capable of Obſervation and Teſtimony. There remains that other Sort, concerning which Men entertain Opinions with Variety of Aſſent, though the Things be ſuch, that, falling not under the Reach of our Senſes, they are not capable of Teſtimony. Such are,

Firſt, The Exiſtence, Nature, and Operations of *finite*, *immaterial* Beings without us, as *Spirits*, *Angels*, &c. or the Exiſtence of *material* Beings, ſuch as, for their Smallneſs or Remoteneſs, our *Senſes* cannot take Notice of: As whether there be any *Plants*, *Animals*, &c. in the *Planets*, and other Manſions of the vaſt Univerſe.

Secondly, Concerning the Manner of Operations in moſt Parts of the Works of *Nature*; wherein tho' we ſee the ſenſible *Effects*, yet their Cauſes are unknown, and we perceive not the Ways, and Manner how they are produced. We ſee *Animals* are generated, nouriſhed, and move; the *Loadſtone* draws *Iron*, &c. but the Cauſes that operate, and the Manner they are produced in, we can only gueſs, and probably conjecture. In theſe Matters, *Analogy* is the only Help we have; and it is from that alone we draw all our Grounds of *Probability*. Thus obſerving, that the bare rubbing of two Bodies violently upon one another, produces *Heat* and very often *Fire*; we have reaſon to think that what we call *Heat* and *Fire*, conſiſts in a certain violent Agitation of the imperceptible minute Parts of the burning Matter. The Difference is exceeding great between ſome Men, and ſome Animals; but if we will compare the Underſtanding and Abilities of ſome Men, and ſome Brutes, we ſhall find ſo little Difference, that it will be hard to ſay, that that of the Man is either clearer or larger. Obſerving, I ſay, ſuch gradual and gentle Deſcents downwards in thoſe Parts of the Creation that are beneath Man, the Rule

Rule of Analogy may make it probable, that it is ſo alſo in Things above us and our Obſervation; and that there are ſeveral Ranks of intelligent Beings, excelling us in ſeveral Degrees of Perfection, aſcending upwards towards the infinite Perfection of the Creator, by gentle Steps and Differences, that are every one at no great Diſtance from the next to it. This Sort of *Probability*, which is the beſt Conduct of rational Experiments, and the Riſe of Hypotheſis, has alſo its Uſe and Influence; and a wary Reaſoning from *Analogy*, leads us often into the Diſcovery of *Truths*, and uſeful *Productions*, which would otherwiſe lie concealed.

Tho' the common Experience, and the ordinary Courſe of Things, have a mighty Influence on the Minds of Men, to make them give or refuſe Credit to any Thing propoſed to their Belief; yet there is one Caſe wherein the Strangeneſs of the Fact leſſens not the *Aſſent* to a fair Teſtimony given of it. For where ſuch ſupernatural *Events* are ſuitable to Ends aimed at by him, who has the Power to change the Courſe of Nature; there, under ſuch Circumſtances, they may be the fitter to procure Belief, by how much the more they are beyond, or contrary to, ordinary Obſervation. This is the proper Caſe of *Miracles*, which, well atteſted, do not only find Credit themſelves, but give it alſo to other *Truths*, which need ſuch Confirmation.

There are Propoſitions that challenge the higheſt Degree of our *Aſſent*, upon bare Teſtimony, whether the Thing propoſed agree or diſagree with common Experience, and the ordinary Courſe of Things or no: The Reaſon whereof is, becauſe the Teſtimony is of ſuch *an one* as cannot deceive or be deceived; and that is *God* himſelf. This carries with it Certainty beyond Doubt, Evidence beyond Exception. This is called by a peculiar Name, *Revelation*, and our *Aſſent* to it, *Faith*; which has as much Certainty in it, as our Knowledge itſelf; and we may as well doubt of our own *Being*, as we

we can, whether any *Revelation* from *God* be *true*. So that *Faith* is a ſettled and ſure Principle of *Aſſent* and *Aſſurance*, and leaves no Manner of Room for Doubt or Heſitation; only we muſt be ſure, that it be a divine *Revelation*, and that we underſtand it right; elſe we ſhall expoſe ourſelves to all the Extravagancy of *Enthuſiaſm*, and all the Errour of wrong Principles if we have *Faith* and *Aſſurance*, in what is not *divine Revelation*. And therefore, in thoſe Caſes, our Aſſent can be rationally no higher than the Evidence of its being a Revelation, and that this is the Meaning of the Expreſſions it is delivered in. If the Evidence of its being a Revelation, or that this is its true Senſe, be only on probable Proofs, our Aſſent can reach no higher than an Aſſurance or Diffidence, ariſing from the more, or leſs, apparent Probability of the Proofs.

CHAP. XVII.

Of Reaſon.

THE Word *Reaſon*, in the *Engliſh* Language, has different Significations. Sometimes it is taken for *true* and *clear Principles*; ſometimes for *clear* and *fair Deductions* from thoſe Principles: Sometimes for the *Cauſe*, and particularly for the *final Cauſe*; but the Conſideration I ſhall have of it here is, as it ſtands for a *Faculty*, whereby *Man* is ſuppoſed to be diſtinguiſhed from *Beaſts*; and wherein it is evident he much ſurpaſſes them.

If general Knowledge, as has been ſhown, conſiſts in a Perception of the Agreement or Diſagreement of our own Ideas, and the Knowledge of the Exiſtence of all Things without us, (except only of a GOD, whoſe Exiſtence every Man may certainly know and demonſtrate to himſelf from his own Exiſtence) be had only by our Senſes: What Room then is there for the Exerciſe of any other Faculty, but

but outward Senſe, and inward Perception? What need is there of Reaſon? Very much; both for the Enlargement of our Knowledge, and regulating our Aſſent: For it hath to do both in Knowledge and Opinion, and is neceſſary and aſſiſting to all our other intellectual Faculties; and, indeed, contains *two* of them, *viz. Firſt*, *Sagacity*, whereby it finds intermediate *Ideas*. *Secondly*, *Illation*, whereby it ſo orders and diſpoſes of them, as to diſcover what Connexion there is in each Link of the Chain, whereby the Extremes are held together, and thereby, as it were, to draw into View the Truth ſought for; which is what we call *Illation* or *Inference*: And conſiſts in nothing but the Perception of the Connexion there is between the Ideas, in each Step of the Deduction, whereby the Mind comes to ſee, either the certain Agreement or Diſagreement of any two Ideas, as in *Demonſtration*, in which it arrives at Knowledge: Or their probable Connexion, on which it gives or withholds its *Aſſent*, as in *Opinion*.

Senſe and *Intuition* reach but a little Way: The greateſt Part of our Knowledge depends upon Deductions and intermediate Ideas. In thoſe Caſes where we muſt take Propoſitions for true, without being certain of their being ſo, we have need to find out, examine, and compare the Grounds of their *Probability*: In both Caſes, the Faculty which finds out the Means, and rightly applies them to diſcover Certainty in the one, and Probability in the other, is that which we call *Reaſon*. For as Reaſon perceives the neceſſary and indubitable Connexion of all the Ideas or Proofs one to another, in each Step of any Demonſtration that produces Knowledge: So it likewiſe perceives the probable Connexion of all the Ideas or Proofs one to another, in every Step of a Diſcourſe to which it will think Aſſent due. This is the loweſt Degree of that which can be truly called *Reaſon*. For where the Mind does not perceive this probable Connexion; where it does not diſcern whether there be any ſuch Connexion or no, there

there Men's Opinions are not the Product of Judgment, or the Conſequence of Reaſon, but the Effects of Chance, and Hazard of a Mind floating at all Adventures, without Choice, and without Direction.

So that in Reaſon we may conſider theſe *four* Degrees; *Firſt*, The diſcovering and finding out of Proofs. *Secondly*, The regular and methodical Diſpoſition of them, and laying them in ſuch Order as their Connexion may be plainly perceived. *Thirdly*, The perceiving their Connexion. *Fourthly*, The making a right Concluſion. Theſe ſeveral Degrees may be obſerved in any Mathematical Demonſtration: It being one Thing to perceive the Connexion of each Part, as the Demonſtration is made by another; another to perceive the Dependence of the Concluſion on all the Parts; a third to make out a Demonſtration clearly and properly one's ſelf; and ſomething different from all theſe, to have firſt found out thoſe intermediate Ideas or Proofs by which it is made.

There is one Thing more which I ſhall deſire to be conſidered concerning *Reaſon*, and that is, whether *Syllogiſm*, as is generally thought, be the proper Inſtrument of it; and the moſt uſeful Way of exerciſing this Faculty. The Cauſes I have to doubt of it, are theſe,

Firſt, Becauſe *Syllogiſm* ſerves our *Reaſon* but in one only of the forementioned Parts of it, and that is to ſhow the Connexion of the Proofs of any one Inſtance, and no more: But in this it is of no great Uſe, ſince the Mind can perceive ſuch Connexion, where it really is, as eaſy, nay, perhaps, better without it. We may obſerve that there are many Men that reaſon exceeding clear and rightly, who know not how to make a *Syllogiſm*: And I believe ſcarce any one makes *Syllogiſms* in reaſoning within himſelf. Indeed, ſometimes they may ſerve to diſ-

cover a Fallacy, hid in a *Rhetorical* Flouriſh; or by ſtripping an Abſurdity off the Cover of Wit and good Language, ſhow it in its naked Deformity. But the Weakneſs or Fallacy of ſuch a looſe Diſcourſe, it ſhows, by the artificial Form it is put into, only to thoſe who have thoroughly ſtudied *Mode* and *Figure*, and have ſo examined the many Ways, that three Propoſitions may be put together, as to know which of them does certainly conclude right, and which not, and upon what Grounds it is that they do ſo. All who have ſo far conſidered *Syllogiſm*, as to ſee the Reaſon why, in three Propoſitions laid together in one Form the Concluſion will be certainly right, but in another, not certainly ſo, I grant are certain of the Concluſions they draw from the Premiſes in the allowed Modes and Figures. But they who have not ſo far looked into thoſe Forms, are not ſure, by Virtue of *Syllogiſm*, that the Concluſion certainly follows from the Premiſes; they only take it to be ſo by an implicit Faith in their Teachers, and a Confidence in thoſe Forms of Augmentation; but this is ſtill but believing, not being certain. The Mind is not taught to reaſon by theſe *Rules*; it has a native Faculty to perceive the Coherence or Incoherence of its Ideas, and can range them right, without any ſuch perplexing *Repititions*.

And to ſhow the Weakneſs of an Argument, there needs no more but to ſtrip it of the ſuperfluous Ideas, which blended and confounded with thoſe on which the Inference depends, ſeem to ſhow a Connexion where there is none, or at leaſt do hinder the Diſcovery of the Want of it, and then to lay the naked Ideas, on which the Force of the Augmentation depends, in their due Order; in which Poſition the Mind taking a View of them, ſees what Connexion they have, and ſo is able to judge of the Inference without any Need of Syllogiſm at all.

Secondly,

Secondly, Becauſe Syllogiſms are not leſs liable to Fallacies than the plainer Ways of Argumentation: And for this I appeal to common Obſervation, which has always found theſe artificial Methods of Reaſoning more adapted to catch and entangle the Mind, than to inſtruct and inform the Underſtanding. And if it be certain that Fallacy can be couched in Syllogiſms, as it cannot be denied, it muſt be ſomething elſe, and not Syllogiſm that muſt diſcover them. But if Men ſkilled in and uſed to Syllogiſms, find them aſſiſting to their Reaſon in the Diſcovery of Truth, I think they ought to make uſe of them. All that I aim at is, that they ſhould not aſcribe more to theſe Forms than belongs to them; and think that Men have no Uſe, or not ſo full a Uſe, of their reaſoning Faculty without them.

But however it be in Knowledge, I think it is of far leſs, or no Uſe at all in *Probabilities*: For the *Aſſent* there being to be determined by the Preponderancy, after a due weighing of all the Proofs on both Sides, nothing is ſo unfit to aſſiſt the Mind in that, as *Syllogiſm*; which running away with one aſſumed *Probability*, purſues that till it has led the Mind quite out of Sight of the Thing under Conſideration.

But let it help us (as perhaps may be ſaid) *in convincing Men of their Errour or Miſtakes*; yet ſtill it fails our Reaſon in that Part, which if not its higheſt Perfection, is yet certainly its hardeſt Taſk; and that which we moſt need its help in, and that is, *The finding out of Proofs, and making new Diſcoveries*. The Rules of Syllogiſm ſerve not to furniſh the Mind with thoſe intermediate Ideas that may ſhow the Connexion of remote ones. This Way of Reaſoning diſcovers no new Proofs, but is the Art of marſhalling and ranging the old ones we have already. The forty-ſeventh Propoſition of the firſt Book of Euclid, is very true; but the Diſcovery of it, I think, not owing to any Rules of common Logick. A Man knows firſt, and then he is able to

prove *ſyllogiſtically*; ſo that *Syllogiſm* comes after Knowledge; and then a Man has little or no Need of it. But it is chiefly by the finding out thoſe Ideas that ſhow the Connexion of diſtant ones, that our Stock of Knowledge is increaſed, and that uſeful Arts and Sciences are advanced.

Reaſon, though it penetrates into the Depths of the Sea and Earth, elevates our Thoughts as high as the Stars, and leads us through the vaſt Spaces, and large Rooms of this mighty Fabrick, yet it comes far ſhort of the real Extent of even corporeal Being; and there are many Inſtances wherein it fails us: As,

Firſt, It perfectly fails us where our Ideas fail. It neither does, nor can extend itſelf farther than they do. And therefore whereever we have no Ideas, our Reaſoning ſtops, and we are at an End of our Reckoning: And if at any Time we reaſon about Words, which do not ſtand for any Ideas, it is only about thoſe Sounds, and nothing elſe.

Secondly, It is often at a Loſs, becauſe of the Obſcurity, Confuſion, or Imperfection of the Ideas it is employed about. Thus having no perfect Idea of the leaſt Extenſion of *Matter*, nor of *Infinity*, we are at a Loſs about the Diviſibility of *Matter*; but having perfect, clear, and diſtinct Ideas of Number, our Reaſon meets with none of thoſe inextricable Difficulties in Numbers, nor finds itſelf involved in any Contradictions about them.

Thirdly, Our *Reaſon* is often at a Stand, becauſe it perceives not thoſe Ideas which would ſerve to ſhow the certain or probable Agreement or Diſagreement of any other two Ideas: And in this ſome Mens Faculties far out-go others. Till Algebra, that great Inſtrument and Inſtance of human Sagacity, was diſcovered, Men, with Amazement, looked on ſeveral of the Demonſtrations of ancient Mathematicians, and could ſcarce forbear to think the finding

finding ſeveral of theſe Proofs to be ſomething more than human.

Fourthly, Our *Reaſon* is often engaged in Abſurdities and Difficulties, by proceeding upon falſe Principles, which being followed, lead Men into Contradictions to themſelves, and Inconſiſtency in their own Thoughts.

Fifthly, As obſcure and imperfect Ideas often involve our Reaſon, ſo, upon the ſame Ground, do dubious Words, and uncertain Signs, often in Diſcourſes and Arguing, when not cautiouſly attended to, puzzle Mens *Reaſon*, and bring them to a Nonplus: But theſe two latter are our Fault, and not the Fault of Reaſon. But yet the Conſequences of them are nevertheleſs obvious; and the Perplexities of Errours they fill Mens Minds with, are every where obſervable.

Some of the Ideas that are in the Mind, are ſo there, that they can be, by themſelves, immediately compared one with another: And in theſe the Mind is able to perceive, that they agree, or diſagree, as clearly as that it has them. Thus the Mind perceives, that an Arch of a Circle is leſs than the whole Circle, as clearly as it does the Idea of a Circle: And this therefore, as has been ſaid, I call *intuitive Knowledge*, which is certain, beyond all Doubt, and needs no Probation, nor can have any; this being the higheſt of all human Certainty. In this conſiſts the Evidence of all thoſe Maxims which no Body has any Doubt about, but every Man (does not, as is ſaid, only aſſent to, but) knows to be true, as ſoon as ever they are propoſed to his Underſtanding. In the Diſcovery of, and Aſſent to, theſe Truths, there is no Uſe of the diſcurſive Faculty, no Need of Reaſoning, but they are known by a ſuperiour, and higher Degree of Evidence. And ſuch, if I may gueſs at Things unknown, I am apt to think, that Angels have now, and the Spirits of juſt Men made perfect, ſhall have in a future State, of Thouſands

of Things, which now either wholly eſcape our Apprehenſion, or which, our ſhort-ſighted Reaſon having got ſome faint Glimpſe of, we, in the dark, grope after.

But though we have here and there a little of this clear Light, ſome Sparks of bright Knowledge; yet the greateſt Part of our Ideas are ſuch, that we cannot diſcern their Agreement or Diſagreement, by an immediate comparing them. And in all theſe we have Need of Reaſoning, and muſt, by Diſcourſe and Inference, make our Diſcoveries. Now, of theſe there are two Sorts, which I ſhall take the Liberty to mention here again:

Firſt, Thoſe whoſe Agreement or Diſagreement, though it cannot be ſeen by an immediate putting them together, yet may be examined by the Intervention of other Ideas, which can be compared with them. In this Caſe, when the Agreement or Diſagreement of the intermediate Idea, on both Sides with thoſe which we would compare, is plainly diſcerned, there it amounts to Demonſtration, whereby Knowledge is produced, which though it be certain, yet it is not ſo eaſy, nor altogether ſo clear, as intuitive Knowledge; becauſe in that, there is barely one ſimple Intuition, wherein there is no Room for any the leaſt Miſtake or Doubt; the Truth is ſeen all perfectly at once. In Demonſtration, it is true, there is Intuition too, but not altogether at once; for there muſt be a Remembrance of the Intuition of the Agreement of the Medium, or intermediate Idea, with that we compared it with before, when we compare it with the other; and where there are many Mediums, there the Danger of the Miſtake is the greater. For each Agreement or Diſagreement of the Ideas muſt be obſerved and ſeen in each Step of the whole Train, and retained in the Memory, juſt as it is, and the Mind muſt be ſure that no Part of what is neceſſary to make up the Demonſtration, is omitted or overlooked. This makes ſome Demonſtrations long

long and perplexed, and too hard for thoſe who have not Strength of Parts diſtinctly to perceive, and exactly carry ſo many Particulars orderly in their Heads. And even thoſe, who are able to maſter ſuch intricate Speculations, are fain ſometimes to go over them again, and there is Need of more than one Review before they can arrive at Certainty. But yet where the Mind clearly retains the Intuition it had of the Agreement of any Idea with another, and that with a third, and that with a fourth, *&c.* there the Agreement of the firſt and fourth is a Demonſtration, and produces certain Knowledge, which may be called *rational Knowledge*, as the other is *intuitive*.

Secondly, There are other Ideas, whoſe Agreement or Diſagreement can no otherwiſe be judged of, but by the Intervention of others, which have not a certain Agreement with the Extremes, but an uſual or likely one: And in theſe it is, that the Judgment is properly exerciſed, which is the acquieſcing of the Mind, that any Ideas do agree, by comparing them with ſuch probable Mediums. This, though it never amounts to Knowledge, no, not to that which is the loweſt Degree of it; yet ſometimes the intermediate Ideas tie the Extremes ſo firmly together, and the Probability is ſo clear and ſtrong, that Aſſent as neceſſarily follows it, as Knowledge does Demonſtration. The great Excellency and Uſe of the Judgment is to obſerve right, and take a true Eſtimate of the Force and Weight of each Probability; and then caſting them up all right together, chooſe that Side which has the over-balance.

Intuitive Knowledge is the Perception of the certain Agreement or Diſagreement of two Ideas, immediately compared together.

Rational Knowledge is the Perception of the certain Agreement or Diſagreement of any two Ideas, by the Intervention of one or more other Ideas.

Judgment

Judgment is the thinking or taking two Ideas to agree or diſagree by the Intervention of one or more Ideas, whoſe certain Agreement or Diſagreement with them it does not perceive, but hath obſerved to be frequent and uſual.

Tho' the deducing one Propoſition from another be a great Part of *Reaſon*, and that which it is uſually employed about; yet the principal Act of Ratiocination is the finding the Agreement or Diſagreement of two Ideas one with another, by the Intervention of a third. As a Man, by a Yard, finds two Houſes to be of the ſame Length, which could not be brought together to meaſure their Equality by *Juxta-poſition*. Words have their Conſequences as the Signs of ſuch Ideas; and Things agree, or diſagree, as really they are; but we obſerve it only by our Ideas.

In Reaſoning, Men ordinarily uſe *Four Sorts* of *Arguments*.

The *Firſt*, is to allege the Opinions of Men, whoſe Parts, Learning, Eminency, Power, or ſome other Cauſe, has gained a Name, and ſettled their Reputation in the common Eſteem with ſome Kind of Authority. This may be called *Argumentum ad Verecundiam*.

Secondly, Another Way that Men ordinarily uſe to drive others, and force them to ſubmit their Judgments, and receive the Opinion in Debate, is to require the Adverſary to admit what they allege as a Proof, or to aſſign a better. This I call *Argumentum ad Ignorantiam*.

A *third* Way, is to preſs a Man with Conſequences drawn from his own Principles or Conceſſions This is already known under the Name of *Argumentum ad hominem*.

Fourthly, The uſing of Proofs drawn from any of the Foundations of Knowledge or Probability. This I call *Argumentum ad Judicium*. This alone of all the

the Four, brings true inſtruction with it, and advances us in our Way to Knowledge. For *Firſt*, It argues not another Man's Opinion to be right, becauſe I, out of Reſpect, or any other Conſideration but that of Conviction, will not contradict him. *Secondly*, It proves not another Man to be in the right Way, nor that I ought to take the ſame with him, becauſe I know not a better. *Thirdly*, Nor does it follow, that another Man is in the right Way, becauſe he has ſhown me that I am in the wrong. I may be modeſt, and therefore not oppoſe another Man's Perſuaſion; I may be ignorant, and not be able to produce a better; I may be in an Errour, and another may ſhow me that I am ſo. This may diſpoſe me perhaps for the Reception of Truth, but helps me not to it; that muſt come from *Proofs* and *Arguments*, and Light ariſing from the Nature of Things themſelves; not from my Shame-facedneſs, Ignorance, or Errour.

By what has been ſaid of *Reaſon*, we may be able to make ſome gueſs at the Diſtinction of Things, into thoſe that are according to, above, and contrary to *Reaſon*. *According to Reaſon*, are ſuch Propoſitions, whoſe Truth we can diſcover, by examining and tracing thoſe Ideas we have from *Senſation* and *Reflection*, and by natural Deduction find to be true or probable. *Above Reaſon*, are ſuch Propoſitions, whoſe *Truth* or *Probability* we cannot by *Reaſon* derive from thoſe Principles. *Contrary to Reaſon*, are ſuch Propoſitions as are inconſiſtent with, or irreconcileable to, our clear and diſtinct *Ideas*. Thus the *Exiſtence of one God*, is according to *Reaſon*: The *Exiſtence of more than one God*, contrary to *Reaſon*: The *Reſurrection of the Body* after Death, above *Reaſon*. *Above Reaſon*, may be alſo taken in a double Senſe, *viz. Above Probability*, or *Certainty*. In that large Senſe alſo, *contrary to Reaſon*, is, I ſuppoſe, ſometimes taken.

There is another Uſe of the Word *Reaſon*, wherein it is oppoſed to *Faith*; which, though authorized by

by common Uſe, yet is, in itſelf, a very improper Way of Speaking: For *Faith* is nothing but a firm *Aſſent* of the Mind; which if it be regulated as is our Duty, cannot be afforded to any Thing but upon good *Reaſon*, and ſo cannot be oppoſite to it. He that believes without having any Reaſon for believing, may be in Love with his own Fancies; but neither ſeeks *Truth* as he ought, nor pays the Obedience due to his Maker, who would have him uſe thoſe diſcerning Faculties, he has given him, to keep him out of Miſtake and Errour. He that does not this to the beſt of his Power, however he ſometimes lights on Truth, is in the Right but by Chance; and I know not whether the Luckineſs of the Accident will excuſe the Irregularity of his Proceeding. This, at leaſt, is certain, that he muſt be accountable for whatever Miſtakes he runs into; whereas he that makes Uſe of the Light and Faculties GOD has given him, and ſeeks ſincerely to diſcover Truth by thoſe Helps and Abilities he has, may have this Satisfaction in doing his Duty as a rational Creature, that though he ſhould miſs Truth, he will not miſs the Reward of it: For he governs his Aſſent right, and places it as he ſhould, who, in any Caſe or Matter whatſoever, believes or diſbelieves according as *Reaſon* directs him. He that does otherwiſe, tranſgreſſes againſt his own Light, and miſuſes thoſe Faculties which were given to no other End, but to ſearch and follow the clearer Evidence, and greater Probability. But ſince *Reaſon* and *Faith* are by ſome Men oppoſed, we will ſo conſider them in the following *Chapter*.

CHAP. XVIII.

Of Faith and Reaſon, and their diſtinct Provinces.

FROM what has been juſt related, it is evident,

1. That we are, of Neceſſity, ignorant, and want Knowledge of all Sorts, where we want Ideas.

2. That

2. That we are ignorant, and want rational Knowledge, where we want Proofs. 3. That we want general Knowledge and Certainty, as far as we want clear and determined ſpecifick Ideas. 4. That we want Probability to direct our Aſſent in Matters where we have neither Knowledge of our own, nor Teſtimony of other Men to ground our Reaſon upon.

From theſe Things thus premiſed, I think we may come to lay down the Meaſures and Boundaries between Faith and Reaſon: The Want whereof may poſſibly have been the Cauſe, if not of great Diſorders, yet at leaſt of great Diſputes, and perhaps Miſtakes in the World: For till it be reſolved how far we are to be guided by Reaſon, and how far by Faith, we ſhall in vain diſpute, and endeavour to convince one another in Matters of Religion.

I find every Sect, as far as Reaſon will help them, make uſe of it gladly; and where it fails them, they cry out, *It is Matter of Faith, and above Reaſon.* And I do not ſee how they can argue with any one, or ever convince a Gain-ſayer, who makes Uſe of the ſame Plea, without ſetting down ſtrict Boundaries between Faith and Reaſon, which ought to be the firſt Point eſtabliſhed in all Queſtions, where Faith has any Thing to do.

Reaſon, as oppoſed to *Faith*, I take to be the Diſcovery of the *Certainty* or *Probability* of ſuch Propoſitions or Truths which the Mind arrives at by Deductions made from ſuch *Ideas*, which it has got by the Uſe of its natural Faculties, *viz.* by *Senſation* or *Reflection*.

Faith, on the other Side, is the Aſſent to any Propoſition, not thus made out by the Deductions of Reaſon, but upon the Credit of the Propoſer, as coming from GOD, in ſome extraordinary Way of Communication. This Way of diſcovering Truths to Men, we call *Revelation*.

Firſt,

First, That *no Man inſpired by* God, *can by any Revelation communicate to others, any new* ſimple Idea, which they had not before from *Senſation* or *Reflection*: For whatſoever Impreſſions he himſelf may have from the immediate Hand of God, this Revelation, if it be of new ſimple Ideas, cannot be conveyed to another, either by Words, or any other Signs; for Words, by their immediate Operation on us, cauſe no other Ideas but of their natural Sounds; and as *Signs* of latent Ideas, they can only recall to our Thoughts thoſe Ideas, which to us they have been wont to be Signs of; but cannot introduce any new, and formerly unknown, ſimple Ideas. The ſame holds good in all other *Signs*, which cannot ſignify to us Things of which we never before had any Idea.

Thus whatever Things were diſcovered to St. Paul when he was taken up into the third Heaven, whatever new Ideas his Mind there received, all the Deſcription he could give to others of that Place, was only this, that there are ſuch Things *as Eye hath not ſeen, nor Ear heard, nor hath it entered into the Heart of Man to conceive.* The great Creator has limited the human Species of this lower World to five Senſes, it cannot be ſuppoſed as an Impoſſibility that others of his Creatures elſe-where Inhabitants, may be endowed with an additional Senſe, of whoſe Perception we cannot have any Conception; as for our ſimple Ideas we muſt depend for them wholly upon our natural Faculties, and can by no Means receive them from *traditional Revelation*; I ſay *traditional*, in Diſtinction to *original Revelation*. By the *one*, I mean that Impreſſion which is made immediately by God on the Mind of any Man, to which we cannot ſet any Bounds. And by the *other*, thoſe Impreſſions delivered over to others in Words, and the ordinary Ways of conveying our Conceptions one to another.

Secondly, I ſay, that *the ſame Truths may be diſcovered by Revelation, which are diſcoverable to us by Reaſon*;

Reaſon; but in ſuch there is little Occaſion for, or Uſe of *Revelation*; God having furniſhed us with natural Means to arrive at the Knowledge of them: And Truths diſcovered by our natural Faculties, are more certain, than when conveyed to us by *traditional Revelation*. For the Knowledge we have, that this *Revelation* came at firſt from GOD, can never be ſo ſure as the Knowledge we have from the clear and diſtinct Perception of the Agreement or Diſagreement of our own Ideas. This alſo holds in Matters of Fact, knowable by our Senſes: As the *Hiſtory* of the *Deluge* is conveyed to us by Writings, which had their Original from *Revelation*; and yet no Body, I think, will ſay he has as certain and clear Knowledge of the *Flood*, as *Noah* that ſaw it, or that he himſelf would have had, had he then been alive and ſeen it. For he has no greater Aſſurance, than that of his *Senſes*, that it is written in the Book ſuppoſed to have been written by *Moſes* when inſpired. But he has not ſo great an Aſſurance that *Moſes* wrote that Book, as if he had ſeen *Moſes* write it; ſo that the Aſſurance of its being a *Revelation*, is ſtill leſs than the Aſſurance of his *Senſes*.

Revelation cannot be admitted againſt the clear Evidence of *Reaſon*. For ſince no Evidence of our Faculties, by which we receive ſuch a *Revelation*, can exceed, if equal the Certainty of our *intuitive* Knowledge; we can never receive for a Truth any Thing that is directly contrary to our clear and diſtinct Knowledge. Thus the Ideas of *one Body* and *one Place*, do ſo clearly agree, that we can never aſſent to a Propoſition that affirms *the ſame Body to be in two diſtinct Places at once*; however, it ſhould pretend to the Authority of a divine Revelation: Since the Evidence, *Firſt*, That we deceive not ourſelves in aſcribing it to *God*: *Secondly*, That we underſtand it right, can never be ſo great as the Evidence of our own *intuitive* Knowledge, whereby we diſcern it impoſſible for *the ſame Body to be in two Places at once*.

In Propoſitions, therefore, contrary to our diſtinct and clear Ideas, it will be in vain to urge them as Matters of Faith. For Faith can never convince us of any Thing that contradicts our Knowledge. Becauſe, though Faith be founded upon the Teſtimony of *God*, who cannot lie, yet we cannot have an Aſſurance of the Truth of its being a *divine Revelation*, greater than our own Knowledge. For if the Mind of Man can never have a clearer Evidence of any Thing to be a *divine Revelation*, than it has of the Principles of its own Reaſon; it can never have a Ground to quit the clear Evidence of its Reaſon, to give Place to a Propoſition, whoſe *Revelation* has not a greater Evidence than thoſe Principles have.

In all Things therefore where we have clear Evidence from our Ideas, and the Principles of Knowledge juſt mentioned, *Reaſon* is the proper Judge; and *Revelation* cannot, in ſuch Caſes, invalidate its Degrees; nor can we be obliged, where we have the clear and evident Sentence of Reaſon, to quit it for the contrary Opinion, under a Pretence that it is *Matter of Faith*, which can have no Authority againſt the plain and clear Dictates of *Reaſon*. But,

Thirdly, There being many Things of which we have but imperfect Notions, or none at all; and other Things, of whoſe paſt, preſent, or further Exiſtence, by the natural Uſe of our Faculties, we can have no Knowledge at all: Theſe, being beyond the *Diſcovery of our Faculties, and above Reaſon*, when revealed become the *proper Matter of Faith*. Thus, that Part of the Angels rebelled againſt *God*, and thereby loſt their firſt happy State; that the Bodies of Men ſhall riſe and live again, and the like, are purely Matters of Faith, with which Reaſon has directly nothing to do.

But ſince God in giving us the Light of Reaſon has not thereby debarred himſelf from affording us, when he thinks fit, the Light of Revelation in any

of

of thoſe Matters, wherein our natural Faculties are able to give a probable Determination; *Revelation*, where GOD has been pleaſed to give it, muſt carry it againſt the probable Conjectures of Reaſon, becauſe the Mind, not being certain of the Truth of that it does not evidently know, but only yielding to the Probability that appears in it, is bound to give its Aſſent to ſuch a Teſtimony; which, it is ſatisfied, comes from one who cannot err, and will not deceive. But yet it ſtill belongs to Reaſon, to judge of the Truth of its being a Revelation, and of the Signification of the Words wherein it is delivered. Indeed, if any Thing ſhall be thought Revelation, which is contrary to the plain Principles of Reaſon, and the evident Knowledge the Mind has of its own clear and diſtinct Ideas, there Reaſon muſt be hearkened to, as to a Matter within its Province. Since a Man can never have ſo certain a Knowledge, that a Propoſition, which contradicts the clear Principles and Evidence of his own Knowledge, was divinely revealed, or that he underſtands the Words rightly, wherein it is delivered, as he has, that the contrary is true; and ſo is bound to conſider and judge of it as a Matter of Reaſon, and not implicitly believe, as a Matter of Faith, without Examination.

Firſt then, Whatever Propoſition is revealed, of whoſe Truth our Mind, by its natural Faculties and Notions, cannot judge, that is purely Matter of Faith and above Reaſon.

Secondly, All Propoſitions, whereof the Mind, by its natural Faculties, can come to determine and judge from natural acquired Ideas, are *Matter of Reaſon*; but with this Difference; that in thoſe concerning which it has but an uncertain Evidence, and ſo is perſuaded of their Truth only upon probable Grounds, which ſtill admit a Poſſibility of the contrary to be true, without doing Violence to the certain Evidence of its own Knowledge, and over-

turning the Principles of all Reaſon, in ſuch probable Propoſitions; I ſay, an *evident Revelation ought to determine our Aſſent*, even againſt *Probability*. For where the Principles of Reaſon have not evidenced a Propoſition to be certainly true or falſe, there clear Revelation, as another Principle of Truth, and Ground of Aſſent, may determine; and ſo it may be *Matter* of *Faith*, and be alſo above Reaſon, becauſe Reaſon, in that particular Matter, being able to reach no higher than Probability, *Faith* gave the Determination where *Reaſon* came ſhort; and *Revelation* diſcovered on which Side the Truth lay.

Thus far the Dominion of Faith reaches; and that without any Violence to *Reaſon*, which is not injured or diſturbed, but aſſiſted and improved by new Diſcoveries of Truth, coming from the *eternal Fountain* of all Knowledge. Whatever *God* hath revealed is certainly true; no Doubt can be made of it. This is the proper Object of *Faith*: But whether it be a divine Revelation or no, *Reaſon* muſt judge; which can never permit the Mind to reject a greater Evidence, to embrace what is leſs evident, nor prefer leſs Certainty to the greater. There can be no Evidence, that any traditional *Revelation* is of divine Original, in the Words we receive it, and the Senſe we underſtand it, ſo clear and ſo certain, as that of the Principles of *Reaſon:* And therefore, *Nothing that is contrary to the clear and ſelf-evident Dictates of* Reaſon, *has a Right to be urged or aſſented to, as a Matter of Faith, wherein* Reaſon *has not any thing to do.* Whatſoever is divine *Revelation*, ought to over-rule all our Opinions, Prejudices and Intereſts, and hath a Right to be received with a full *Aſſent*. Such a Submiſſion as this, of our *Reaſon* to *Faith*, takes not away the Land-marks of Knowledge: This ſhakes not the Foundation of Reaſon, but leaves us that Uſe of our Faculties, for which they were given us.

If the Provinces of *Faith* and *Reaſon* are not kept diſtinct by theſe Boundaries, there will, in Matters of

of Religion, be no Room for Reaſon at all; and thoſe extravagant Opinions and Ceremonies, that are to be found in the ſeveral Religions of the World, will not deſerve to be blamed. For, to this crying up of Faith, in Oppoſition to Reaſon, we may, I think, in a good Meaſure, aſcribe thoſe Abſurdities that fill almoſt all the Religions which poſſeſs and divide Mankind. For Men, having been principled with an Opinion, that they muſt not conſult Reaſon in the Things of Religion, however apparently contradictory to common Senſe, and the very Principles of all their Knowledge, have let looſe their Fancies, and natural Superſtition; and have been, by them, led into ſo ſtrange Opinions, and extravagant Practices in Religion, that a conſiderate Man cannot but ſtand amazed at their Follies, and judge them ſo far from being acceptable to the great and wiſe GOD, that he cannot avoid thinking them ridiculous, and offenſive to a ſober good Man. So that, in Effect, Religion, which ſhould moſt diſtinguiſh us from Beaſts, and ought moſt peculiarly to elevate us, as rational Creatures, above Brutes, is that wherein Men often appear moſt irrational, and more ſenſeleſs than Beaſts themſelves. *Credo, quia impoſſibile eſt: I believe, becauſe it is impoſſible*, might, in a good Man, paſs for a Sally of Zeal; but would prove a very ill Rule for Men to chooſe their Opinions, or Religion, by.

CHAP. XIX.

Of Enthuſiaſm.

HE that would ſeriouſly ſet about the Search of Truth, ought in the firſt Place to prepare his Mind with a Love of it. For he that loves it not, will not take much Pains to acquire it, nor be much concerned when he loſes it. There is no one who does not profeſs himſelf a Lover of Truth, and that would not take it amiſs to be thought otherwiſe.

And yet, notwithſtanding, one may truly ſay, there are very few Lovers of Truth for Truth's Sake, even amongſt thoſe who perſuade themſelves that they are ſo. How a Man may know whether he be ſo, in earneſt, is worthy Inquiry: And, I think, there is this one unerring Mark of it, *viz.* The not entertaining any Propoſition with greater Aſſurance than the Proofs it is built upon will warrant. Whoever goes beyond this Meaſure of Aſſent, 'tis plain, receives not Truth in the Love of it: For the Evidence that any Propoſition is true (except ſuch as are ſelf-evident) lieing only in the Proofs a Man has of it, whatever Degrees of Aſſent he affords it, beyond the Degrees of that Evidence, 'tis plain all the Aſſurances that exceed this, are owing to ſome other Affection, and not to the Love of Truth. Whatever Credit we give to any Propoſition more than it receives from the Principles and Proofs it ſupports itſelf upon, is owing to our Inclinations that Way, and is, ſo far, a Deviation from the Love of Truth as ſuch: Which as it can receive no Evidence from our Paſſions or Intereſts, ſo it ſhould receive no Tincture from them.

The aſſuming an Authority of Dictating to others, and a Forwardneſs to preſcribe to their Opinions, is a conſtant Concomitant of this Bias and Corruption of our Judgments. For how can it be otherwiſe, but that he ſhould be ready to impoſe on another's Belief, who has already impoſed on his own? Who can reaſonably expect Arguments and Conviction from him, in Dealing with others, whoſe Underſtanding is not accuſtomed to them in his Dealing with himſelf? Who does Violence to his own Faculties, tyrannizes over his own Mind, and uſurps the Prerogative that belongs to Truth alone, which is to command Aſſent by only its own Authority, *i. e.* by, and in Proportion to, that Evidence which it carries with it.

Upon this Occaſion I ſhall conſider a third Ground of Aſſent, which, with ſome Men, has the ſame Authority

as either *Faith* or *Reaſon*, I mean, *Enthuſiaſm*; which, laying aſide *Reaſon*, would ſet up Revelation without it. Whereby, in Effect, it takes away both Reaſon and Revelation, and ſubſtitutes, in the Room of it, the ungrounded Fancies of a Man's own Brain, and aſſumes them for a Foundation both of Opinion and Conduct.

Reaſon is natural Revelation, whereby the eternal Father of Light, and Fountain of all Knowledge, communicates to Mankind that Portion of Truth, which he has laid within the Reach of their natural Faculties. Revelation is natural Reaſon enlarged by a new Set of Diſcoveries communicated by GOD immediately, which Reaſon vouches the Truth of, by the Teſtimony and Proofs it gives, that they come from GOD. So that he that takes away Reaſon, to make Way for Revelation, puts out the Light of both, and does much the ſame, as if he would perſuade a Man to put out his Eyes, the better to receive the Light of an inviſible Star by a Teleſcope.

Immediate Revelation being a much eaſier Way for Men to eſtabliſh their Opinions, and regulate their Conduct, than the tedious Labour of ſtrict Reaſoning, it is no Wonder that ſome have been very apt to pretend to it; eſpecially in ſuch of their Actions and Opinions as they cannot account for by the ordinary Methods of Knowledge and Principles of Reaſon. Hence we ſee that, in all Ages, Men in whom Melancholy has mixed with Devotion, or whoſe Conceit of themſelves has raiſed them into an Opinion of a greater Familiarity with God than is allowed others, have often flattered themſelves with a Perſuaſion of an immediate Intercourſe with the Almighty, and frequent Communications from the Divine Spirit. Their Minds being thus prepared, whatever Opinion, however ſo groundleſs, comes to ſettle ſtrongly upon their Fancies, is an Illumination from the Spirit of God; and whatſoever odd Action they find, in themſelves, a ſtrong Inclination to do, that Impulſe is concluded to be a Call or Direction

rection from Heaven, and muſt be obeyed. This I take to be properly *Enthuſiaſm*, which, though riſing from the Conceit of a warm, or overweening Brain, works, where it once gets Footing, more powerfully on the Perſuaſions and Actions of Men, than either Reaſon or Revelation, or both together; Men being moſt forwardly obedient to the Impulſes they receive from themſelves. Strong Conceit, like a new Principle, carries all eaſily with it; when got above common Senſe, and free from all Reſtraint of Reaſon, and Check of Reflection, it is heightened into a divine Authority, in Concurrence with our own Temper and Inclination.

When Men are once got into this Way of immediate Revelation, of Illumination without Search, and of Certainty without Proof, 'tis a hard Matter to get them out of it. Reaſon is loſt upon them, they are above it: They ſee the *Light* infuſed into their Underſtandings, and cannot be miſtaken; 'tis clear and viſible there, like the Light of bright Sun-ſhine; ſhows itſelf, and needs no other Proof, but its own Evidence: They feel the Hand of God moving them within, and the Impulſes of the Spirit, and cannot be miſtaken in what they feel. Thus they ſupport themſelves, and are ſure Reaſon hath nothing to do with what they ſee and feel in themſelves; what they have a ſenſible Experience of, admits no Doubt, and needs no other Evidence. This Light from Heaven is ſtrong, clear, and pure; carries its own Demonſtration with it; and we may as rationally take a Glow-worm to aſſiſt us to diſcover the Sun, as to examine the celeſtial Ray by our dim Candle, Reaſon.

This is the Way of talking of theſe Men; they are ſure *becauſe* they are ſure: And their Perſuaſions are right, only becauſe they are ſtrong in them. For when what they ſay is ſtripped of the Metaphor of ſeeing and feeling, this is all it amounts to; and yet theſe Similies ſo impoſe on them, that they ſerve for Certainty in themſelves, and Demonſtration to others.

But

But to examine, a little ſoberly, this internal Light, and this Feeling on which they build ſo much. Theſe Men have, they ſay, clear Light, and they ſee; They have an awakened Senſe, and they feel: This cannot, they are ſure, be diſputed them. But here let me aſk: Is this ſeeing the Perception of the Truth of the Propoſition, or of this, that it is a Revelation from God? Is this Feeling a Perception of an Inclination to do ſomething, or of the Spirit of God moving that Inclination? Theſe are two very different Perceptions, and muſt be carefully diſtinguiſhed. I may perceive the Truth of a Propoſition, and yet not perceive that it is an immediate Revelation from God Nay I may perceive I came not by it in a natural Way, without perceiving that it is a Revelation from God. Becauſe there are Spirits, which without being divinely commiſſioned, may excite thoſe Ideas in me, and make their Connexion perceived. So that the Knowledge of any Propoſition coming into my Mind I know not how, is not a Perception that it is from God. But however it be called Light and Seeing; I ſuppoſe it is, at moſt, but Belief and Aſſurance. For where a Propoſition is known to be true, Revelation is needleſs. If therefore it be a Propoſition which they are perſuaded, but do not know, to be true, it is not ſeeing but believing. What I ſee, I know to be ſo by the Evidence of the Thing itſelf: What I believe, I take to be ſo upon the Teſtimony of another: But this Teſtimony I muſt know to be given, or elſe what Ground have I of believing? I muſt ſee that it is God that reveals this to me, or elſe I ſee nothing. The Queſtion then here is, how do I know that God is the Revealer of this to me; that this Impreſſion is made upon my Mind by his holy Spirit, and that therefore I ought to obey it? If I know not this, how great ſoever my Aſſurance is, it is groundleſs: Whatever Light I pretend to, it is but *Enthuſiaſm*. For whether the Propoſition, ſuppoſed to be revealed, be, in itſelf, evidently true, or viſibly probable, or by the natural Ways of Knowledge

ledge uncertain, the Propoſition that muſt be well-grounded, and manifeſted to be true, is this, that GOD is the Revealer of it, and that what I take to be a Revelation, is certainly put into my Mind by him, and is not an Illuſion, dropped in by ſome other Spirit, or raiſed by my own Fancy. For, if I miſtake not, theſe Men receive it for true, becauſe they preſume GOD revealed it. Is it not then Incumbent upon them, to examine upon what Grounds they preſume it to be a Revelation from GOD? Or elſe all their Confidence is mere Preſumption; and this Light they are ſo dazzled with, is nothing but an *ignis fatuus*, that leads them continually round in this Circle. It is a Revelation, becauſe they firmly believe it; and they believe it, becauſe it is a Revelation.

In all that is of divine Revelation, there is Need of no other Proof, but that it is from God: For he can neither deceive nor be deceived. But how ſhall it be known that any Propoſition in our Minds is a Truth revealed to us by God? Here it is that *Enthuſiaſm* fails of the Evidence it pretends to. For Men thus poſſeſſed boaſt of a Light, whereby they ſay they are brought into the Knowledge of this or that Truth. But if they know it to be a Truth, they muſt know it to be ſo, either by its own Self-Evidence, or by the rational Proofs that make it out to be ſo. If they know it to be a Truth, either of theſe two Ways, they in vain ſuppoſe it to be a Revelation. For thus all Truths of what Kind ſoever, that Men uninſpired are enlightened with, come into their Minds. If they ſay they know it to be true, becauſe it is a Revelation from God, the Reaſon is good: But then it will be demanded, how they know it to be a Revelation from God. If they ſay by the Light it brings with it, I beſeech them to conſider, whether this be any more, than that it is a Revelation becauſe they ſtrongly believe it to be true. For all the Light they ſpeak of, is but a ſtrong Perſuaſion

ſuaſion of their own Minds that it is a Truth, which is a very unſafe Ground to proceed on, either in our Tenets or Actions.

This cannot be otherwiſe, whilſt Firmneſs of Perſuaſion is made the Cauſe of believing, and Confidence of being in the right, is made an Argument of Truth. St. Paul himſelf believed he did well, and that he had a Call to it when he perſecuted the Chriſtians, whom he confidently thought in the wrong: But yet it was he, and not they, who were miſtaken. Good Men are Men ſtill, liable to Miſtakes, and are ſometimes warmly engaged in Errours, which they take for divine Truths, ſhining in their Minds with the cleareſt Light.

True Light in the Mind, is nothing elſe but the *Evidence* of the Truth of any Propoſition; And if it be not ſelf-evident, all the Light it can have is from Clearneſs of thoſe Proofs upon which it is received. To talk of any other Light in the Underſtanding, is to put ourſelves in the Dark, or in the Power of the Prince of Darkneſs, and, by our own Conſent, to give ourſelves up to Deluſion, to believe a Lie: For if Strength of Perſuaſion be the Light which muſt guide us, I aſk how ſhall any one diſtinguiſh between the Deluſions of *Satan*, and the Inſpirations of the Holy Ghoſt? He, therefore, that will not give up himſelf to Deluſion and Errour, muſt bring this Guide of his *Light within* to the Trial. God, when he makes the Prophet, does not unmake the Man. He leaves his Faculties in their natural State to enable him to judge of his Inſpirations, whether they be of divine Original or no. If he would have us aſſent to the Truth of any Propoſition, he either evidences that Truth by the uſual Methods of natural Reaſon, or elſe makes it known to be a Truth which he would have us aſſent to by his Authority; and convinces us that it is from him, by ſome Marks, which Reaſon cannot be miſtaken in. Reaſon muſt be our laſt Judge and Guide in every Thing. I do not mean that we muſt conſult Reaſon,

ſon, and examine whether a Propoſition revealed from God can be made out by natural Principles, and if it cannot, that then we may reject it: But conſult it we muſt, and by it examine, whether it be a Revelation from God or no; and if Reaſon finds it to be revealed from God, Reaſon then declares for it, as much as for any other Truth, and makes it one of her Dictates. Every Conceit that thoroughly warms our Fancies muſt paſs for an Inſpiration, if there be nothing but the Strength of our Perſuaſions whereby to judge of them: If Reaſon muſt not examine their Truth by ſomething extrinſical to the Perſuaſions themſelves, Inſpirations and Deluſions, Truth and Falſehood, will have the ſame Meaſure, and will not be poſſible to be diſtinguiſhed.

If this internal Light, or any Propoſition which under that Title we take for inſpired, be conformable to the Principles of Reaſon, or to the Word of God, which is atteſted Revelation, Reaſon warrants it, and we may ſafely receive it for true, and be guided by it in our Belief and Actions: If it receives no Teſtimony nor Evidence from either of theſe Rules, we cannot take it for a Revelation, or ſo much as for true, till we have ſome other Mark that it is a Revelation, beſides our believing that it is ſo. Thus we ſee the holy Men of God, who had Revelations from God, had ſomething elſe beſides that internal Light of Aſſurance in their own Minds, to teſtify to them that it was from God. They had outward Signs to convince them of the Author of thoſe Revelations. And when they were to convince others, they had a Power given them to juſtify the Truth of their Commiſſion from Heaven; and, by viſible Signs, to aſſert the divine Authority of the Meſſage they were ſent with. *Moſes* ſaw the Buſh burn without being conſumed, and heard a Voice out of it. God, by another Miracle of his Rod turned into a Serpent, aſſured him, likewiſe, of a Power to teſtify his Miſſion by the ſame Miracle repeated

repeated before them, to whom he was ſent. This, and the like Inſtances to be found among the Prophets of old, are enough to ſhow, that they thought not an inward Seeing or Perſuaſion of their own Minds a ſufficient Evidence, without any other Proof, that it was from God, though the *Scripture* does not every where mention their demanding or having ſuch Proofs.

I do not deny that God can, or doth ſometimes enlighten Mens Minds in the apprehending of certain Truths, or excite them to good Actions by the immediate Influence and Aſſiſtance of the Holy Spirit, without any extraordinary Signs accompanying it. But in ſuch Caſes too we have Reaſon and the Scriptures, unerring Rules to know whether it be from God or no. Where the Truth embraced is conſonant to the Revelation in the written Word of God; or the Action conformable to the Dictates of right Reaſon, or Holy Writ, we run no Riſk in entertaining it as ſuch; becauſe though perhaps it be not an immediate Revelation from God, extraordinarily operating on our Minds, yet we are ſure it is warranted by that Revelation which he has given us of Truth. Where Reaſon or Scripture is expreſs for any Opinion or Action, we may receive it as of divine Authority: But 'tis not the Strength of our own Perſuaſions which can by itſelf give it that Stamp. The Bent of our own Minds may favour it as much as we pleaſe; that may ſhow it to be a Fondling of our own, but will by no Means prove it to be an *Offspring* of Heaven, and of divine Original.

CHAP. XX.

Of wrong Aſſent or Errour.

KNOWLEDGE being to be had only of viſible certain Truth, *Errour* is not a Fault of our

Knowledge, but a Miſtake of our Judgment, in giving *Aſſent* to that which is not true.

But if *Aſſent* be grounded on Likelihood, if the proper Object and Motive of our *Aſſent* be Probability, and that Probability conſiſts in what is laid down in the foregoing Chapters, it will be demanded, how Men come to give their *Aſſent* contrary to Probability. For there is nothing more common than Contrariety of Opinions; nothing more obvious, than that one Man wholly diſbelieves what another only doubts of, and a third ſtedfaſtly believes, and firmly adheres to. The Reaſons whereof, though they may be various, yet, I ſuppoſe, may all be reduced to theſe four; Firſt, *Want of Proofs*. Secondly, *Want of Abilities to uſe them*. Thirdly, *Want of Will to uſe them*. Fourthly, *Wrong Meaſures of Probability*.

Firſt, *Want of Proofs*; by which I do not mean only the Want of thoſe Proofs which are not to be had, but alſo of thoſe Proofs which are in Being, or might be procured. The greateſt Part of Mankind want the Conveniencies and Opportunities of making Experiments and Obſervations themſelves, or of collecting the Teſtimonies of others, being enſlaved to the Neceſſity of their mean Condition, whoſe Lives are worn out only in the Proviſion for Living. Theſe Men are by the Conſtitution of human Affairs, unavoidably given over to invincible Ignorance of thoſe Proofs on which others build, and which are neceſſary to eſtabliſh thoſe Opinions. For having much to do to get the Means of living, they are not in a Condition to look after thoſe of learned and laborious Inquiries.

It is true, that GOD has furniſhed Men with Faculties ſufficient to direct them in the Way they ſhould take, if they will but ſeriouſly employ them that Way, when their ordinary Vocations allow them Leiſure. No Man is ſo wholly taken up with the Attendance on the Means of living, as to have

no

no ſpare Time at all to think on his *Soul*, and inform himſelf in Matters of Religion, were Men as intent on theſe as they are on Things of far leſs Importance, There are none ſo enſlaved to the Neceſſities of Life, who might not find many Vacancies that might be well managed to this Knowledge.

Secondly, Want of *Ability* to uſe them. There are many who cannot carry a Train of Conſequences in their Heads, nor weigh exactly the Force of contrary Proofs and Teſtimonies. Theſe cannot diſcern that Side on which the ſtrongeſt Proofs lie; nor follow that which in itſelf is the moſt probable Opinion. It is certain, that there is a wide Difference in Mens Underſtandings, Apprehenſions and Reaſonings, to a very great Latitude, ſo that one may, without doing Injury to Mankind, affirm, that there is a greater Diſtance between ſome Men and others in this Reſpect, than between ſome Men and ſome Beaſts: But how this comes about is a Speculation, though of great Conſequence, yet not neceſſary to our preſent Purpoſe.

Thirdly, For Want of Will to uſe them. Some, though they have Opportunities and Leiſure enough, and want neither Parts nor Learning, nor other Helps, are yet never the better for them, and never come to the Knowledge of ſeveral Truths that lie within their Reach; either upon Account of their hot Purſuit of Pleaſure, conſtant Drudgery in Buſineſs, Lazineſs and Careleſſneſs in general, or a particular Averſion from Books and Study: And ſome out of Fear that an impartial Inquiry would not favour thoſe Opinions, which beſt ſuit their Prejudices, Lives, Deſigns, Intereſts, *&c.* as many Men forbear to caſt up their Accounts, who have Reaſon to fear that their Affairs are in no very good poſture.

How Men, whoſe plentiful Fortunes allow them Leiſure to improve their Underſtandings, can ſatisfy themſelves with a lazy Ignorance, I cannot tell: But methinks they have a low Opinion of their

Souls, who lay out all their Incomes in Provisions for the Body, and employ none of it to procure the Means and Helps of Knowledge. I will not here mention how unreasonable this is for Men that never think of a future State, and their Concernment in it, which no rational Man can avoid to do sometimes: Nor shall I take Notice what a Shame it is to the greatest Contemners of Knowledge, to be found ignorant in Things they are concerned to know. But this, at least, is worth the Consideration of those who call themselves Gentlemen; that however they may think Credit, Respect, and Authority the Concomitants of their Birth and Fortune: Yet they will find all these still carried away from them by Men of lower Condition who surpass them in Knowledge. They who are blind, will always be led by those that see, or else fall in the Ditch: And he is certainly the most subjected, the most enslaved, who is so in his Understanding. In the foregoing Instances, some of the Causes have been shown of wrong Assent, and how it comes to pass, that probable Doctrines are not always received with an Assent proportionable to the Reasons which are to be had for their Probability: But hitherto we have considered only the Probabilities, whose Proofs do exist, but do not appear to him that embraces the Error.

Fourthly, There remains yet the last Sort, who, even where the real Probabilities appear, and are plainly laid before them, do not admit of the Conviction, nor yield unto manifest Reasons, but do either ἐπέχειν, Suspend their Assent, or give it to the less probable Opinion. And to this Danger are those exposed, who have taken up wrong Measures of Probability, which are,

First, *Propositions that are not in themselves certain and evident, but doubtful and false, taken for Principles.* Propositions looked on as Principles, have so great an Influence upon our Opinions, that it is usually by them we judge of Truth; and what is incon-

inconſiſtent with them, is ſo far from paſſing for probable with us, that it will not be allowed poſſible. The Reverence borne to theſe Principles is ſo great, that the Teſtimony, not only of other Men, but the Evidence of our own Senſes is often rejected, when it offers to vouch any Thing contrary to theſe eſtabliſhed Rules. The great Obſtinacy that is to be found in Men, firmly believing quite contrary Opinions, though many Times equally abſurd in the various Religions of Mankind, is as evident a Proof, as it is an unavoidable Conſequence of this Way of Reaſoning from received traditional Principles. So that Men will diſbelieve their own Eyes, renounce the Evidence of their Senſes, and give their own Experience the Lie, rather than admit of any Thing diſagreeing with theſe ſacred Tenets.

Secondly, *Received Hypotheſes*. The Difference between theſe and the former, is, that thoſe who proceed by theſe, will admit of Matter of Fact, and agree with Diſſenters in that; but differ in aſſigning of Reaſons, and explaining the Manner of Operation. Theſe are not at that open Defiance with their *Senſes* as the former: They can endure to hearken to their Information a little more patiently; but will by no Means admit of their Reports in the Explanation of Things; nor be prevailed on by *Probabilities* which would convince them, that Things are not brought about juſt after the ſame Manner that they have decreed within themſelves that they are. There is nothing more familiar than this. The Inſtances of Men contending for different Opinions, which they all derive from the infallible Truth of the Scripture, are an undeniable Proof of it. All that call themſelves Chriſtians, allow the Text that ſays, μετανοεῖτε, to carry in it the Obligation of a very weighty Duty. But how erroneous and different muſt their Opinions and Practices be, who underſtanding no other Language but the French, take for their Guide the following Tranſla-

tion of the Greek, *repentez vous*, repent ye: While others follow that of *faitiez penitence*, do Penance.

Thirdly, *Predominant Paſſions or Inclinations:* Let ever ſo much *Probability* preponderate on one Side of a *covetous* Man's Reaſoning, and *Money*, on the other, it is eaſy to foreſee which will prevail. Tho' Men cannot always openly refute, or reſiſt the Force of manifeſt *Probabilities* that make againſt them, yet yield they not to the Argument. Not but that it is the Nature of the Underſtanding, conſtantly to cloſe with the more probable Side: But yet a Man hath Power to ſuſpend and reſtrain its Inquiries, and not permit a full and ſatisfactory Examination. Until that be done, there will be always theſe *two Ways* left for evading the moſt *apparent Probabilities*.

Firſt, That the Arguments being brought in Words, there may be *Fallacy* latent in them; and the Conſequences being perhaps many in Train, may be ſome of them incoherent. There are few Diſcourſes ſo ſhort and clear, to which Men may not with Satisfaction enough to themſelves raiſe this Doubt, and from whoſe Conviction they may not, without Reproach of Diſingenuity or Unreaſonableneſs, ſet themſelves free.

Secondly, Manifeſt *Probabilities* may be evaded upon this Suggeſtion, that *I know not yet all that may be ſaid on the contrary Side:* And therefore, tho' a Man be beaten, it is not neceſſary he ſhould yield, not knowing what Forces there are in Reſerve behind. This is a Refuge againſt Conviction, ſo open and ſo wide, that it is hard to determine, when a Man is quite out of the Verge of it.

As Knowledge is no more arbitrary than Perception; ſo, I think, *Aſſent* is no more in our Power than Knowledge. When the Agreement of any two Ideas appears to our Minds, whether immediately, or by the Aſſiſtance of Reaſon, I can no more refuſe to perceive, no more avoid knowing it, than I can avoid ſeeing thoſe Objects which I turn my

my Eyes to, and look on in Day light: And what, upon full Examination, I find the moſt probable, I cannot deny my Aſſent to. But though we cannot hinder our Knowledge, where the Agreement is once perceived; nor our Aſſent, where the Probability manifeſtly appears upon due Conſideration of all the Meaſures of it; yet we can hinder both Knowledge and Aſſent, by ſtopping our Inquiry, and not employing our Faculties in the Search of any Truth. If it were not ſo, Ignorance, Errour, or Infidelity, could not in any Caſe be a Fault; but where Men will act otherwiſe, and not ſubmit to this Indolence, the greater Probability, I think, in that Caſe, will determine the Aſſent; and a Man can no more avoid aſſenting, or taking it to be true, where he perceives the greater Probability, than he can avoid knowing it to be true, where he perceives the Agreement or Diſagreement of any two Ideas. If this be ſo, the Foundation of Errour will lie in wrong Meaſures of Probability; as the Foundation of Vice in wrong Meaſures of good.

Fourthly, *Authority*, or the *giving up our Aſſent to the common received Opinions*, either of our Friends or Party, Neighbourhood or Country. How many Men have no other Ground for their Tenets, than the ſuppoſed Honeſty, or Learning, or Number of theſe of the ſame Profeſſion? As if honeſt or learned Men could not err; or Truth were to be eſtabliſhed by the Vote of the Multitude. Yet this with moſt Men ſerves the Turn. All Men are liable to Error, and moſt Men are in many Points by *Paſſion* or *Intereſt* under Temptation to it. This is certain, that there is not an Opinion ſo abſurd, which a Man may not receive upon this Ground; there is no Errour to be named, which has not had its Profeſſors. And a Man ſhall never want crooked Paths to walk in, if he thinks that he is in the right Way, wherever he has the Footſteps of others to follow. But, notwithſtanding the great Noiſe in the World about Errours and Opinions, I muſt do mankind that

that right, as to ſay, there are not *ſo many Men in Errours and wrong Opinions, as is commonly ſuppoſed*: Not that I think they embrace the Truth, but indeed, becauſe concerning thoſe Doctrines they keep ſuch a Stir about, they have *no Thought, no Opinion at all.* For if any one ſhould a little catechize the greateſt Part of the *Partiſans* of moſt of the Sects in the World, he would not find, concerning thoſe Matters they are ſo zealous for, that they have any Opinions of their own: Much leſs would he have Reaſon to think that they took them upon the Examination of Arguments, and Appearances of Probability. They are reſolved to ſtick to a Party, that Education or Intereſt has engaged them in: And there, like the common Soldiers of an Army, ſhow their Courage and Warmth, as their Leaders direct, without ever examining, or ſo much as knowing the Cauſe they contend for. If a Man's Life ſhows that he has no ſerious Regard for Religion; for what Reaſon ſhould we think, that he beats his Head about the Opinions of his Church, and troubles himſelf to examine the Grounds of this or that Doctrine? It is enough for him to obey his Leaders, to have his Hand and his Tongue ready for the Support of the common Cauſe, and thereby approve himſelf to thoſe who can give him Credit, Preferment or Protection in that Society. Thus Men become Profeſſors of, and Combatants for thoſe Opinions, they were never convinced of, nor Proſelytes to; no, nor ever had ſo much as floating in their Heads; and though one cannot ſay there are fewer improbable or erroneous Opinions in the World than there are, yet this is certain, there are fewer that actually aſſent to them, and miſtake them for Truths, than is imagined.

CHAP.

CHAP. XXI.

Of the Diviſion of the Sciences.

ALL that can fall within the Compaſs of human Underſtanding, being either, *Firſt*, The Nature of Things, their Relations, and their Manner of Operation: Or, *Secondly*, That which Man himſelf ought to do as a rational and voluntary Agent for the Attainment of any End, eſpecially *Happineſs*: Or, *Thirdly*, The Ways and Means whereby the Knowledge of both of theſe are attained and communicated: I think *Science* may be properly divided into theſe *three Sorts*.

Firſt, The Knowledge of Things, their Conſtitutions, Properties, and Operations, whether material or immaterial: This, in a little more enlarged Senſe of the Word, I call φυσικὴ or *Natural Philoſophy*. The End of this is bare *Speculative Truth*, and whatſoever can afford the Mind of Man any ſuch, falls under this Branch: Whether it be God himſelf, *Angels*, *Spirits*, *Bodies*, or any of their Affections, as *Number*, *Figure*, &c.

Secondly, Πρακτικὴ, the Skill of right-applying our own Powers and Actions for the Attainment of Things good and uſeful. The moſt conſiderable under this Head, is *Ethicks*, which is the ſeeking out thoſe Rules and Meaſures of human Actions which lead to *Happineſs*, and the Means to practiſe them. The End of this is not bare *Speculation*, and the Knowledge of Truth; but *right*, and a Conduct ſuitable thereto.

Thirdly, The third Branch may be called Σημιωτικὴ, or the *Doctrine of Signs*, the moſt uſual whereof being Words, it is aptly enough termed alſo Λογικὴ, *Logick*; the Buſineſs whereof is to conſider the Nature of Signs the Mind makes Uſe of for the Underſtanding of Things, or conveying its Knowledge

to

to others. For ſince the Things the Mind contemplates are none of them, beſides itſelf, preſent to the Underſtanding, it is neceſſary that ſomething elſe, as a Sign or Repreſentation of the Thing it conſiders, ſhould be preſent to it; and theſe are Ideas. And becauſe the Scene of Ideas that makes one Man's Thoughts, cannot be laid open to the immediate View of another, nor laid up any where but in the Memory, a no very ſure Repoſitory; therefore, to communicate our Thoughts to one another, as well as record them for our own Uſe, Signs of our Ideas are alſo neceſſary. Thoſe which Men have found moſt convenient, and therefore generally make Uſe of, are *articulate Sounds*. The Conſideration then of Ideas and Words, as the great Inſtruments of Knowledge, makes no deſpicable Part of their Contemplation, who would take a View of human Knowledge, in the whole Extent of it. And perhaps if they were diſtinctly weighed, and duly conſidered, they would afford us another Sort of *Logick* and *Criticiſm*, than what we have been hitherto acquainted with.

This ſeems to me the *firſt and moſt general, as well as natural Diviſion* of the Objects of our Underſtanding. For a Man can employ his Thoughts about nothing, but either the Contemplation of Things themſelves for the Diſcovery of Truth, or about the Things in his own Power, which are his *Actions* for the Attainment of his own Ends; or the *Signs* the Mind makes Uſe of, both in the one and the other, and the right ordering of them for its clearer Information. All which *three*, viz. *Things*, as they are in themſelves, knowable: *Actions*, as they depend on us in Order to Happineſs, and the right Uſe of *Signs*, in Order to Knowledge, being *Toto Cœlo* different, they ſeemed to me to be the three great Provinces of the *intellectual* World wholly ſeparate, and diſtinct one from another.

F I N I S.